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“If only the problem of food supply could be solved by large applications of capital to vast 
acreage of land; if only capital could ‘overcome any obstacle,’ then the world hunger 
problem might be alleviated with extraordinary rapidity” 







Agriculture is the mainstay of rural households in developing countries. It accounts 
for the bulk of the total labor force in most of these countries (Gollin, 2010). In sub-
Saharan Africa, nearly two-thirds of the total income of rural households is 
generated through on-farm agriculture (Davis et al., 2017). Despite the importance of 
this sector, its productivity often remains low and many rural areas underdeveloped. 
Various scholarly works have been put forward to explain how smallholders’ 
productivity and contribution to economic development can be enhanced. Most 
prominent among these, is the theory by Johnston and Mellor (1961) and Mellor 
(1966) that argues that the introduction of modern technology would enhance the 
efficiency of smallholder agriculture and thereby foster economic growth. Within 
this model, growth would be spurred on through the creation of linkages in inputs 
and outputs between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In a similar vein, 
one of the most well-known advocates of investments in small-scale agriculture, 




Theodore Schultz, argued that economic growth would be achieved through 
investments in the quality of inputs, increasing smallholders’ access to knowledge 
and through the provision of incentives (Schultz, 1964; 1980). In his seminal book on 
Transforming Traditional Agriculture, he stated that “The farmer who has access to 
and knows how to use what science knows about soils, plants, animals, and 
machines can produce an abundance of food though the land be poor ...”(Schultz, 
1964, p. 3).  
These views that place smallholders at the center of development challenged earlier 
development models by Lewis (1954), and Ranis and Fei (1961) on dual economies 
that regarded family farm workers as part of a subsistence sector that is 
characterized by excess labor, low marginal productivity and low wages. Lewis 
(1954)’s model posited that as the economy develops, smallholders would be 
absorbed by the more productive capitalist sector that included plantations and 
large-scale farms. Based on this growth theory, the market economy would push 
unproductive smallholders out of the stagnant subsistence sector (Timmer, 1988; 
Bryceson, 2000; Ellis and Biggs, 2001). 
Today, few would dispute the important role that agriculture plays in fueling a 
structural transformation which would result in the movement of workers and 
resources from agriculture into more productive sectors (Gollin, 2010). What 
remains more contentious, however, is the type of farming system that will fuel this 
transformation. Based on the extensive size and direct poverty reducing impacts of 
smallholder agriculture, approaches that focus on smallholders still dominate the 
rural development discourse. For instance, the 2008 World Development Report on 
Agriculture for Development devoted a large section towards discussing the 
contribution of smallholders to economic growth and rural development (World 
Bank, 2007). The importance of investing in smallholders has also been recognized 
in Target 2.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that aims to double the 




agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers by 2030 (United 
Nations, 2015). 
Most arguments in favor of smallholder agriculture are based on a strand of 
literature that claims that there is an inverse relationship between farm size and 
land productivity. This literature, that is influenced by classic works from Alexander 
Chayanov and John Stuart Mill proposes that smallholders are productive because 
they have lower labor costs which allow them to raise their output by applying labor 
intensively (Sen, 1966; Barbier, 1984; Bhalla and Roy, 1988; Benjamin, 1995; Barrett et 
al., 2010). Another explanation that is commonly given within this literature, relates 
to the presence of principal-agent problems and the high supervision costs needed 
to prevent the shirking of hired laborers. Smaller farms that rely on family labor are 
believed to be more productive because they do not incur high costs of supervision 
or hiring labor (Feder, 1985; Barrett, 1996; Barrett, 2010). 
However, others have been more skeptical about these smallholder–centric models 
of rural development. For instance, Collier (2008) makes a strong case for large-scale 
agriculture, stating that it is more suited to cater to rising global food supply needs, 
since it is innovative and resilient to price fluctuations. Innovations on large-scale 
farms, he points out, can also be shared with smallholders through out-grower and 
contract farming arrangements. In a later paper, co-authored with Stefan Dercon, 
Collier reemphasizes the importance of large-scale farms, when he argues that large-
scale farms are better placed to make use of economies of scale in knowledge 
diffusion, technology adoption, accessing finance and capital as well as in the 
organization of logistics (Collier and Dercon, 2014).  
Empirical evidence that compares the productivity of the two farming systems is 
mixed. Studies that have found evidence of the inverse relationship between farm 
size and higher smallholder agricultural productivity have omitted key variables 
such as land quality or have been prone to statistical bias (Barrett, 2010). Likewise, 




studies that favor large-scale agriculture rarely consider the impacts of such farms on 
the environment, land use and land cover. Even fewer empirical studies are available 
that analyze how rural development is affected when these two farming systems 
coexist. The primary aim of this dissertation will be to contribute to filling this 
research gap by analyzing how the encounter of these two farming systems affects 
rural development.  
1.2 Challenges affecting rural development 
Recently, there has been a growing tendency in the literature to use micro-level 
datasets to investigate the persistence of agricultural productivity gaps and the 
prospects for a structural transformation (Gollin et al., 2014; Hicks et al., 2017; 
McCullough, 2018). This literature, that departs from conventional sectoral analyses 
that use macro-level data, finds that productivity in the agricultural sector is not as 
low as has been argued to be the case if one considers factors such as hours worked 
and the role played by human capital. However, despite these new insights, the 
authors of these studies point out that large agricultural gaps remain, which 
continue to challenge structural transformation and rural development.1 
One of the major reasons why many rural regions remain undeveloped is the 
adoption of policies that have been biased against agriculture and rural areas. Lipton 
(1977) brought the discussion of ‘urban bias’ to the fore when he explained why 
poverty persists in rural areas. According to Lipton (1977), ‘policies that are designed 
by and for people in urban areas’ placed a strong focus on urban industrialization 
and resulted in large inefficiencies in rural areas. Bezemer and Headey (2008) 
explain that the causes of urban bias are deep-rooted and can be traced to colonial 
regimes that sought to extract profits and excluded local populations from access to 
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An exception to these studies is a paper by Diao et al., (2017) who combine macro-data from the 
Groningen Growth and Development Center’s Africa Sector Database with micro-data from the 
Demographic Health Surveys and find a decline in the agricultural labor force in Africa. 




land and public resources. The demise of colonialism was followed by the adoption 
of industrialization policies and later structural adjustment policies whose effects on 
the rural poor and smallholders in particular can still be seen today (Bryceson, 2002; 
Bezemer and Headey, 2008). 
Today, smallholders are confronted with an even larger set of challenges that 
continue to undermine rural development. In addition to the persisting market 
imperfections and infrastructural constraints that arose from urban bias, 
smallholders are increasingly threatened by rainfall and temperature variability 
caused by climate change (Collier and Dercon, 2014; Cohn et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
increasing price volatility and health shocks render smallholders vulnerable. In a 
study using the World Banks’ Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated 
Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), Nikoloski et al., (2018) find that more than 60 
percent of households report sudden losses in income and assets due to shocks. The 
authors find that price shocks that arise when crop prices unexpectedly fall or food 
prices suddenly rise can be just as damaging as weather-related shocks.  
Added to this, are growing concerns of unsustainable smallholder land conversion 
and land-use change owing to demographic change. Barbier (2000) points out that 
African smallholders respond to declining productivity and population pressure by 
moving to or converting new lands for grazing and cultivation. He argues that this 
form of land-extensification exerts pressure on land resources and results in a 
cumulative causation of land degradation that further lowers smallholders’ yields. 
More recent evidence by Jayne et al. (2014) shows that population pressure has 
resulted in an intergenerational subdivision of land that has decreased smallholders’ 
farm sizes. In response smallholders have begun to crop their fields all year round, 
without allowing for fallow or soil replenishment between crop seasons. Similar 
evidence has been found for Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Niger by 
Binswanger-Mkhize and Savastano (2018), who show that fallow has gradually 




disappeared. These current trends associated with population pressure and land 
intensification were already foreseen in the 1960’s by Danish economist Ester 
Boserup, who hypothesized that farmers would respond to land constraints imposed 
by rising population densities through agricultural intensification that would take 
the form of increased input application per unit of land, higher crop frequencies and 
shortened fallow periods (Boserup, 1965; Jayne et al., 2014). 
While it is clear that demographic pressure and other macroeconomic factors such 
as agricultural commodity price fluctuations may cause smallholders to adopt more 
extensive or intensive land use practices, the mechanisms through which micro-level 
factors cause such changes at the household level largely remain unknown. 
Understanding the micro-level determinants of smallholders’ land-use decisions is 
important, as it will help devise strategies that lead to the sustainable use of 
resources that are already constrained and enhance agricultural productivity on 
existing land resources. This dissertation addresses this research gap by analyzing 
the micro determinants of smallholders’ land use decisions. 
1.3 Recent developments affecting land-use in rural areas 
In a bid to overcome the challenges affecting smallholders’ agricultural productivity, 
there has been an increasing shift to adopt Lewis-model inspired policies that favor 
capital intensive large-scale land investments (Collier and Dercon, 2014). This new 
wave of large-scale land investments has mostly been driven by governments of 
resource-constrained countries that seek to outsource food production, international 
financial entities and, commercial farmers planning to expand their operations (De 
Schutter, 2011; Deininger et al., 2011). Policy makers view this increased interest for 
agricultural land as an opportunity to close high yield gaps and provide employment 
for rural populations.  




Yet others have pointed out that a sole focus on large-scale agriculture does not 
come without its problems. For instance, several case studies have shown that 
setting up large-scale land investments in rural areas where property rights tend to 
be weak can lead to displacements and heightened perceptions of tenure insecurity 
(Sulle and Nelson, 2009; Cotula, 2011). In addition, large-scale land investments have 
been found to increase water scarcity, environmental degradation and pollution 
(Mujenja and Wonani, 2012; Johansson et al., 2016). Moreover, the employment 
opportunities offered by the large-scale farms have been found to be limited due to 
the highly mechanized nature of these farms (Nolte and Ostermeier, 2017).  
Recently, a growing literature (see for instance, Anseeuw, 2016 and Jayne et al., 2016) 
has highlighted the emergence of a new medium-scale farming system that has not 
yet received much recognition in the rural development literature. Medium-scale 
farmers who mostly consist of the urban elite are now estimated to hold more 
agricultural land than smallholders. This emerging farming system has increased 
smallholders’ land constraints that are already threatened by demographic pressures 
(Jayne et al., 2014).  
The empirical impacts of both large-scale land investments and medium-scale farms 
on smallholders are still under-researched as the general discourse on rural 
development has mostly been shaped by case studies. While these case studies have 
been informative, more empirical research is needed to understand the nature and 
magnitude of the impacts on smallholders that arise from these interactions. This 
dissertation contributes to the growing empirical literature by presenting four 
studies that analyze how smallholders are affected by large–scale land investments.2 
  
                                                 
2
 For the sake of brevity, large-scale land investments are referred to as large-scale farms in the 
remainder of this section. In subsequent chapters they are referred to by the definition provided with 
the data, for instance in Chapters 2 and 4 we use the term large-scale farm, while in Chapter 5 we 
refer to these investments as agribusinesses and plantations. 




1.4 Overview of dissertation chapters 
The first research questions posed in this dissertation are: Where are large-scale 
farms located? and what determines their location? The answers to these questions 
are provided in Chapter 2 titled ‘Large-scale farms and smallholders: Evidence from 
Zambia’ where we conduct a systematic analysis of the geographic characteristics of 
regions that host large-scale farms. Using a census of large-scale farms in Zambia 
(farms that cover an area of 20 hectares or more) that was jointly collected in 2013 
and 2014 with the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO), we are able to identify 
all the wards that have had large-scale farms since 1995. Wards are the smallest 
administrative units in Zambia, following districts and provinces. We combine the 
large-scale farm locational data with geospatial datasets that provide us with ward-
level information on land cover, railroad infrastructure, cities and irrigation. In 
addition, ward boundaries and population estimates are identified using data 
provided by CSO, while poverty headcount data is obtained from a World Bank 
report on Mapping Poverty in Zambia (de la Fuente et al., 2015). 
Combining these multiple datasets enables us to challenge some of the commonly 
held perceptions on the locations of large-scale farms. For instance, it was widely 
believed that large-scale farms are established on ‘idle lands’ that would otherwise 
not have been put into productive use by smallholders (Cotula et al., 2009; Anseeuw 
et al., 2012). Our geographical analysis challenges this perception by showing that 
large-scale farms are not set up on idle land, but instead are clustered close to 
smallholder communities in wards that already host large-scale farms. The analysis 
further reveals that large-scale farms are located in wards that have good soil quality 
and infrastructure. Moreover, we find that wards that host large-scale farms have 
experienced considerable reductions in tree cover since the early 2000s. This 
indicates that large-scale farms result in extensive conversions of forest to 
agricultural land. 




The second research question addressed in Chapter 2 asks whether large-scale farms 
have an impact on smallholders’ agricultural outcomes. To answer this question, we 
match the census on large-scale farms with seven nationally representative cross-
sectional household datasets that contain information on household head 
characteristics, assets, livestock holdings, the use of agricultural inputs, as well as 
the amount of crops cultivated, harvested, and sold. This combination of data 
enables us to create a ward-level panel with smallholder agricultural outcomes. 
Using a difference-in-differences estimation where our outcome variable of interest 
is the interaction between a variable that indicates that smallholder data was 
collected after the year 2010 and a variable that indicates that a ward has a large-
scale farm, we investigate how smallholders’ cultivated area, access to fertilizer and 
maize yields are affected by large-scale farms. Ward and year fixed effects are added 
to the regression to capture any time-invariant unobservables that may bias our 
results. We find significant increases in maize yields and the area cultivated by 
smallholders located in wards with large-scale farms. This hints at positive spill-
overs that may lead smallholders to increase their productivity at the extensive 
margins. However, we cannot say with certainty that this result is purely driven by 
large-scale farms as medium-scale farmers are also active in these regions. 
Interestingly, despite observing significant increments in smallholders’ maize yields, 
we do not find that large-scale farms raise access to or use of fertilizer. This is likely 
to be caused by distortions that have been created by the Farmer Input Support 
Program (FISP) (Burke et al., 2016).  
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation that are respectively titled ‘Social Capital and 
Large-Scale Agricultural Investments: An Experimental Investigation’ and ‘Market 
exposure makes females behave more competitively and closes the gender gap’ we 
employ experimental economic methods to investigate whether the externalities 
from large-scale farms extend beyond conventional measures of agricultural 
productivity to smallholders’ social capital and competitiveness. The general context 




in which these two studies occur consists of two large-scale farms in Zambia’s 
Central Province that are not only representative of large-scale farms in Zambia but 
also of large-scale farms in other African countries. Using village lists and maps 
obtained from CSO, we randomly selected 13 villages within a 15 kilometer radius of 
the large-scale farms and 16 villages within a 50 to 70 kilometer radius from the 
large-scale farms in the year 2015. 445 smallholders from villages close to large-scale 
farms and 487 smallholders that live in villages located further away from the two 
large-scale farms participated in our experiment. 
In Chapter 3, we follow Glaeser et al. (2000)’s methodological insights on combining 
experiments and surveys to measure trust and reciprocity (‘trustworthiness’) - which 
are two important components of social capital. In doing so, we employ Clark and 
Sefton (2001)’s Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma in a lab-in-the-field experiment to 
measure intra-village trust and reciprocal behavior in villages that are near and 
further away from the large-scale farms. Our results reveal that smallholders in 
villages close to the two large-scale farms trust each other significantly more than 
smallholders in villages further away. We suggest that these results are driven by 
smallholders banding together as large-scale farms are set up within their vicinity. 
Qualitative evidence collected in a follow up visit to the villages confirms that the 
establishment of large-scale farms brings about uncertainty and leads smallholders 
in surrounding communities to meet more frequently, as they discuss how to deal 
with the large-scale farms. In addition, we find that smallholders that have been 
employed on large-scale farms display significantly more trust and reciprocal 
behavior than those with no such experience. It is likely that these traits, that are 
necessary to build a good reputation in employer-employee relations (Akerlof, 1982), 
are internalized by large-scale farm workers. 
Chapter 3 also introduces a natural field experiment in which both villages near and 
further away from the large-scale farms were endowed with a public good (a 




community solar system). The natural field experiment was undertaken to validate 
the results of the lab-in-the field experiment. Moreover, following the tradition of 
studies that measured village social capital through the management of community 
resources, such as Narayan and Pritchett (1996), we undertook the natural 
experiment to have an independent measure of intra-village social capital. One year 
after the public goods were gifted, we paid impromptu visits to the villages. These 
visits were aimed at measuring the governance of the community solar systems. The 
results of the natural experiment provide evidence that villages close to large-scale 
farms have a higher propensity to govern the public good in a more equitable 
manner than villages further away. We also find a high correlation between intra-
village trust and the levels of public good governance. This finding validates the 
results of the lab-in-the-field experiment that show that intra-village trust is higher 
in villages next to large-scale farms. 
In Chapter 4, we revisit the setting introduced in Chapter 3 and investigate whether 
smallholders’ competitive behavior is affected by market exposure. We are mainly 
interested in investigating whether exogenous market exposure (driven through 
proximity to large-scale farms) and endogenous market exposure (resulting from 
active participation on crop sales markets) affects the competitive decisions of 
smallholders. We elicit competitive behavior, by drawing on Gneezy et al. (2009)’s 
lab-in-the-field experiment that compares participants’ decisions to take part in a 
task where pay-offs are determined by competing with another anonymous village 
member or by receiving a piece rate.  
We find that both forms of market exposure jointly and significantly increase the 
probability that a smallholder will decide to compete. Disaggregating these results 
by gender, we find that the gender gap in competitiveness that has been observed in 
multiple settings (Andersen et al., 2013; Buser et al., 2014; Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007; Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy et al., 2009; Leibbrandt et al., 2013) is levelled off 




for both adult and children female participants in villages close to large-scale farms. 
Interestingly, we also observe heterogeneity in the determinants of male and female 
participants’ competitive decisions. To be specific, we find that females’ competitive 
behavior is significantly affected by exogenous market exposure, while endogenous 
market exposure drives males’ competitive behavior. 
With regard to endogenous market exposure, we argue that although both male and 
female smallholders equally participate on the crop sales market, females’ 
participation is constrained by the prevailing norms and customs in rural Zambia, 
that assign domestic and agricultural roles to women. Crop sales may not be as 
lucrative for women, thus explaining why they are not affected by endogenous 
market exposure.  
Comparing male and females’ socio-economic characteristics, we also observe that 
females are more marginalized in terms of education, assets and the diversity of 
crops grown. In addition, males’ competitive behavior is affected by other factors 
such as village size, lineage and land title. Based on this, we suggest that female’s 
competitive behavior is more responsive to exogenous market exposure since none 
of the other observed factors affect their competiveness. We do not find that large-
scale farms increase females’ employment or assets. This leads us to believe that 
exogenous market exposure raises females’ competitive behavior through exposing 
women to opportunities that were previously unavailable. In line with the literature 
on competitiveness (Almas et al., 2015; Deckers et al., 2015), we find that competitive 
behavior is also passed on from adult parents to children in our setting. 
Chapter 5 titled ‘Agribusinesses, Smallholder Tenure Security and Plot‐level 
Investments: Evidence from Rural Tanzania’ investigates whether spill-overs on 
smallholders persist when large-scale farms decrease or cease their operations. This 
research question is pertinent for the Tanzanian setting, where many large-scale 
farms that acquired land for commercial agriculture - particularly for the cultivation 




of biofuels – ceased their operations (Sulle and Nelson, 2013; Sulle, 2015). The land 
tenure system in Tanzania is multi-layered and designed to protect smallholders 
land rights, but it does not provide a clear indication of whether smallholders can 
reclaim their land following the failure of a large-scale farm (Sulle and Nelson, 2013; 
Byamugisha, 2014). We draw on a panel of 5,101 plots from the first and third rounds 
of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TZNPS) and investigate whether a decrease 
in the share of land held by a large-scale farm in a village affects the likelihood that a 
plot cultivated by smallholders has tenure security. Using a plot-level fixed effects 
estimation, we find that smallholders perceive their plots to be more secure (de facto 
tenure security) and acquire more title (de jure tenure security), following the 
reduction in the area of land held by large-scale farms. This increase in tenure 
security is mostly undertaken as a safeguard against the uncertainty that arises after 
large-scale land investments fail.  
A well-established theoretical literature has linked more secure land tenure to an 
increase in plot-level investments (Braselle et al., 2002; Besley and Ghatak 2010; 
Fenske, 2011). In the second part of Chapter 5, we also analyze whether this link 
exists for smallholders that are located in villages that have experienced a decrease 
in the share of land cultivated by large-scale farms. Using linear probability and tobit 
models with plot-level and year fixed effects, we investigate whether the share of 
land held by an agribusiness increases non-cash intensive investments (i.e. fallow 
and time spent on the plot) as well as cash intensive investments (i.e. improved 
seeds, irrigation, fertilizer and hired labor). We observe that a decrease in the share 
of land held by large-scale farms leads smallholders to increase the time spent on 
their plots, but find that this result is largely driven by their employment on large-
scale farms and not through changes in smallholders’ levels of tenure security. 
Moreover, we do not find that a decrease in the share of land held by large-scale 
farms affects smallholders’ cash intensive investments. This suggests that there are 




no income-spillovers from large-scale farms onto smallholders within our study 
context. 
Having established a clear case for the presence of externalities from large-scale 
farms on smallholders in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, the sixth chapter of this dissertation 
titled ‘Drivers of households’ land-use decisions: a critical review of micro-level studies 
in tropical regions’ takes a different approach and answers the question: What are 
the micro-level drivers of households’ land use decisions? As already noted above, 
understanding how the determinants of land-use change at the household level will 
lead to more sustainable use of land resources that are constrained by demographic 
pressures is important. Moreover, understanding the flip side of smallholders’ land 
use and agriculture related decisions when they are not in the vicinity of large-scale 
farms is important as the majority of smallholders lives and cultivates land in regions 
that are not in the proximity of large-scale farms.  
In Chapter 6, we systematically review and conduct a meta-analysis of 91 studies that 
use data from tropical regions and are published between the years 2000 and 2015. 
The studies were sourced from academic databases and search engines such as 
Google Scholar, Scirus, Repec, Mendeley, and AgEcon. We ensure that our 
systematic review only includes studies on smallholders by selecting studies that use 
either household or village level data. This is in line with the approaches taken in 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Our meta-analysis reveals that the most common form of land-use change 
undertaken by smallholders is the conversion of forest land to agricultural land. This 
suggests that smallholders face external pressure to expand their farm size even in 
the absence of large-scale farms, while in Chapter 2 it has been shown that large-
scale farms increase smallholders’ cultivated area. 




To investigate this further, we cluster the seven main drivers that influence 
smallholder households’ land-use decisions into key policies, technology, markets, 
demography, endowments, infrastructure, as well as property rights and institutions. 
Our choice of these drivers is influenced by pioneering literature that has analyzed 
the underlying causes of deforestation such as Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) and 
Geist and Lambin (2001). Amongst these factors, we find that household 
endowments and characteristics – especially owing to an increase in households’ 
income and asset-holdings – account for the largest conversions of forest land to 
agricultural land. The results of the meta-analysis therefore highlight the role that 
economic growth plays in driving households’ land-use decisions. 
Interestingly, the review reveals that very few studies on the micro-level drivers of 
land use-change have been conducted on Asian countries between the years 2000 
and 2015. This is surprising, considering the high rates of conversion from forest land 
to large-scale agricultural land (plantation farming) that has recently characterized 
South East Asian countries (Elz et al., 2011; Miettinen et al., 2011; Sodhi et al., 2004). 
It indicates that an important dimension of the literature is still missing, namely, 
how large-scale land conversions determine smallholders’ land use decisions. As 
noted in Chapter 2, smallholders in Zambia increase their area cultivated if they are 
in the same region as a large-scale farm. Moreover, Chapter 5 shows that large-scale 
farms affect smallholders’ land tenure security, which has been identified as one of 
the main drivers of land-use decisions in Chapter 6. We therefore conclude Chapter 
6 by providing several recommendations for future research including one that calls 
for more research that analyses the micro-level drivers of land-use change in the 
light of large-scale land investments particularly in the form of farming and logging. 
1.5 Contribution to the literature 
The chapters presented in this dissertation address several empirical gaps and 
provide a number of novel contributions to the existing literature.  




Chapter 2 is the first study to combine a systematic geographic analysis of the 
locations of large-scale farms with an empirical analysis of the impacts of large-scale 
farms on smallholders’ agricultural outcomes. This combination allows for a more 
meaningful interpretation of the results from the impact study as it provides detailed 
information on the context in which farms operate. 
Chapter 3 and 4 are the only studies we are aware of, that go beyond analyzing 
directly observable effects of large-scale farms on smallholders. The results from 
these studies make the case for a more comprehensive analysis of the impacts of 
large-scale farms on smallholders that do not only end at agricultural productivity, 
but also include more nuanced impacts that cannot be captured by conventional 
household survey methods. Analyzing both the direct and indirect impacts is a 
fundamental step required to make evidence-based policy decisions. 
Moreover, despite large-scale farms and their impact on smallholder tenure security 
being a highly contentious topic, prior to the work presented in Chapter 5, no other 
study had investigated this link empirically. Furthermore, although this is a fairly 
common phenomenon, there is very little if any empirical research that analyzes 
how smallholders are affected by the failure or closure of large-scale farms. The work 
presented in Chapter 5 is intended to highlight the importance of not only 
addressing the impacts of large-scale farms that are operational, but also of 
questioning what happens to smallholders in the event that large-scale farm projects 
do not come into execution. 
Finally, Chapter 6 builds on a well-established literature by providing a systematic 
overview and meta-analysis of the drivers of smallholders’ land-use change 
decisions. The novelty of this chapter is that it does not only focus on the conversion 
of forest land to agricultural land through deforestation but instead introduces a 
matrix of assorted land-use conversions. In addition, it is one of the first works to 




solely focus on the drivers of households’ land-use decisions at the micro-level 
thereby bringing new insights to the literature.  
1.6 Suggestions for future research 
Our recommendations for further research are multi-method because this 
dissertation employs a number of analytical tools. First, we recommend that more 
precise geospatial data that includes the location and changes in farm sizes are 
collected using satellite imagery. Such data would allow for more accurate spatial 
analysis on the impacts of large-scale farms. In addition, it would also enable more 
detailed analyses that integrate the changes in land-use and farm-size of 
smallholder, medium- and large-scale farms. Access to detailed geospatial data 
would also be useful in extending the research presented in Chapter 2, to include 
spatial measures that can be used to estimate whether the impacts of large-scale 
farms on smallholders are larger with increasing proximity to the farms. 
Second, we suggest that studies that further analyze the impacts of large-scale farms 
on smallholders do so within a panel-dimension setting to enable greater causal 
inferences. The lack of smallholder panel data that was collected before and after the 
establishment of large-scale farms in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 prevent us from making 
strong causal statements which is a key requirement for meaningful impact analyses. 
Data that follows the same smallholders through the various project phases and that 
collects information on the changes in infrastructure, employment opportunities, 
tenure security, soil quality and other environmental factors would be ideal. 
Moreover, panel data on the indirect impacts of large-scale farms on smallholders, 
such as the ones presented in Chapters 3 and 4, is necessary to provide a whole 
picture of the impacts of these farms on smallholders. 
Third, we recommend that more research should be conducted that analyses how 
the externalities imposed by large-and medium-scale farms affect smallholders’ land-




use decisions. Such research is especially pertinent in light of the results that show 
that large-scale farms set up in the vicinity of smallholder communities increase 
smallholders’ area cultivated (Chapter 2) and affect their tenure security (Chapter 5). 
We expect large- and medium-scale farms to accelerate the process of smallholder 
land intensification that has already been observed in a number of studies (Jayne et 
al., 2014 and Binswanger-Mkhize and Savastano, 2018), because growing 
demographic pressures hinder smallholders’ ability to expand their area cultivated. 
However, more research is needed to investigate this further. 
Lastly, we suggest that as the number of studies that analyze the impacts of large-
scale farms on smallholders increase, carefully executed meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews should be conducted to compare these impacts across several 
study settings and contexts. Synthesizing the empirical studies that analyze the 
impacts of large-scale farms on smallholders in a comprehensive meta-analysis will 
provide a better overview of the main impacts of large-scale farms identified across 
different study contexts. 






2 Large-scale farms and smallholders: 
Evidence from Zambia  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) gained international prominence in the early 
2010’s when they were depicted as ‘land grabs’ by the media and some civil society 
organizations. These reports highlighted the opaque acquisition processes and adverse 
impacts on surrounding local communities (Cotula et al., 2009). Since then, several 
scholarly works have addressed the impacts and spill-overs of LSAIs on neighboring 
smallholders through case studies.3 While these case studies have provided important 
insights into individual LSAIs and have therewith furthered the debate on the impacts of 
LSAIs, they are often too specific and lack external validity beyond their study regions.  
More recently, a new literature that goes beyond case studies to provide systematic 
evidence of the impacts of LSAIs on smallholders at the national or regional level has 
emerged. For instance, Deininger and Xia (2016) combine information on the location 
and start date of large farms with smallholder surveys to quantitatively assess spillover 
effects from large land-based investments in Mozambique. Ali et al. (2017) conduct a 
similar analysis based on a large farm census and smallholder surveys in Ethiopia, while 
Herrmann (2017) looks at household income and income poverty of out-growers, wage 
                                                 
 This chapter has been co-authored with Kerstin Nolte and Jann Lay. It is an updated version of the 
AGRODEP Working Paper 0011 titled The impact of foreign large-scale land acquisitions on smallholder 
productivity: Evidence from Zambia that has been co-authored with Jann Lay. 
 This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ), (project “Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: Data, Patterns, Impacts, and Policies”) and the African 
Growth and Development Policy Modeling Consortium (AGRODEP) (2012 GAPS IN RESEARCH GRANT). 
3
 For recent literature reviews and meta-analyses of these case studies, refer to Oberlack et al. (2016) and 
Schoneveld (2016) for meta-analyses of some of these case studies. 




employees and non-participants of LSAIs in Tanzania. Ahlerup and Tengstam (2015) use 
three waves of panel data to analyze how large-scale farms affect smallholders’ wage 
incomes at the district level in Zambia.  
This chapter provides an innovative contribution to this literature with a context-
sensitive quantitative study. We combine a systematic analysis of the geographic 
characteristics of wards that host large-scale farms with a differences-in-differences and 
fixed effects analysis of the impacts of large-scale farms on smallholders’ agricultural 
outcomes for Zambia. Zambia is particularly interesting for our study as it has a long 
history of large-scale farms that have co-existed alongside smallholder communities 
(Chu, 2013). However in recent years, similar to many other developing countries, Zambia 
has experienced a sudden increase in the demand for land to be used for large-scale 
agricultural purposes. The Land Matrix estimates that 26 deals that cover an area of 
389,774 hectares have been concluded since 2000 (Harding at al., 2016).4  
This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways: First, the detailed assessment of 
the large-scale farm sector in Zambia and the study of the geographical context provides a 
comprehensive image of large-scale agriculture in Zambia and challenges some of the 
commonly held perceptions surrounding these farms. Second, our study is the first to 
assess the impacts of large-scale farms on agricultural outcomes of smallholders in 
Zambia. In addition, it covers a larger time-span than earlier studies; and uses a 
difference–in-differences analysis with fixed effects for wards, which are the smallest 
administrative unit in Zambia. Finally, the combination of the analysis of the geographic 
context with a quantitative impact assessment allows for a meaningful interpretation of 
the results from the impact study as it is based on a thorough understanding of the 
context in which farms operate. This link between the locations of large-scale farms and 
the impacts of these farms on surrounding smallholders was lacking in previous studies 
                                                 
4 The Land Matrix is a database that provides information on land acquisitions that cover areas larger than 
200 hectares and that have been set up after the year 2000. It is a partnership between the International 
Land Coalition, Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, 
the Centre of Development and Environment at the University of Bern, the German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies and the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH). 




The results from the geographic analysis nicely highlight the importance of access to 
infrastructure and the agglomeration of farms in certain regions. The regression results 
show that smallholders’ farm sizes increase in wards with large-scale farms. This could be 
indicative of the fact that smallholders increase their production at the extensive margin 
or may be a result of increasing trend of land consolidation in Zambia. Moreover, we find 
a reduction in fertilizer usage and an increase in maize yields in wards with large-scale 
farms. While the results on fertilizer are difficult to interpret in the Zambian context 
where government subsidy programs simultaneously affect smallholder fertilizer use, the 
increase in yields are indicative of increasing smallholder productivity at the intensive 
margin. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The second section presents the 
data used for the analysis. In section 2.3, we provide a descriptive overview of large-scale 
farms in Zambia and analyse the local geographical contexts of wards that host large-scale 
farms. In section 2.4, we analyse the impacts of large-scale farms on smallholders, in 
particular, we discuss the hypotheses, the estimation strategy, econmetric considerations, 
the results and robustness checks . The final section discusses our results and concludes. 
2.2 Data  
To analyze the impacts of large-scale farms on smallholders’ agricultural outcomes over 
time, we combine several datasets that provide us with large-scale farm, spatial and 
smallholder information.  
The large-scale farm data is obtained from the Post-Harvest Survey (PHS) for Large-scale 
Agricultural Holdings, which is a census on all large-scale farms (defined as farms that are 
above 20 hectares) collected by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO). The large-
scale farm data contains information on the crops grown, area cultivated and harvested, 
fertilizer used, livestock reared and the value of sales (CSO, 2004). In 2013/2014, a total of 
1,102 large-scale farms were surveyed, out of which we use a subset of 834 large-scale 




farms that cultivate crops and are owned by non-state actors.5 We collaborated with CSO 
to include additional questions in the 2013/2014 PHS on Large-Scale Agricultural 
Holdings. The questions gathered information on the year in which the large-scale farms 
were established (i.e. the year land was acquired and the year that cultivation started); the 
development of large-scale farm sizes over time (i.e. the size of the farm upon acquisition, 
the farm size five years ago, the farm size at the time of the survey); the location of the 
farm (i.e. in which ward the farm is located); as well as on the countries of origin of the 
large-scale farm owners. 
The spatial datasets that provides us with information on ward boundaries, land cover, 
railroad infrastructure, cities and irrigation data are obtained from CSO’s Cartography 
and Mapping Department, the Global Land Cover database, the Digital Chart of the 
World, the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Global Map of irrigation 
areas, respectively. Ward-level poverty estimates are obtained from the World Bank (de la 
Fuente et al., 2015) and the ward population data is obtained from CSO.  
The smallholder data is obtained from the PHS for Small and Medium Sized Agricultural 
Holdings that is collected by the CSO and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. The 
PHS on Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Holdings are nationally representative 
cross-sectional surveys that contain information on household head characteristics, 
assets, livestock holdings, the use of agricultural inputs as well as the amount of crops 
cultivated, harvested, and sold. The surveys are collected annually between August and 
September, after the crop harvest period has ended (Megill, 2004). 
A two stage sampling procedure is used to select the households interviewed in the 
surveys. In the first stage, Standard Enumeration Areas (SEAs) are selected using 
probability proportional to size sampling methods. In the second stage, the households 
are stratified by farm size categories, the number of livestock and poultry and the 
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 Our main focus is on large-scale farms that engage in crop cultivation thus we exclude large-scale farms 
engaged in animal husbandry for the analysis. We also exclude institutional large-scale farms that are 
owned or managed by schools, prisons and other state facilities. 




cultivation of special crops.6 Sampling is based on the sampling frame of the current 
National Census of Housing and Population, and is updated when a new census is 
collected (Megill, 2004). We use seven cross-sections of the PHS on Small and Medium 
Sized Agricultural Holdings collected for the years 2002/2003, 2003/2004, 2004/2005, 
2005/2006, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, and 2012/2013.7 The first five surveys are collected using 
the sampling frame of the 2000 National Census of Housing and Population while the 
2011/2012 and 2012/2013 surveys are based on the sampling frame of the 2010 National 
Census of Housing and Population. This data covers farms with a size of up to 20 
hectares. Table 2.A.1 in the appendix shows the size distribution of these farms and 
highlights a clear trend of increases in larger farm sizes. 
In the sampling frame of the 2000 National Census of Housing and Population, Zambia 
was subdivided into 1,286 wards which later increased to 1,421 wards in the 2010 sampling 
frame. The increase in the number of wards was driven by the partitioning of Northern 
Province into Muchinga and Northern Province in 2011. This partitioning resulted in the 
need to redraw several wards that cut across the boundaries of the new province. In 
addition, the ward boundaries were also redrawn to facilitate the work of the Electoral 
Commission of Zambia who held several local government elections in the period 
between the two censuses.8 
The ward-level is crucial for our analysis: we investigate the geographical context on the 
ward-level and we link large- and small-scale farms via the location. In order to create a 
ward panel that accounts for the changes in the ward boundaries over time, we used the 
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 The PHS on Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Holdings identifies eight crops (sorghum, rice, cotton, 
burley tobacco, virginia tobacco, sunflower, soybeans and paprika) that receive special attention in the 
sample to ensure a representative distribution of crops and to improve the precision of crop area and 
production estimates (Megill, 2004). 
7
 We take the 2003/2004 dataset as the base year for our analysis as ward-level information is not available 
for earlier PHS on Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Holdings. In 2006/2007, the PHS on Small and 
Medium Agricultural Sized Holdings did not include a module on the households’ asset holdings. In 
2007/2008, the PHS was not collected and a few questions on smallholders’ harvest were included into the 
Crop Forecast Survey. The 2008/2009 and 2009/ 2010 PHS were not collected due to a lack of funding by the 
government. Thus we exclude the 2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 PHS on Small and 
Medium Sized Holdings from our analysis as the datasets are incomplete or inexistent. 
8
 The explanations behind the change in ward boundaries were provided by cartographers and census 
planners at CSO who were interviewed by one of the authors in February, 2014.  




ward shapefiles provided by CSO to create a panel that only consists of wards whose 
boundaries have remained constant across the two sampling frames and wards whose 
boundaries have changed in a consistent and a systematic manner for the same period. 
Under the latter, we consider those wards whose boundaries have either been split or 
merged in 2010 and can easily be reconstructed to their 2000 boundaries.  
Since the main focus of the study is to analyze the impacts of large-scale farms on 
smallholders in rural regions, we excluded all wards that are located in urban areas. We 
also excluded wards that were included in the PHS on Large-scale Agricultural Holdings 
but not in the PHS on Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Holdings. These restrictions 
result in a final panel of 439 wards, out of which 70 wards played host to a large-scale 
farm in 2003, and 87 in 2013. The ward panel is matched with the PHS on Small and 
Medium Sized Agricultural Holdings that contains data on 27,109 households that are 
unevenly distributed across the seven survey periods. 
2.3  Large-scale agricultural farms and their host regions  
In this section, we analyze the characteristics of large-scale farms and the wards that host 
them. Providing a descriptive overview of large-scale farms in Zambia and analyzing their 
geographical contexts, we question whether some of the commonly held perceptions 
about large-scale farms hold for Zambia. More specifically, we use the data introduced in 
the previous section to shed light on the origin of large-scale farm investors, the duration 
of large-scale farm investments and the determinants of their locations. 
Who is investing in Zambian large-scale farms? 
Many studies have linked the recent demand for large-scale agriculture with the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 food price crisis (see for instance, De Schutter, 2011). They 
argue that the crisis led governments of industrialized nations to outsource food 
production to land abundant developing countries. At the same time, food-importing, 
resource constraint countries such as the Gulf countries found it attractive to partner 




with low-income and land abundant countries for the production of food (De Schutter, 
2011).9 
Table 2.1. Countries of origin of large-scale farm investors 
Country Freq. Percent Hectares 
Australia 1 0.12 31 
China 4 0.48 1,405 
Cyprus 1 0.12 800 
Denmark 1 0.12 1,080 
Germany 3 0.36 32,572 
Greece 4 0.48 8,191 
India 5 0.59 6,635 
Ireland 2 0.24 1,945 
Italy 6 0.71 8,665 
Kenya 1 0.12 400 
Netherlands 7 0.83 10,467 
New Zealand 1 0.12 1,371 
Nigeria 1 0.12 400 
Singapore 3 0.36 4,597 
South Africa 25 2.97 35,755 
Tanzania 3 0.36 3,220 
United Kingdom 26 3.09 39,808 
United States 4 0.48 1,698 
Zambia 705 83.83 340,232 
Zimbabwe 38 4.52 31,287 
Total 841 100 530,559 
Source: Authors own based on the 2013/2014 PHS on Large-Scale Agricultural Holding 
Note: Table 2.1 reports all countries that operate large-scale farms in Zambia. Seven 
large-scale farms that are jointly owned by two countries are reported more than 
once. This raises the total number of foreign owned farms to 841 from 834. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the countries of origin of large-scale farm investors in Zambia, the 
number of large-scale farms under operation per country and the total area cultivated by 
these large-scale farms. We find that 84 percent (705) of the large-scale farms in Zambia 
are operated by Zambian investors. This does not match the widely held perceptions that 
foreign investors from industrialized nations dominate the large-scale agricultural sector 
but instead renders partial support to the growing evidence on emerging medium-scale 
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 The questionnaire asks for the “country of origin of owner of the farm”. Given that some large-scale farms 
owned by foreign investors may be registered under a Zambian subsidiary company, the numbers reported 
for Zambian large-scale holdings may be overestimated. 




farmers in Zambia. Large-scale farmers from countries within the southern African 
region, i.e. Zimbabwe and South Africa, also account for a significant share of large-scale 
farm investments. Not surprisingly, the country’s colonial history attracts a large number 
of investors from the United Kingdom, which has the third highest number of large-scale 
farms in the country. 
Taking a look at the total amount of hectares cultivated per country, it is clear that the 
countries with the highest number of large-scale farms also cultivate large amounts of 
land.10 
Have large-scale farms increased their presence over time? 
In Figure 2.1, we distinguish between Zambian and foreign owned large-scale farms to 
show the years in which these farms were acquired. The graph provides several 
interesting insights. First, it confirms that large-scale farms have had a long history in 
Zambia. The oldest large-scale farms were established in the early 1900s. Second, it 
illustrates that three key political and economic changes have influenced the number of 
large-scale farms in Zambia. First, in the years following Zambia’s attainment of 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1964, the Zambian government pursued 
strong nationalization policies such as the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act in 1975 that 
aimed to increase the engagement of indigenous Zambians in the agricultural sector. The 
Act vested all land in the President, who held it in perpetuity for the people of Zambia 
(Adams, 2003). This post-independence period coincides with the first spike in Zambian-
owned large-scale farms that occurred in the late 1970’s.  
Second, in the late 1990’s, both Zambian and foreign owned large-scale farms increased 
significantly. This increase was driven by the adoption of the Land Act of 1995 that 
allowed foreign investors to acquire land in Zambia via leasehold (Nolte, 2014). The last 
spike in large-scale farms occurs after the year 2010 for foreign-owned large-scale farms. 
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 The exception being Germany that only has three large-scale farms in Zambia but cultivates 32,572 
hectares Amatheon Agri, a German owned large-scale farm that acquired 30,000 hectares in Mumbwa, 
accounts for the bulk of land cultivated by large-scale farm investors from Germany. 




This confirms that foreign large-scale investments have indeed increased their presence 
in Zambia in the years following the 2007-2008 food price crisis. 
Figure 2.1. Large-scale farm acquisitions over time 
Source: Authors own based on the 2013/2014 PHS on Large-Scale Agricultural Holdings. 
Where are large-scale farms located? 
Figure 2.2 shows the wards that have hosted large-scale farms since 1995.11 The larger the 
area that is under cultivation by large-scale farms, the darker the ward is shaded. We 
show the cumulative development of the area cultivated over time, with the first map in 
the top left corner covering the period between 1994 and 1999 and the next maps 
illustrating five year intervals until 2014.  
                                                 
11
 The Land Act 1995 is a crucial event in Zambia, a new era for commercial farms in Zambia. We hence 
consider all farms as of 1995 to be part of this new wave of commercialization. See Nolte (2014) for a 





















































































As can be seen in the map, large-scale farms are only concentrated in a few wards in 
Zambia. Moreover, one can see that most new large-scale farms are located in wards that 
already had large-scale farms prior to 1995. This hints at the agglomeration of large-scale 
farms in certain wards. To better understand this non-random distribution, we undertake 
an analysis of the wards that host large-scale farms using various spatial datasets. 
Figure 2.2. Location of large-scale farms  
 








Does infrastructure influence the location of large-scale farms? 
The areas shaded grey in Figure 2.3, illustrate three buffers (10, 25 and 50 km) between 
wards with large-scale farms, important transport infrastructure (main roads and railway 
routes) and urban centers (cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants).12  
Figure 2.3. Large-scale farms and infrastructure. 
Source: Own display based on data from the Digital Chart of the World (roads and railroads), and the 
U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (cities) with cross-checking recent population sizes at 
http://www.citypopulation.de/Zambia-Cities.html. 
                                                 
12 Sitko and Chamberlin (2016) use a travel-time model to estimate market access which shows similar 
patterns to the buffer areas. We opted for this simplified approach as we look at wards, i.e. larger polygons 
instead of exact coordinates. This display is meant to provide a rough overview on accessibility in Zambia. 
We use three different buffers (10, 25 and 50 kilometers) to show different degrees of access. 




In addition, we calculated the Euclidian distance between the nearest point of a ward 
with a large-scale farm and a) a highway (mean: 43.9 km) b) a railroad (mean: 43.3 km) 
and c) a city with more than 20.000 inhabitants (mean: 42.7 km).  
Considering the shortest distance to one of these infrastructural features only, the 
distance to a ward that hosts a large-scale farm is 24.5 km on average whereas the 
distance to wards without large-scale farms is 64 km on average. We can see both from 
the map and the average distance that with a few exceptions, wards targeted by large-
scale farms are relatively close to main transport infrastructure and/ or urban centers.  
Does the idle land narrative hold for Zambia? 
A number of studies have established that large-scale farms are not located on ‘idle land’ 
as was previously reported (Messerli et. al. 2014). We examine whether this growing 
consensus on large-scale farm location and idle land is also valid for Zambia by looking at 
the main land-cover of wards with large-scale farms in the year 2000.13  
Starting from the top right of Figure 2.4 and moving in an anti-clockwise manner, we 
superimpose the boundaries of wards with large-scale farms (outlined in black) over maps 
of: cropland cover; shrub and herbaceous cover; and tree cover. The map in the bottom 
right corner combines all three land-covers. One can see that all three types of land-cover 
are present in wards that host large-scale farms. Cropland is most frequent along the line 
of rail and coincides with large-scale farm presence. Thus, most wards targeted by large-
scale farmers already had cropland in 2000. One striking observation is that many of the 
wards that host large-scale farms were largely covered by trees in 2000. This hints at the 
scale of deforestation that occurs when land is prepared for farming activities and at the 
same time a loss of income for local communities since forest land is a source of firewood 
and non-timber forest products. 
 
                                                 
13
 The year 2000 is selected as the start data due to data availability. 




Figure 2.4. Land cover and large-scale farms 
Own display based on data from GLC 2000 (resampled by DIVA-GIS onto a 30 seconds grid). 
Do agro-ecological conditions determine the location of large-scale farms? 
Arezki et al. (2015) show that agro-ecological potential is one of the major determinants 
of land based investment. In Figure 2.5, we investigate whether wards that host large-
scale farms have better soil quality than wards without such farms. 
To construct a measure of soil quality we combine the seven soil characteristics that have 
been identified as being good for crop production by the Harmonized World Soil 
Database.14 The map shows the mean soil quality values, with the green cells indicating 
high soil quality and the red cells indicating low soil quality. From Figure 2.5, it is easy to 
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 The seven soil characteristics are 1) nutrient availability, 2) nutrient retention capacity, 3) rooting 
conditions, 4) oxygen availability to roots, 5) excess salts, 6) toxicity, and 7) workability. For further 
information, please refer to: http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/External-World-soil-
database/HTML/SoilQuality.html?sb=10. All soil classes are scaled between 1 and 7. We add up all values for 
the seven individual soil classes and divide this by seven so that our result is equally scaled between 1 and 7. 
A value of 7 indicates the best soil quality and 1 very low soil quality. 




see that the majority of wards with large-scale farms are located in regions with high soil 
quality. Sitko et al. (2015: pp. 12) show that the southern part of Zambia has the highest 
variation in intra- and inter-seasonal rainfall and is also the driest part of the country.  
Figure 2.5. Soil quality and large-scale farms. 
 
Own display based on the Harmonized World Soil Database from IIASA and FAO (Fischer et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, our data shows that wards targeted by large-scale farms are located both in 
the Northern and the Southern parts of Zambia. Thus we assume that historical legacy 
plays out: European settler agriculture occurred in the Southern parts of Zambia (Sitko et 
al., 2015:12) and thus investors today might prefer regions with a tradition in large-scale 
farming despite the rainfall patterns not being ideal. 




Do smallholders’ socio-economic characteristics determine the location of large-scale 
farms?  
Differences in the socio-economic characteristics of smallholders living in wards with 
large-scale farms may determine the location of large-scale farms. For instance, if a large-
scale farm is labor intensive, the large-scale farm owners may decide to set up their farm 
in densely populated areas where they are assured that labor is readily available.  
Table 2.2 compares the socio-economic characteristics of wards that host large-scale 
farms with those that do not host such farms. The population in wards with large-scale 
farms is significantly higher than in wards without large-scale farms for both the years 
2000 and 2010 when national census data was collected. The poverty head count is also 
larger in wards that host large-scale farms. However, there are no significant differences 
in population density and the incidence of poverty across these wards.  
Comparing smallholder households in wards with and without large-scale farms for the 
years 2002/2003, 2003/2004, 2004/2005, 2005/2006, and the years 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 
2012/ 2013, we observe that there are many statistically significant differences across the 
socio-economic characteristics of smallholders. These results are reported for the years 
2003-2006 and 2011-2013 in the lower panels of Table 2.2.15 In both time periods, 
smallholder households in wards with large-scale farms tend to be larger than those 
without large-scale farms. In addition, households in wards with large-scale farms in 
2003-2006 have significantly larger areas under cultivation, grow more cash crops, apply 
more fertilizer and have higher maize yields.  
                                                 
15 For the sake of brevity, these two periods will henceforth be referred to as 2003 to 2006 and 2011 to 2013. 
Survey data from the years 2006/2007, 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 which coincide with the global food price 
crisis are not reported due to the reasons outlined in section 2.2. 




Table 2.2. Ward and smallholders’ socio-economic characteristics  
 Ward socio-economic characteristics 
 
Wards with large-scale farms Wards without large-scale farms 
 Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Population 2000 10386.64 5866.03 6821.23 4116.14 0.00 
Population 2010 12709.86 7181.67 8367.11 5643.20 0.00 
  28.04 24.28 31.02 62.89 0.32 
Number of poor 2010 10593.89 6088.28 6739.76 4059.90 0.00 
Poverty headcount 2010 0.78 0.11 0.81 0.12 0.09 
Observations 28 323 
 Smallholder socio-economic characteristics (2003-2006) 
 Wards with large-scale farms Wards without large-scale farms 
 Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Age of household head 45.69 14.87 44.95 14.88 0.07 
Years of schooling of household head 8.27 5.01 8.62 5.29 0.17 
Number of household members 6.88 3.49 6.52 3.13 0.01 
Household grows cash crops (dummy=1 if yes) 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.00 
Total fertilizer used per hectare (in kg) 54.12 104.31 48.82 128.23 0.01 
Maize harvest (kg) 2003.31 4578.58 1492.63 3053.57 0.00 
Maize yield 1310.81 918.18 1455.65 990.61 0.00 
Household asset index 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household 2.42 2.60 1.91 1.87 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household for maize 1.22 1.45 0.95 1.16 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household for staple crops 0.18 0.43 0.27 0.64 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household for cash crops 0.65 1.24 0.31 0.76 0.00 
Share of small farms (<1.42 hectares) 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.00 
Share of big farms (1.42 to 20 hectares) 0.55 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.00 
Observations 1,107 9,158 




 Smallholder socio-economic characteristics (2011-2013) 
 Wards with large-scale farms Wards without large-scale farms  
 Mean SD Mean SD p-value 
Age of household head 44.95 14.89 44.80 14.51 0.73 
Years of schooling of household head 4.77 3.97 4.51 3.89 0.04 
Number of household members 7.15 3.66 6.56 2.99 0.02 
Household grows cash crops (dummy=1 if yes) 0.20 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.00 
Total fertilizer used per hectare (in kg) 120.33 140.36 125.51 155.46 0.59 
Maize harvest (kg) 4528.63 7635.83 2900.69 5369.45 0.70 
Maize yield 1758.47 1148.64 1804.21 1214.61 0.21 
Household asset index16 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household 3.30 3.02 2.16 2.23 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household for maize 2.04 2.20 1.33 1.58 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household for staple crops 0.03 0.24 0.13 0.52 0.00 
Hectares cultivated by household for cash crops 0.72 1.06 0.26 0.67 0.00 
Share of small farms (<1.42 hectares) 0.30 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.00 
Share of big farms (1.42 to 20 hectares) 0.70 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.00 
Observations 1.321 11.015    
Sources: Population and population density from CSO ward shapefiles, poverty headcount from de la Fuente (2015). The poverty head 
count is the proportion of the population that lives below the national poverty line which is valued at the cost of the national food basket in 2010 
(ZMW 96,366) All other data is sourced from the PHS on Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Holdings.
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 The asset index is constructed from a linear index of households’ physical assets whose weights have been obtained using a principal components 
analysis. It includes the household’s ownership of assets such as ploughs, harrows, tractors, ox-carts, vehicles, water pumps, cattle and livestock. 




Moreover, these households own more assets and have a higher share of farms that are 
larger than the median smallholder farm of 1.42 hectares. Interestingly, we observe that 
smallholders in wards without large-scale farms not only catch up with regards to 
fertilizer use but even exceed the amount of fertilizer used by smallholders in wards with 
large-scale farms in 2011-2013.This high amount of fertilizer usage is not commensurate 
with maize yields, as maize yields tend to be higher in wards without large-scale farms. 
Examining the trends over time, we observe a drastic increase in fertilizer use and maize 
harvest. We further observe that both smallholders in wards with large-scale farms and 
smallholders in wards without large-scale farms increase the area that they cultivate. A 
striking insight concerns the share of small and big farms (we compare smallholders that 
are smaller and larger than the median farm size of 1.42 hectares): while the share of big 
farms increases for both sets of smallholders between the two time periods, the increase 
in wards with large-scale farms is particularly striking as we remain with only 30 percent 
of farms below 1.42 hectares.  
A first descriptive overview on large-scale farms in Zambia and the analysis of local 
geographical contexts shows that some of the commonly held perceptions do not hold for 
Zambia: we observe that large-scale farms are not located on idle land but in wards that 
are well connected to infrastructure, that already have some land under large-scale 
cultivation and that have significant amounts of tree cover and good soil quality. In 
addition, we discover that smallholders in wards hosting large-scale farms tend to have 
larger farms, focus more on cash crops and have higher yields than their counterparts in 
wards without large-scale farms. Over time, we see huge increases in fertilizer use and 
yields in both types of wards. Strikingly, the share of small farms decreases at a rapid rate 








2.4  Effects of large-scale farms on smallholder households 
2.4.1 Hypotheses 
In this section we derive three main hypotheses that are based on the literature on the 
impacts of large-scale farms on surrounding smallholder communities. First, we are 
interested in examining how the presence of large-scale farms in a ward affects the area 
cultivated by smallholders. If smallholders do not have legally recognized land rights, the 
arrival of large-scale farms within their community may be accompanied by a heightened 
sense of uncertainty, land scarcity or tenure insecurity (Cotula, 2011; Sipangule, 2017). The 
area cultivated by smallholders may be negatively affected by the presence of large-scale 
farms if large-scale farms displace smallholders and/ or if they heighten land scarcity and 
tenure insecurity. We would therefore expect a negative relationship between large-scale 
farms and smallholders’ area cultivated (H1: a). 
For the case of Mkushi in Central Zambia, Chu (2013) shows that large-scale farm 
investors prefer to acquire titled state land within already established commercial 
farming areas over displacing smallholders from communal land. This suggests that in 
many cases, large-scale farms do not expand to smallholder land. This in turn, limits the 
negative effects on smallholder area cultivated as outlined in hypothesis H1: a. Taking 
these considerations into account, we posit that if large-scale farms acquire land from 
markets that are not accessible to smallholders, the expansion of large-scale farms in a 
ward will not affect the area cultivated by smallholders. Thus we do not expect an effect 
on smallholders cultivated area (H1: b). 
Lastly, large-scale farms may speed up the existing trend of land consolidation (Jayne et 
al., 2014; Jayne et al., 2016) and contribute to an expansion in the area cultivated by 
smallholders. Matenga and Hichaambwa (2017) provide evidence for this in a study where 
they compare a large-scale plantation, a medium to large-scale commercial farming area 
and an out-grower scheme that supplies sugarcane to a large-scale farm for processing. 
They find that the out-grower scheme leads to the agglomeration or pooling of family 




land into consolidated land blocks. For the case at hand, we expect that if some 
smallholders reduce their area cultivated and medium-scale farmers expand, the average 
area cultivated by smallholders would rise. Furthermore, if the presence of large-scale 
farms in a ward results in positive spill-overs for smallholders, smallholders may respond 
to these spill-overs by increasing their area cultivated (H1: c).  
The effects outlined in our threefold hypothesis could be occurring simultaneously, thus 
making the direction of the net effect on smallholders’ area cultivated dependent on 
which effect (H1: a, H1: b or H1: c) is more dominant. 
Second, we test whether the presence of large-scale farms increases smallholders’ access 
to fertilizer. Studies conducted in other sub-Saharan African countries, find that 
smallholders benefit from the increased access to agricultural infrastructure and inputs 
provided by large-scale farms. For instance, Deininger and Xia (2016) show that 
smallholders living within a 50 kilometer radius of large-scale farms in Mozambique have 
increased access to agricultural technologies in the short term. Similar results that hint at 
positive spillovers on fertilizer, yields and improved seed use in Ethiopia have been 
observed by Ali et al. (2016).  
In Zambia, smallholder access to fertilizer is largely determined by the Farmer Input 
Support Program (FISP). The FISP – formerly known as the Farmer Support Program 
(FSP) – is a government subsidy that was introduced in 2002 with the initial goal of 
increasing private sector participation in agricultural input markets. A second goal of 
increasing household food security and incomes was adopted in 2009/2010 when the FSP 
was reformed to the FISP (Resnick and Mason, 2016). In spite of its growth enhancing and 
poverty reducing objectives, the FISP has resulted in the crowding out of private sector 
fertilizer supplies and in reductions in the total amount of fertilizer available for 
smallholders in some regions of Zambia (Xu et al., 2009). 
Taking the FISP into account, we posit a second twofold hypothesis: First, large-scale 
farms may increase smallholders’ access to fertilizer, if there are no distortionary effects 
caused by the FISP (H2: a). Second, if the subsidy program leads to a crowding out of the 




private sector, we do not expect smallholders’ access to fertilizer in wards with large-scale 
farms to increase (H2: b). 
Lastly, we investigate how smallholders’ maize yields are affected by the increasing 
presence of large-scale farms in wards. We select maize yields as our outcome variable as 
maize is a staple crop grown by all smallholders in our sample. We expect that learning 
effects, increased access to infrastructure and agricultural technologies that arise from the 
presence of a large-scale farm in a ward increase smallholders’ investments at the 
intensive margin and causes them to increase their maize yields (H3). However it is likely 
that these yield enhancing effects may be undermined if large-scale farms have adverse 
environmental effects on smallholders. For instance, Mujenja and Wonani (2012) show 
that large-scale farms are responsible for the emission of toxic substances into the air, 
water and soil. In addition, they find that large-scale farms contribute to the 
contamination of ground water through the excessive use of chemical fertilizers and 
aerial pesticide sprays. Johansson et al. (2016) find that land acquisitions heavily draw on 
freshwater resources and therewith overconsume surface and ground water. 
2.4.2 Estimation strategy 
We adopt a difference–in-differences approach that compares the three agricultural 
outcomes outlined above for smallholders in wards with large-scale farms to that of 
smalholders in wards with no such farms. More specifically, we compare the difference in 
the change in the hectares cultivated by smallholders, maize yields or access to fertiliser, 
between the years 2003 to 2006 and 2011 to 2013 for smallholder households. Our decision 
to examine changes before and after these two periods is motivated by the occurrence of 
the 2007-2008 food price crisis as well as by the availability of PHS data. As pointed out 
by several scholars and confirmed by Figure 1, the period directly after the 2007-2008 food 
price crisis was exceptional in that it led to an increase in foreign–owned large-scale 
farms. Thus it is reasonable to study the period directly before and after this shock. We 
pool the data into two time periods to ease the intepretability of the results. This 
approach has also been adopted by others using multiple cross-sectional data, see for 




instance (Abramitzky and Lavy, 2014). All wards that have hosted large-scale farms since 
the year 2003 are considered for the analysis. The year 2003 is selected as the start date 
because ward-level data is not available for earlier PHS datasets.  
We thus estimate: 
𝑌𝑖𝑤𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑤𝑡+𝛽4𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑤𝑤 + 𝑖𝑤𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑤𝑡 represents the logs of hectares, first cultivated for all crops, and later for 
maize only, maize yields or access to fertilizer by a smallholder household 𝑖 in a ward 𝑤 at 
time 𝑡. The time dummy 𝑡 is equal to 1 for the years 2011-2013 and 0 for the earlier years. 
 𝑇𝑤𝑡𝑡 which is the main explanatory variable of interest is an interaction term between the 
treatment dummy 𝑇𝑤𝑡 and 𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑤𝑡 is a vector of household and ward-level control 
variables, 𝑦𝑡are year dummies and 𝑤𝑤 represents ward-level fixed effects. 𝑖𝑤𝑡 is the error 
term. 
2.4.3 Econometric considerations 
The difference-in-differences strategy we adopt does not account for selection bias that 
may arise due to the non-random location of the large-scale farms. If the location of the 
large-scale farms is partially determined by smallholders’ agricultural outcomes this 
would bias the results. One way to correct this bias would be through the use of 
propensity score matching that would match the observed pre-treatment characteristics 
of similar smallholders across wards with and without large-scale farms. However, the 
dataset at hand does not allow us to perform such a matching strategy as it does not 
contain sufficient pre-treatment variables that simultaneously influence the location of 
large-scale farms and smallholders’ agricultural outcomes (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
Since the analysis of the local geographical contexts of large-scale farms in the previous 
section reveals that infrastructure and soil quality are more important determinants of 
large-scale farm locations than smallholders’ agricultural outcomes we are confident that 
selection bias is not a major problem for our analysis. 




Furthermore, endogeneity bias may arise because smallholders in wards with large-scale 
farms are on different trajectories than those in wards without large-scale farms. This 
would violate the parallel trends assumption associated with difference-in-differences 
analyses (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). A common approach adopted in the literature is to 
graph the trajectories of the treatment and control group to confirm that they followed a 
common underlying trend prior to the intervention (Hastings, 2004). Taking this 
approach, Figures 2.A.1-2.A.3 in the appendix show that the maize harvested, fertilizer 
used and hectares cultivated by smallholders in the treatment and control groups were on 
parallel trajectories prior to 2007-2008 food price crisis. 
Moreover, the use of ward–year fixed effects enables us to wipe out any time invariant 
variables that would otherwise bias the results.  
2.4.4  Results 
First, we examine whether the increasing presence of large-scale farms in a ward reduces 
the areas cultivated by smallholders (H1). Table 2.3 reports the results of the difference-
in-differences estimation. The first two columns show the impacts of large-scale farms on 
the total area cultivated by smallholders while Columns 3 and 4 show how the area 
cultivated for maize by smallholders is affected by large-scale farms. The main 
explanatory variable of interest – the interaction between the treatment and time variable 
(Treat_time) - shows that large-scale farms have positively and significantly affected the 
area cultivated by smallholders. In the full regression models where we control for the 
household heads’ characteristics (columns 2 and 4), we observe that the total area 
cultivated and the area cultivated for maize increase by 15 and 13 percent respectively. 
This result is statistically significant for all smallholders at the 1 percent level. Over time, 
we can see that the area cultivated significantly increases for all smallholders. The total 
area cultivated increases by 6 percent while the area cultivated for maize increases by 33 
percent (columns 2 and 4). This is in line with the descriptives statistics in Table 2.2 that 
also indicate a rise in area cultivated. 
 




Table 2.3. Large-scale farms and smallholders’ cultivated area. 











     
Treat_time 0.231*** 0.154*** 0.164*** 0.131*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Time 0.097*** 0.056*** 0.343*** 0.332*** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
Age of household head  0.042***  0.038*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Age of household head squared  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female household head  -0.303***  -0.261*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Years of schooling  0.008***  0.013*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Asset index based on pca  2.236***  2.100*** 
  (0.042)  (0.044) 
Household grows cash crop  0.164***  -0.050** 
  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Constant 0.344*** -1.005*** -0.450*** -1.733*** 
 (0.017) (0.051) (0.017) (0.053) 
     
Observations 22,601 19,960 22,601 19,960 
R-squared 0.011 0.201 0.030 0.180 
Number of ward_id_2010 349 349 349 349 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 2.4 further examines whether this result also holds for heterogeneous groups of 
smallholders – smallholders that cultivate small farms (below the median farm size of 1.42 
hectares) and smallholders that cultivate big farms ( between 1.42 and 20 hectares) – and 
for the area cultivated for other crops than maize. We observe that the presence of large-
scale farms in a ward significantly increases the total area cultivated for both small and 
large farms by 9 and 8 percent (columns 1 and 2). 
 




Table 2.4. Large-scale farms and smallholders’ area cultivated for different crops 


























          
Treat_time 0.090* 0.080** 0.096* 0.003 -0.200* -0.073 -0.198** 0.030 
 
(0.053) (0.033) (0.055) (0.045) (0.117) (0.088) (0.079) (0.100) 
Time -0.002 0.063*** 0.188*** 0.413*** -1.074*** -1.148*** 0.190*** 0.101* 
 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.052) (0.051) (0.036) -0.058 
Age of household head 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.010** 0.008 0.002 0.017*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
Age of household head 
squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female household head -0.170*** -0.085*** -0.152*** -0.073*** -0.005 -0.049 -0.158*** -0.252*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.030) (0.039) (0.021) (0.044) 
Years of schooling 0.003** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.011*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.005*** -0.007** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Asset index based on pca 0.944*** 1.236*** 0.738*** 1.313*** 0.110 -0.058 0.907*** 1.587*** 
 
(0.084) (0.032) (0.087) (0.044) (0.184) (0.087) (0.125) (0.098) 
Grows cash crop 0.198*** 0.020 -0.142*** -0.133*** 0.069 0.042 2.313*** 1.274*** 
 
(0.031) (0.014) (0.032) (0.020) (0.069) (0.039) (0.047) (0.044) 
Constant -1.011*** 0.447*** -1.572*** -0.628*** -3.125*** -2.855*** -4.426*** -3.340*** 
 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.055) (0.067) (0.116) (0.132) (0.078) (0.150) 
         Observations 9,761 10,199 9,761 10,199 9,761 10,199 9,761 10,199 
R-squared 0.054 0.162 0.043 0.148 0.062 0.071 0.239 0.129 
Number of ward_id_2010 349 344 349 344 349 344 349 344 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Examining how the area cultivated for different crops is affected, we observe that 
smallholders cultivating smaller farms in wards with large-scale farms increase the 
area of land cultivated for maize by 10 percent (column 3) but decrease the area 
cultivated for other staples (millet, cassava, rice, and sorghum) and cash crops 
(tobacco, cotton, sunflower) (columns 5 and 7). This suggests that smallholders with 
smaller farms favor the cultivation of maize. In contrast, we do not observe any 
significant crop specific effects for smallholders cultivating bigger farms but find 
positive signs for maize and cash crops.  
Taken together, we find evidence of an increase in the area cultivated by 
smallholders, supporting hypothesis H1:c. The area cultivated for all crops and for 
maize is larger for smallholders that are located in wards with large-scale farms. 
Moreover, we observe that the presence of large-scale farms in a ward leads 
smallholders to switch the allocation of land from the cultivation of traditional 
staples and cash crops to maize 
Next, we examine whether the presence of large-scale farms in a ward over time 
increases smallholders access to inorganic fertilizer, or whether it has no effect on 
fertilizer use (H2: a and H2: b). Table 2.5 reports the results. The variable of interest 
(Treat_time) has a negative sign for all smallholders as well as for those smallholder 
with smaller and those with bigger farms. Only the co-efficient for smallholders with 
small farms is statistically significant.17 This negative finding is in line with the 
descriptives presented in Table 2.2 that hint at smallholders in wards without large-
scale farms overtaking those in wards with large-scale farms with regards to fertilizer 
use. The negative result could also be indicative of the crowding-out effect of private 
fertiliser suppliers in regions that have large-scale farms. 
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 Regressions were also conducted separately for the two most commonly used inorganic fertilizers in 
Zambia i.e. basal and top dressing fertilizer Burke et al., (2016). However similar negative and 
insignificant results were obtained for the impact of large-scale farms on smallholders’ access to these 
fertilizer types. 





Table 2.5. Large-scale farms and smallholders’ fertilizer access 







    
Treat_time -0.016 -0.062* -0.026 
 (0.020) (0.036) (0.025) 
Time 0.377*** 0.353*** 0.400*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
Household received FISP subsidy in 2006 0.584*** 0.638*** 0.521*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.026) 
Female household head -0.042*** -0.022** -0.017 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Total hectares cultivated per household 0.028*** 0.180*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.002) 
Age of household head 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of household head squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index based on pca 0.271*** 0.309*** 0.278*** 
 (0.024) (0.057) (0.026) 
Household grows cash crop -0.033*** -0.052** -0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) 
Constant 0.073*** -0.014 0.217*** 
 (0.026) (0.036) (0.037) 
Observations    
R-squared 19,960 9,761 10,199 
Number of ward_id_2010 0.307 0.343 0.258 
Year FE 349 349 344 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the FISP is a major determinant of 
smallholders’ fertilizer access. Households that received fertilizer from the FISP in 




2006 had approximately 52 to 64 percent more access to fertilizer as shown by a 
dummy introduced in our regressions.18  
Table 2.6. Large-scale farms and smallholders’ maize yields 
 (1) (2) (3) 









    
Treat_time 0.229*** 0.215 0.170** 
 (0.071) (0.136) (0.080) 
Time -0.177*** -0.153** -0.172*** 
 (0.039) (0.063) (0.048) 
Age of household head 0.005 0.010* 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age of household head squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female household head -0.116*** -0.149*** -0.083** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.036) 
Years of schooling 0.008*** 0.004 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Access to Fertilizer (1=yes) 0.601*** 0.668*** 0.509*** 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.032) 
Asset index based on pca 1.119*** 1.367*** 1.168*** 
 (0.084) (0.227) (0.087) 
Household grows cash crop 0.029 -0.058 0.055 
 (0.035) (0.082) (0.036) 
Hectares cultivated per household -0.040*** -0.064 -0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.045) (0.005) 
Constant 6.649*** 6.579*** 6.664*** 
 (0.090) (0.137) (0.121) 
    
Observations 18,872 9,294 9,578 
R-squared 0.073 0.059 0.091 
Number of ward_id_2010 349 348 344 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 The data set only provides information on the distribution of the FSP across smallholders for the 
year 2006 and not the whole study period. 




Lastly, we examine whether smallholders’ maize yields are affected by the presence 
of large-scale farms. Table 2.6 shows that maize yields for all smallholders 
significantly rise by 23 percent if they are located in a ward with a large-scale farm. 
Columns 2 and 3 split the sample into smaller and bigger smallholder farms. For 
both groups of smallholders, we find positive signs, but only the results for bigger 
farms are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
2.4.5  Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness tests to test the validity of our results. First, we check 
the specification: rather than pooling the data sets into a before and after period as 
in the previous set of regressions, we now interact the treatment variable with each 
year following the 2007-2008 food price crises. The three new outcome variables of 
interest are reported as Treat_2011, Treat_2012 and Treat_2013 in Table 2.A.2. The 
first two columns show the total areas cultivated by smallholders and the total area 
cultivated for maize, the third column shows the results for maize yields. As can be 
seen in Table 2.A.2, using interactions between the individual years and treatment 
variable does not considerably change the results from the ones presented for 
hectares cultivated and maize yields in Tables 2.3 and 2.6. For instance, smallholders 
in wards with large-scale farms experience an increase in total areas cultivated of 12 
to 17 percent over the three years which does not diverge from the 15 percent 
increment reported in column 2 of Table 2.3. 
Second, we check our sample: as described in the previous sections, Zambia has had 
a long history of large-scale agriculture that dates back to before 2003. In Table 
2.A.3, we check whether the results obtained also hold if we account for the fact that 
large-scale farms existed prior to 2003 by introducing a dummy for wards that 
hosted large-scale farms prior to 2003 that we interact with the time variable to 
obtain a new outcome variable (All_treat_time). The results highlight that large-




scale farms still affect smallholders’ area cultivated and maize yields in a similar way 
although the effect sizes are smaller.19  
Lastly, we examine whether analyzing the impacts of large-scale farms on the 
quantity of fertilizer applied per hectare yields different results compared to the 
fertilizer dummy used in Table 2.5. Again, all signs reported in Table 2.A.4 are 
negative suggesting a decrease in fertilizer usage in those wards hosting large-scale 
farms. For smallholders cultivating big farms, we even get statistically significant 
results (at the 5 percent level, column 3).  
2.5  Discussion and conclusion 
The emergence of LSAIs in the Global South is widely discussed and Zambia is a 
well-sought after target country. Based on a census of large-scale farms with ward 
locational information, we are able to paint a comprehensive picture of large-scale 
farms in Zambia. This unique data set allows us to analyze the local geographical 
contexts of wards targeted by large-scale farms. We investigate these areas and have 
sufficient evidence to dismiss the ‘idle’ land narrative: We find that land targeted by 
investors is close to infrastructure and markets. Moreover, large-scale farms are 
often established in areas with a tradition in large-scale farming as evidenced by the 
agglomeration of large-scale farms in certain wards. This confirms that large-scale 
farms are typically set up in close proximity to smallholders, and that the question of 
how small and large farms interact is crucial. To better understand the impacts of 
large-scale farms on smallholders, we derive several hypotheses that are tested using 
a difference-in-differences estimation with ward and year fixed effects. 
This analysis yields three main results: First, we find that smallholders located in 
wards with large-scale farms tend to increase the area cultivated. Interestingly we 
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 We also run separate regressions with these specifications for smallholders cultivating small and big 
farms and find results similar to the ones reported in Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, albeit with different 
effect sizes.  




also observe that smallholders that cultivate small areas of land and are located in 
wards that host large-scale farms instead reduce the areas of land dedicated to 
growing staples and cash crops in order to expand their maize production. 
Given our threefold hypothesis, we expect multiple dynamics to simultaneously 
affect the relationship between large-scale farms and smallholders’ area cultivated. 
We find a positive relationship which can be explained in two ways: first, it is likely 
that the rise of medium-scale farms may be driving our result. Assuming that 
medium-scale farms are likely to target the same regions as large-scale farms, we 
cannot rule out that the increase in area cultivated by smallholders is partially driven 
by a process of land consolidation during which less efficient smallholders sell or 
rent land to medium-scale farmers (Jayne et al., 2016). In fact, our descriptive 
statistics confirm a general trend of a rising medium-scale agricultural sector and 
shrinking number of land poor smallholders that has been found in the literature 
(for instance Anseeuw 2016 and Jayne et al., 2016). As we do not have smallholder 
panel data, we cannot follow changes in smallholders’ landholdings over time. Thus, 
in this case of a positive relationship between large-scale farms and smallholders’ 
area, we cannot say with certainty what drives our results. Second, we do not find 
any support for the hypothesis that large-scale farms increase smallholders’ access to 
fertilizer as has been found to be the case for neighboring Mozambique (Deininger 
and Xia, 2016). However, one should note that the results on fertilizer are to be 
interpreted with caution as the FISP is a major determinant of smallholders’ 
fertilizer use. Albeit insignificant, our finding that fertilizer access decreases in wards 
where large-scale farms are active is unexpected. This could hint at the crowding-out 
of private sector fertilizer suppliers in these regions; however we lack sufficient data 
to say this with certainty. Further research is required to better understand these 
mechanisms. 




Third, we find yield increases in wards with large-scale farms. Based on the 
literature, we assume that learning effects, increased access to infrastructure and 
agricultural technologies outweigh any negative impacts associated with large-scale 
farms. The positive results may also be explained by the fact that smallholders 
cultivating larger areas of land rent or purchase land cultivated by smaller 
smallholders and produce more efficiently – especially given that the result is only 
statistically significant for bigger smallholders. 
We cannot capture the trade-offs between these different effects in our analysis. It is 
highly likely that both positive and negative effects go hand in hand. For instance, an 
increase in smallholder productivity as evidenced by higher yields might be 
accompanied by adverse environmental effects. Moreover, it is not clear whether this 
effect would last in the long term as negative environmental impacts such as soil 
degradation may compromise smallholders’ productivity. Hence, we argue that 
effects have to be considered and evaluated at large. Policy makers and investors 
should be transparent about the fact that investment projects are likely to be 
accompanied by both favorable and less favorable effects. 
We close this analysis with some ideas for future research. First, more 
comprehensive and longitudinal smallholder data would allow us to include more 
outcome variables that highlight the linkages between large-scale farms and 
smallholders. Data that allows us to separately estimate the impacts of medium- and 
large-scale farms would especially be useful in disentangling the mechanisms 
through which smallholder outcomes are affected. Such data would also provide us 
with more insights on the trend of land consolidation that is taking place 
simultaneously. Furthermore, detailed data on large-scale farm labor would enable 
us to analyze the spatial and temporal dimensions of employment effects of large-
scale farms on smallholders in their vicinities. For instance, we would expect that 
smallholders are employed in the early project stages but as the years of operation of 




large-scale farms increase, mechanized methods reduce the associated employment 
effects. Employment effects are also expected to be stronger for smallholders living 
in the direct proximity of large-scale farms compared to those further away. In 
addition, our data does not enable us to capture any environmental effects that may 
accompany the clearing of land for agriculture, the increased application of 
inorganic fertilizers and pesticides as well as the increased pressure on ground water 
levels by large-scale farms. Moreover, better data on the investment projects would 
allow for a clearer distinction between the crops cultivated by investors as well as the 
influence from their countries of origin and other investor traits. Finally, better 
spatial data that includes the exact geographic coordinates of smallholders and 
large-scale farms would be helpful in measuring how the effects on smallholders vary 
with the distance to large-scale farms.  
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Table 2.A.1. The distribution of hectares cultivated by smallholders 
2002/2003 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.64 1.07 1.4 93.06 
5-10 hectares 6.7 1.17 6.48 5.91 
0.79 10-15 hectares 12.44 1.34 12.76 
15-20 hectares 18.05 1.65 18.32 0.24 
2003/2004 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.62 1.04 1.42 93.92 
5-10 hectares 6.44 1.18 6.07 5.41 
10-15 hectares 11.36 0.98 11 0.52 
15-20 hectares 17.5 1.35 18 0.16 
2004/2005 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.54 1.06 1.25 94.69 
5-10 hectares 6.61 1.23 6.2 4.59 
10-15 hectares 11.55 1.39 11.07 0.57 
15-20 hectares 17.24 1.68 16.52 0.15 
2005/2006 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.41 1.03 1.13 92.83 
5-10 hectares 6.8 1.4 6.34 5.36 
10-15 hectares 11.89 1.26 11.87 1.58 
15-20 hectares 16.99 1.43 17 0.24 
2010/2011 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.57 1.11 1.25 92.21 
5-10 hectares 6.68 1.34 6.48 6.44 
10-15 hectares 11.86 1.43 11.4 0.97 
0.38 15-20 hectares 16-56 1.35 16.06 
2011/2012 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.66 1.15 1.38 89.35 
5-10 hectares 6.7 1.18 6.48 8.73 
10-15 hectares 11.87 1.3 11.56 1.52 
15-20 hectares 16.69 1.3 16.5 0.40 
2012/2013 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Median Share 
0-5 hectares 1.71 1.16 1.42 90.46 
7.70 5-10 hectares 6.64 1.27 6.25 
10-15 hectares 12.35 1.31 12.18 1.44 
15-20 hectares 17.54 1.54 17.81 0.40 
  





Table 2.A.2. Maize yields and area cultivated and (yearly treatment) 
 (1) (2) (3) 






    
Treat_2011 0.168*** 0.107* 0.221** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.098) 
Treat_2012 0.176*** 0.138*** 0.219** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.089) 
Treat_2013 0.123** 0.143*** 0.245*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.086) 
Age of household head 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Age of household head squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female household head -0.303*** -0.261*** -0.116*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) 
Years of schooling 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Access to Fertilizer (1=yes)   0.601*** 
   (0.025) 
Asset index based on pca 2.237*** 2.100*** 1.119*** 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.085) 
Household grows cash crop 0.163*** -0.050** 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) 
Total hectares cultivated per hh   -0.040*** 
   (0.005) 
Constant -1.005*** -1.733*** 6.648*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.090) 
    
Observations 19,960 19,960 18,872 
R-squared 0.201 0.180 0.073 
Number of ward_id_2010 349 349 349 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  




Table 2.A.3. Maize yields and area cultivated and (Farms before 2003) 







    
All_treat_time 0.106*** 0.074** 0.125** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.061) 
Time 0.057*** 0.336*** -0.169*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.039) 
Age of household head 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Age of household head squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female household head -0.303*** -0.261*** -0.116*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) 
Years of schooling 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Access to Fertilizer (1=yes)   0.601*** 
   (0.025) 
Asset index based on pca 2.235*** 2.100*** 1.118*** 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.085) 
Household grows cash crop 0.164*** -0.049** 0.031 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) 
Total hectares cultivated per 
household 
  -0.039*** 
   (0.005) 
Constant -1.007*** -1.735*** 6.646*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.090) 
    
Observations 19,960 19,960 18,872 
R-squared 0.201 0.180 0.072 
Number of ward_id_2010 349 349 349 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




Table 2.A.1. Large-scale farms and fertilizer per hectare 










    
Treat_time -0.343 -0.503 -0.493** 
 (0.212) (0.403) (0.248) 
Time 3.753*** 3.549*** 3.938*** 
 (0.108) (0.169) (0.138) 
Household received FISP subsidy in 
2006 
5.426*** 6.161*** 4.634*** 
 (0.202) (0.332) (0.249) 
Female household head -0.460*** -0.323*** -0.144 
 (0.074) (0.104) (0.108) 
Total hectares cultivated per hh 0.210*** 1.725*** 0.105*** 
 (0.015) (0.125) (0.016) 
Age of household head 0.038*** 0.012 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
Age of household head squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.091*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Asset index based on pca 3.324*** 3.900*** 3.446*** 
 (0.240) (0.619) (0.254) 
Household grows cash crop -0.429*** -0.597*** -0.578*** 
 (0.100) (0.227) (0.106) 
Constant -4.137*** -4.919*** -2.957*** 
 (0.264) (0.390) (0.364) 
    
Observations 18,146 8,649 9,497 
R-squared 0.202 0.176 0.202 
Number of ward_id_2010 348 348 343 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 






3 Social capital and large-scale 




The aftermath of the global commodity price spike of 2007-2008 has been 
characterized by a high demand for large tracts of agricultural land in developing 
countries. The Land Matrix Observatory reports more than 1,000 concluded 
international deals and more than 40 million hectares (an area greater than the size 
of Germany) that have been acquired by investors since the year 2000.20 Particularly 
in many African countries, farm land has been sought after due to a number of 
reasons that include speculation on high profits to be earned from investing in low 
productive and underutilized lands, widespread perceptions of land abundance as 
well as attractive investment incentives offered by host governments (Deininger et 
al., 2011; Collier and Venables, 2012). This increase in the demand for agricultural 
land has come to be known in the media by the more contentious terms ‘land grab’, 
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‘new scramble for Africa’ and ‘global land rush’ (Cotula et al., 2009; Cuffaro and 
Hallam, 2011). In the last years, a fairly large body of literature has been dedicated to 
understanding what triggered the rise in large -cale agricultural investments (LSAIs) 
(Zoomers, 2010; Arezki et al. 2015), how they can be governed (Margulis et al., 2013; 
Nolte 2014), and whether they are beneficial or detrimental for the countries that 
host them (Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). 
A key insight that has emerged from this literature is that there are spill-over effects 
that arise from LSAIs to surrounding smallholder settlements (Deininger et al., 
2016). The effects on these communities may either be positive – for example, 
through employment creation and infrastructural development – or negative – 
through displacements, increased land tenure insecurity and heightened perceptions 
of increased land scarcity. With recent improvements in data quality, empirical 
works (Baumgartner et al., 2015; Deininger et al., 2016; Sipangule and Lay, 2015) have 
analyzed the spill-over effects of these investments on the rural communities that 
surround them. 
So far, this literature has focused on how directly observable outcomes such as 
income, agricultural productivity, employment and land accessibility are affected by 
LSAIs. However, to the best of our knowledge no systematic research has been 
conducted on the implications of LSAIs on other important outcomes such as social 
capital that are more difficult to measure or directly observe. The materialization of 
LSAIs in the vicinity of smallholder communities may affect smallholders’ social 
capital levels by exposing them to market-oriented forms of agricultural production 
that are based on strong property right systems and profit-making incentives. This 
form of agriculture greatly differs from smallholder agriculture that is less 
productive and subsistence-orientated. 
This chapter contributes to filling the existing gap in the literature by using 
experimental methods to analyze how the establishment of LSAIs affects the social 




capital of smallholders living within their vicinities. Our approach of identifying the 
impacts of large-scale agricultural investments builds on the experimental 
economics literature on social capital in developing countries (Glaeser et al., 2000; 
Karlan, 2005; Bouma et al., 2008; Braaten, 2014). Within this literature, a broad 
definition of social capital is used to encompass trust, norms of reciprocity, and 
group interactions that are possible via densely connected social networks (Putnam 
1993, Knack and Keefer, 1997; Woolcock, 1998; Ostrom, 2000; Durlauf and 
Fafchamps, 2005). 
We are specifically interested in understanding how the levels of intra-village trust 
and reciprocity of smallholders are affected after a LSAI is set up within their 
proximity. For this purpose, we employ an artefactual field experiment using the 
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (Clark and Sefton, 2001; Khadjavi and Lange, 2013). 
We conduct the field experiment in 13 randomly selected villages close to two LSAIs 
in Zambia, and take 16 similar randomly selected villages further away from the 
investments as the control group. Zambia makes a compelling case study as it is a 
major destination of LSAIs and has a land governance structure that is fairly 
representative of many other sub-Saharan African countries. The experiment is set 
up such that half of the smallholders included in the sample act as first movers who 
make trust-based decisions and the other half take the role of second movers who 
have a choice between reciprocal, altruistic or selfish decisions. We thereby 
essentially measure the extent of unconditional cooperation of the first movers and 
conditional cooperation of the second movers. We complement our analysis with a 
natural field experiment in which we observe the governance of public goods, i.e., 
how solar systems that are bestowed as public goods to the villages in our study are 
administered and maintained.  
Our results from the Prisoner’s Dilemma indicate significantly higher levels of (first-
mover) cooperation in the villages close to LSAIs. While we do not find any 




difference for (second-mover) conditional cooperation between the two groups of 
villages per se, we do find that smallholders who have worked on LSAIs show 
significantly higher propensities both to cooperate when they are first movers and to 
reciprocate cooperative behavior (or the lack of it) when they act as second movers 
in our experiment. The natural field experiment indicates a higher propensity to 
share the public good in villages closer to the LSAI, which further substantiates our 
main result. It also reveals a significant positive correlation between the levels of 
trust in a community and the levels of public good governance. 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative insights reveals that two mechanisms 
are driving our results. First, the spatial proximity to LSAIs creates what Lyons et al. 
(1998) refer to as the communal coping effect. Smallholders in the villages close to 
the investment site are uncertain about how they will be affected by the outsider and 
band together. Second, the reputation effect, as outlined by Arrow (1972), leads 
smallholders who have worked on LSAIs to develop greater levels of trust and 
reciprocation of cooperative behavior. The magnitude of this reputation effect 
increases with the duration of the employer-employee relationship. These findings 
are in line with the literature that shows that integrating small-scale societies into 
market-orientated settings induces norms of cooperation that result in higher 
payoffs in experimental games (Henrich et al., 2001).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses markets 
and their influence on social capital. Section 3.3 explains the choice of the study sites 
and their representativeness. Section 3.4 describes the experimental design. The 
hypotheses and results are presented in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Markets and their influence on social capital 
The debate on markets and their influence on the evolution of moral values and 
preferences is a long-standing one that has intrigued researchers in the social 




sciences (Bowles, 1998). This debate has resulted in two contending camps. The first 
camp advocates the role of markets in fostering norms of cooperation, while the 
second camp points out the erosion of morals and values that are associated with an 
increase in market accessibility (Hirschman, 1982). 
Early works dating back as far as the mid-eighteenth century by French political 
philosopher Montesquieu describe commerce as a civilizing force that is linked the 
to the formation of ‘gentle manners’ such as assiduity, discipline, honesty, 
punctuality, prudence and reliability (Hirschman, 1982). Hirschman (1982) refers to 
this effect as the doux-commerce thesis and argues that the spread of commerce 
leads men to become more cautious about arousing adverse judgment from present 
and future acquaintances. Today, the doux-commerce thesis is still advocated by 
economists who argue that the market nourishes virtues of honest behavior, civility 
and cooperation (McCloskey, 2006; Fourcade and Healy, 2007). Commercial society 
is thought to make people more cooperative by binding them together and reducing 
social tensions. Engagement in frequent economic interactions associated with 
markets also leads one to place a higher importance on developing one’s credibility 
and reputation (Arrow, 1972; Fourcade and Healy, 2007). 
Studies analyzing the determinants of social preferences across 15 small-scale 
societies find that higher levels of aggregate market integration are associated with 
increased cooperation or altruism, which is measured by positive offer sizes in 
ultimatum games (Henrich et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2004). One of these studies 
conducted amongst a pastoral group in Northern Kenya by Ensminger (2004) reveals 
that market integration – measured by the presence or absence of wage/trade 
income – leads to more fair offer sizes (50-50 splits) in the ultimatum and dictator 
games. In line with the doux-commerce thesis, Ensminger (2004) suggests that 
subjects participating in the labor and service markets place a higher value on the 




importance of reputation and behaving fair-mindedly, which is reflected in the 
results of the one shot games. 
Other studies conducted within this cross-cultural context arrive at a similar 
conclusion. Tracer (2004) compares two villages in rural Papua New Guinea and 
finds that the village with less market integration has a higher distribution of low 
offers in the ultimatum game. In addition, doing a within village comparison reveals 
that those with higher market integration proxies such as thatched roofs and wage 
employment have higher offers even though the small sample size used in the study 
makes more research necessary. A follow up study uses more refined measurements 
of market integration, i.e. the percentage of calories purchased in the market, to 
replicate the results of the earlier studies and finds that fairness increases with a 
population’s degree of market integration (Henrich et al., 2010; Ensminger and 
Henrich, 2014). 
While the studies discussed above support the hypothesis that markets have a 
positive effect on cooperative behavior, a large body of literature whose roots can be 
traced to Marx’s work on capitalism argues that markets undermine the moral 
foundations of society (Hirschman, 1982). This market-based erosion of morals that 
Hirschman refers to as the self-destruction thesis arises when markets crowd out 
cooperation and altruism and reduce them to a narrow form of self-interest 
(Fourcade and Healy, 2007). 
The erosion of collective goods and rise in self-interest associated with market 
exposure is illustrated in a qualitative study by Kajoba (1994). He shows how the 
advent of agricultural commercialization led to a change in the perceptions of 
villagers in Chinene, Zambia, who began to favor more individualized forms of land 
tenure. Not only did the commercialization of agriculture increase the value of land 
in Chinene village but it also heightened villagers’ perceptions of land scarcity 
causing them to fence their properties and desire individual land title. In addition, 




Kajoba (1994) reports that the rise in self-regarding behavior amongst villagers in 
Chinene was accompanied by a reduction of social cohesion. An analogous process is 
described by Lesorogol (2005), who presents evidence showing that pastoralists 
living in communities that have experienced privatization of their parcels and have 
been brought into greater contact with markets for land engage in fewer cooperative 
activities on a day-to-day basis. This reduction in cooperation occurs as a result of 
the resettlement of households as well as the increased reliance on crop cultivation 
and decline in the use of communal pastoral grounds. This crowding out of 
cooperation is reinforced by the results of a public goods game that reveals lower 
contributions by the villagers that have experienced privatization. 
Although the two strands of literature are at opposite poles, in practice the positive 
and negative effects of markets on social capital do not always have to be mutually 
exclusive. It may well be that market exposure results in both an increase in self-
regarding behavior and increased cooperation amongst a certain group of 
individuals simultaneously. For instance, a recent study that analyses the effect of 
the formalization of land rights on community cooperation in Peru by Braaten (2014) 
shows that when measured as distance to markets, market integration is negatively 
associated with cooperation, whereas a positive and significant effect is found for 
income from trade that is used as a proxy for market experience. Thus based on the 
discussion in this section, markets may enhance, deteriorate or have an ambiguous 
effect on social capital.21 The mechanisms through which market exposure affects 
social capital will be described in more detail in section 3.5 where we derive the 
hypotheses to be tested in the experimental analysis. To ensure that we are 
capturing the effect of market exposure in this study and not that of traditional 
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 It is important to note, however, that even in the absence of markets there may be other factors that 
induce norms of cooperativeness. F0r instance, Baland et al. (2016) and Grimm et al. (2016) provide 
evidence for norms of solidarity that foster mutual help and transfers across extended family 
members.  




systems of mutual help that might arise within such a setting, the next section 
explains our choice of study area and the design of the field experiments. 
3.3 Choice of country and study sites 
Zambia is a compelling case to study for two major reasons. First, it is an important 
destination of LSAIs. Between 2003 and 2011, 34 LSAIs expressed an interest in 
1,588,916 hectares of agricultural land (Harding et al., 2016). A third of this land was 
previously cultivated by smallholders (Harding et al., 2016). This indicates that it is 
not uncommon for LSAIs to operate within the proximity of smallholders. Second, 
Zambia has a dual land governance structure that is fairly representative of many 
other sub-Saharan African countries. Land in regions cultivated by smallholders is 
governed under a customary system of tenure that assigns authority to chiefs and 
local headwomen or –men who act as custodians of the land on behalf of the chiefs. 
Within this system, formal property rights are a rarity. By contrast, land cultivated 
by LSAIs is almost always titled and follows a formal land governance system. The 
rise in the number of LSAIs, particularly in regions that border customary land, 
increases smallholder exposure to formalized market orientated systems of 
agriculture. LSAIs have also been established in the proximity of smallholder 
communities in other sub-Saharan African countries that allow for both titled and 
customary land tenure system such as Ethiopia (Baumgartner et al., 2015; Ali et al., 
2016), Ghana and Kenya (Nolte and Väth, 2015) and Nigeria (Adewumie et al., 2013; 
Osabuohien, 2014).  
We conducted the artefactual field experiment22 from mid-August to the end of 
September 2015 in two commercial farming areas in Mumbwa and Mkushi districts. 
The LSAI in Mumbwa is leased by Amatheon Agri and covers an area of nearly 
30,000 hectares. Currently the farm only operates 3000 hectares of this land. The 
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 The term was coined by Harrison and List (2004). Such experiments are also commonly referred to 
as ‘lab-in-the-field experiments’ and ‘extra-lab experiments’ (Charness et al., 2013). 




LSAI in Mkushi, which is operated by Chobe Agrivision, consists of 6 different farms 
which together account for an area of 4,000 hectares. Both farms operate within 
formalized institutional settings; they acquired titled state land for their 
establishments and are foreign owned. The farm in Mkushi began its operations in 
2010 while the one in Mumbwa has been operational since 2012. The key distinction 
between the two farms is the extent of land commercialization prior to the 
establishment of the LSAIs. The land in Mumbwa forms part of the Big Concession 
farming scheme and despite being titled, it remained largely underdeveloped 
(greenfield investment) until the commercial farm was set up. On the contrary, the 
LSAI in Mkushi falls within the Mkushi farm block that has a long history of 
commercial farming; the land for the farm was acquired from established 
commercial farms (brownfield investment) (Chu, 2013). 
In terms of the size of land and crops cultivated, the two LSAIs included in this study 
are very similar to 13 other operational LSAIs listed by the Land Matrix (see Table 
3.A.1 in the appendix).23 The farms operated by Amatheon Agri and Agrivision Africa 
both cultivate maize, wheat and soya beans; at least one of these crops is also 
cultivated in all but two of the other LSAIs operational in Zambia. 
Amatheon Agri has been contracted the largest amount of land (38,760 hectares) but 
in terms of the area cultivated (3,000 hectares) it does not differ greatly from 
Agrivision Africa or the other LSAIs operational in Zambia. In addition, the LSAIs 
selected for this study are similar to most of the other operational LSAIs in that they 
only began their operations after the peak in demand for agricultural land that 
occurred in 2008/2009. These similarities make us confident that the results we 
obtain are not only confined to our study area but hold equally important lessons for 
other operational LSAIs administered in a similar way. 
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 The Land Matrix reports another 1700 hectare LSAI, Ambika, that has been established in Mkushi. 
Its approximate location (sourced from the Land Matrix) has been illustrated in Figure 3.1a. Ambika is 
located within the 15 kilometer radius of Chobe Agrivision. 




Our choice of these two farming areas was not only motivated by selecting LSAIs 
that are representative at the national level but also by other key criteria such as: 
identifying farms that are both located in the same province, situated close to main 
roads and are similarly close to Zambia’s capital city Lusaka. 
After the locations of the two LSAIs were identified, village lists and maps of the 
regions surrounding these farms were obtained from the Zambian Central Statistical 
Office (CSO) in Lusaka. These maps were essential for the randomization process 
employed in selecting villages. 29 randomly selected villages located close to a main 
road were sampled, out of which 15 villages were located in Mkushi District and 14 
were in Mumbwa District.24 Altogether, we conducted the experiment with 932 
smallholders in these villages. Figures 3.1a and 3.1b illustrate the study locations. 





                                                 
24 We selected villages close to a main road to avoid any distorting effects caused by proximity to 
markets and infrastructure. 
Note: The red 
polygons depict 
the locations of 
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by the Land 
Matrix (see Table 
3.A.1). 
 
Source: authors’ own and Land Matrix data. Map created using Google Map Maker. 
 








We compare the social capital of villages in the proximity of the two LSAIs with 
counterfactual villages that do not have LSAIs. In each district, we randomly selected 
villages (_near) within a 15 kilometer radius from the large-scale farms as well as 
villages (_further) located in a 50 to 70 kilometer radius around the center of the 
large-scale farms. Extra caution was taken to ensure that the villages located further 
away where not located close to other large-scale farms. The radii were calibrated in 
order to have villages from which smallholders could walk to work in the LSAI on a 
daily basis (_near villages) and to have villages in the same region while ruling out 
this everyday-contact (_further villages). Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the 
villages located further and close to the investments.  
The summary statistics clearly bear out that proximity to LSAIs matters. As 
expected, villages within the 15 kilometer radius have a significantly larger amount of 
Note: The red 
polygons 
depict the 
locations of the 
commercial 
farming areas; 
the red pins 
indicate the 
locations of the 
_near villages 
while the blue 





Source: Authors’ own data. Map created using Google Map Maker. 
 




workers employed on LSAIs – the share of LSAI workers in _near villages is more 
than double that in _further villages – and a lower number of villagers that are 
smallholders. Not surprisingly, households in _further villages sell some of their 
agricultural produce as there is no other dominant employer or source of income 
generation in their proximity.25 By contrast, with the exception of the age and 
marital status of the household head, all relevant village-level socio-demographic 
characteristics are balanced and do not differ significantly. The asset-index, intensity 
of night lights and hectares cultivated by villagers do not indicate that _near villages 
are wealthier than _further villages despite the employment opportunities offered by 
the LSAI in the _near villages.26 Furthermore, there is also no indication of 
differences in soil quality that might drive our results. We obtained soil samples in 
all the villages in our study (including signed agreements for the extractions from 
each headwoman or -man). The soil samples were analyzed by the Zambia 
Agriculture Research Institute, the official research institute of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Zambia.27 Pairwise correlations of villages being _near a LSAI or 
_further and each of the nine soil quality indicators do not yield any significant 
differences. Finally recall that we only selected villages close to a main road to rule 
out any systematic differences in access to infrastructure and markets. As a result, 
we are confident that our randomization strategy was successful in matching similar 
villages that only differ in terms of their proximity to LSAIs. 
 
                                                 
25 These households do not take their agricultural produce to the markets in towns but instead sell it 
on the roadside to traders and passersby. 
26 Our proxy for wealth is derived from an asset index that is constructed from a linear index of 
households’ physical assets whose weights have been obtained using a principal components analysis 
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). We opt in favor of an asset index since income based measures in such 
settings are typically associated with reporting bias. In addition, we use night lights data for the year 
2013 as a proxy for the level of economic activity in the villages. The use of night lights data has gained 
prominence in recent empirical literature estimating economic growth (Henderson et. al., 2012). 
27 The soil samples were tested for their levels of organic carbon, calcium chloride and pH. They were 
also tested for trace elements of potassium, phosphorous, sodium, calcium, magnesium, zinc and 
iron. Figure 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.7 presents correspondence with the institute. 




Table 3.1. Village-level summary statistics. 
 
_near villages _further village  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
p-
values 
Male 0.54 0.15 0.47 0.12 0.12 
Household head 0.46 0.09 0.49 0.13 0.32 
Married 0.67 0.09 0.57 0.15 0.05 
Age (in years) 35.07 2.46 41.11 5.25 0.00 
Migrated after LSAI was 
set-up 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.61 
Years of education  6.56 1.08 6.52 0.86 1.00 
Literacy (with 5 being the 
highest level) 2.68 0.39 2.65 0.38 0.93 
Asset index 0.42 0.03 0.41 0.10 0.46 
Night lights (5km buffer) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.37 
Land title 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.66 
Acquired plot from chief 0.44 0.23 0.53 0.32 0.51 
Inherited plot 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.19 0.83 
Purchased plot 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.15 
Hectares cultivated 4.95 2.17 5.11 1.96 0.83 
Household sells crops 0.68 0.16 0.82 0.10 0.03 
LSAI worker 0.52 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.00 
Smallholder 0.71 0.17 0.84 0.10 0.04 
LSAI requested land in the 
village 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.38 0.86 
Ethnic groups in village 8.46 3.31 8.00 2.92 0.67 
Population in village 570.43 1078.00 234.91 312.60 0.68 
Village size (hectares) 413.00 579.19 1112.56 2069.41 0.90 
Village has public good28 0.77 0.44 0.63 0.50 0.41 
Individuals 445 487  
Number of villages 13 16  
Note: The p-values are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney tests on the village-level. The asset index 
includes information on the households’ possessions of livestock holdings, radios, agricultural 
equipment, transportation, as well indicators of the quality of housing. 
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 While the LSAIs engage in small-scale corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities within the 
communities such as the improvement of school infrastructure, we do not find a difference in public 
goods between the two village groups. Nolte and Subakanya (2016) provide more information about 
CSR activities of the two LSAIs. 




A potential problem for our empirical analysis is that the locations of the large-scale 
farms were not randomly selected. Being market-oriented, they are established in 
regions where the LSAI owners expected to yield high returns from their 
investments. This non-random location may give rise to biased estimates if the social 
capital of surrounding communities is a determinant of where LSAIs are established. 
Note that the share of villages which were approached by LSAIs for land is low and 
similar in both village groups (approx. 17 percent). This shows that the _further 
villages are a good counterfactual since the LSAIs could equally have been 
established close to the _further villages. 
Moreover, the Zambian Development Agency (ZDA) facilitates land acquisition 
through the local government, traditional leaders and Commissioner of Lands. They 
allocate land to investors based on a detailed project proposal with clear indication 
of the agriculture activities they intend to implement and associated requirements 
regarding irrigation, types of crops or livestock, land size, location, et cetera. Among 
the criteria the ZDA’s land allocation agencies apply for identifying suitable land are 
topographic and soil characteristics as well as prevailing land tenure systems. 
Criteria that might be regarded as proxies of social capital in surrounding 
communities do not play a role in the allocation of land for investments, rendering a 
bias due to non-random selection of LSAI locations unlikely.29  
Still, we are aware that our approach is not without problems when it comes to 
identifying the causal effects of LSAIs on social capital. In particular, we lack 
information on pre-investment levels of social capital in the villages. To get around 
the lack of data on pre-investment levels of social capital, we use spatial data to 
                                                 
29 Interviews were conducted with the Investment Promotion Officer at the ZDA and confirmed in 
talks with the Director of Policy and Planning, ZDA. More information about our correspondence 
with the ZDA is available upon request. In addition, Nolte and Subakanya (2016) provided us with 
responses from the managers of the large-scale farms in our study. The explanations for how and why 
the exact locations were acquired do not indicate any proxies for social capital either. 




compare village characteristics that could have potentially influenced social capital 
prior to the establishment of the LSAIs.  
Table 3.2. Pre-investment characteristics across _near and _further villages 
 
  _near villages _further villages 
 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
p-
values 
Night lights 2000 (pixel) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Night lights 2000 (5 km buffer) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Population density (pixel) 5.54 0.52 5.50 0.52 0.85 
Population density (5 km buffer) 5.54 0.51 5.50 0.52 0.74 
Mean monthly rainfall (pixel) 80.05 5.59 81.29 3.32 0.47 
Mean monthly rainfall (5 km buffer) 80.18 5.73 81.26 3.05 0.51 
Elevation (pixel) 1250.63 140.12 1213.85 28.82 0.83 
Elevation (5 km buffer) 1252.24 132.78 1221.39 28.56 1.00 
Mean monthly maximum temperature 
(pixel) 30.08 1.32 30.47 0.49 0.98 
Mean monthly maximum temperature 
(5 km buffer) 30.08 1.25 30.42 0.50 0.86 
Distance to nearest road 1.54 2.14 0.49 0.61 0.20 
Distance to nearest water line 1.79 1.83 1.97 1.13 0.33 
Distance to nearest rail 63.82 65.45 71.90 77.57 0.20 
Note: All datasets were collected prior to the establishment of the LSAIs. The night lights data for the 
years 2000 and 2013 are sourced from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s National 
Centre for Environmental Information (NOAA-NCEI) available at: 
ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html. The 2000 data is obtained by calculating the 
average of the two ‘Average Visible, Stable Lights & Cloud Free Coverages’ data files. The population 
density data is from the year 2000 and was compiled by the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network (CIESEN). The precipitation and temperature data are sourced from the 
WorldClim database. They show the mean monthly maximum temperature and precipitation for the 
period between 1960 and 1990. The elevation data is from the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research- Consortium for Spatial Information (CGIAR-CSI), SRTM30 dataset collected in 
2000. The distance variables are vectors lines that were originally compiled for the Digital Chart of 
the World in 1992. All grid data have a high resolution of 30 seconds. The elevation, land cover, roads, 
railroads, water line, climate and population density data were all downloaded from the DIVA-GIS 
website: www.diva-gis.org/gdata. 
 
Table 3.2 shows that there are no significant differences across the _near and 
_further villages in the intensity of night lights the year 2000 (our proxy of prior 
economic activity), monthly rainfall, temperature, population density, elevation as 




well as distance to roads, railroads and water lines. Analyzing these pre-investment 
variables makes us more confident that the _near and _further villages were quite 
similar prior to the investments. 
Naturally, the ideal identification strategy would take the form of a field experiment 
with a panel dimension that would install and manage a considerable number of 
4,000 hectare-large LSAIs in random locations around the country. It would measure 
social capital in communities in the proximity of and other communities further 
away from these randomly selected sites before and a number of years after the 
installation and continuous operation of these farms. Yet, such a difference-in-
differences field experiment would be very costly and would arguably not stand a 
thorough cost-benefit analysis. For this reason, we regard our approach as a 
worthwhile option that is cost effective and allows at least a tentative causal 
interpretation of the link between the establishment of LSAIs and social capital in 
neighboring village communities.  
3.4 Experimental design and procedures 
In line with the literature on social capital we opted for the use of experimental 
methods to measure our outcomes of interest. For instance, in their seminal 
contributions, Glaeser et al. (2000) and Karlan (2005) use the trust game to measure 
social capital, consisting of trust and reciprocity (also referred to as 
‘trustworthiness’).30 Taking our study setting into account, we simplified the game 
and elicited unconditional and conditional cooperation through the use of the 
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (Clark and Sefton, 2001; Khadjavi and Lange, 2013).31 
                                                 
30 Eckel and Wilson (2004), Kosfeld et al. (2005) and Houser et al. (2010) investigate the relationship 
between trust and risk in social dilemma games. All studies provide supportive evidence that these 
games do not merely measure risk preferences, but a genuine preference for trust. 
31 The battery of our lab-in-the-field experiments also included a sender-receiver cheap-talk game 
(Gneezy, 2005) and a competition game (Gneezy et al., 2009). Those two games were played after the 
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma and were not pre-announced. They should therefore not have any 




Given our context in rural Zambia involving a high number of illiterate participants, 
we decided in favor of the binary sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). This was done 
to establish the highest level of simplicity of the game while still being able to 
measure cooperation.32 The game was played one-shot and designed in a simple 
graphical manner that enabled villagers with low levels of literacy to understand the 
procedure.33 
After receiving general introductory instructions, participants were randomly 
assigned to two groups of first or second movers by drawing a black or a green 
numbered ID card from a bag. The two groups were then spatially separated with 
adequate distances and sight-barriers such as huts, trees and bushes to prevent both 
verbal and non-verbal communication between the groups. Each group was 
accompanied by two Zambian research assistants (always one male and one female). 
The instructions for the Prisoner’s Dilemma were then presented to the respective 
group and read aloud by the same research assistants throughout all experiments.34 
In the black group, individuals made the first decision (move) to cooperate or defect. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the decision sheet that members from the black group received. 
The individuals in the green group made two decisions which were contingent on 
the first mover’s choice. The results from the first movers determine the level of 
                                                                                                                                                    
influence on the data reported in this chapter. We aim to discuss these games in future companion 
papers. 
32 Nearly 25 percent of the participants reported that they are not able to read or write. 
33 We carried out pilot tests and included control questions to test the efficacy of the instruments. 
These additional measures assured us that even those participants that are illiterate were able to 
follow our experiment. 
34 Although English is the official language in Zambia, regional languages are spoken more frequently 
in rural settings. To ensure that all participants understood their tasks, the instructions were 
administered in Bemba in Mkushi and Nyanja in Mumbwa. As a way of testing that the original 
meanings of the instructions were maintained across the experiments, we had the instructions 
translated into Bemba and Nyanja from English and retranslated into English by two separate, 
uninvolved parties. This is the standard validation procedure (see Brislin, 1970). Instructions in 
English are provided in the appendix 3.8 Instructions in Bemba and Nyanja are available upon 
request.  




unconditional cooperation of the villagers, while the results from the second movers 
indicate strategies such as conditional cooperation, payoff maximization or altruism. 
Figure 3.2. Decision sheet for black group members as the first mover in the PD. 
 
To ensure that illiterate individuals were able to make incentivized decisions, the 
decisions were based on easily identifiable colors (Pink or Yellow) and the possible 
payoffs from a decision were represented by pictures of the associated banknotes. 
Participants could earn between 5 and 50 Zambian Kwacha depending on their 
decisions: 40 Kwacha for each player was the payoff in case of mutual cooperation, 
30 Kwacha for each player in case of mutual defection, while 50 Kwacha was the 
‘temptation payoff’ and 5 Kwacha was the ‘sucker payoff’. The payoffs were calibrated 
so that participants could earn a fee that is approximately equivalent to the weekly 




income of LSAI workers in the region.35 The payments were made to villagers after 
their participation in all parts of the study (this includes individual ex-post surveys 
and leisure time between the activities) that lasted approximately four hours. 
Including a show up fee of 5 Kwacha, participants earned 119.72 Kwacha on average 
(13.30 USD). Hence, the stakes in our experiment can be regarded as fairly large. 
To make a decision, each participant’s ID number was called by a research assistant 
and the participant was led to an isolated area to make her or his choice (pink or 
yellow). When called, participants were allowed to ask the research assistants 
questions about the instructions before making their decisions. After the decisions 
had been made the research assistants posed control questions to the participants to 
test for understanding of the instructions. During the decision making process 
another research assistant stayed with the group of participants that had not been 
called out to ensure that participants did not communicate before their numbers 
had been called out. After participants had made their decisions, they were asked to 
go to a second waiting area. 
Importantly, the research assistants were not informed about the research questions 
during the data collection phase of the study to avoid biases. They were only 
debriefed after the collection of data in the last village at the end of September 2015. 
Before each session (there was always only one session per village to avoid 
information spill-overs), we visited each randomly selected village to request 
permission from the village headman (or headwoman) and to seek his (her) 
assistance in recruiting villagers to participate in the study. The village headmen and 
–women were informed about the nature of the experiment (but not the research 
questions), the duration of the study, the average expected earnings and that 
participation in the study was voluntary. We also presented a letter of support from 
                                                 
35
 Approximations of the weekly and daily wages of LSAI workers were obtained from interviews with 
LSAI workers and smallholders during the pilot phase of the study in July 2015. 




the provincial government that encouraged our research (see Figure 3.A.1 in the 
appendix). We stressed that only individuals from the respective village are allowed 
to participate, that we need at least 20 individuals per village, that there is no upper 
limit to the amount of participants from a given village and that the average 
payment does not decrease with the number of participants. Refraining from setting 
an upper bound and randomizing at the individual level was crucial to avoid 
selection issues since village censuses were unavailable. Only adults (people over the 
age of 16 that were eligible for the National Registration Card) were allowed to 
participate in the experiment due to its monetized nature. 
Throughout the experiment and thereafter the identity of the matched players from 
the differently colored groups were kept anonymous. After the experiment was 
completed, the participants’ decisions from the green and black groups were 
randomly matched. 
The information collected in the experiment was supplemented with data from 
community and household surveys that were conducted after the experiments. The 
community questionnaire – only answered by village headmen or –women – 
gathered information on institutional arrangements, land tenure systems, soil 
quality and interactions with outsiders.36The household questionnaire gathered 
information on socio-demographic characteristics, social networks and land tenure 
arrangements. This information is mainly used to control for possible confounding 
factors in the subsequent empirical analysis.  
3.5  Hypotheses and results 
We first develop a set of hypotheses as to how – and through which mechanisms – 
the exposure to LSAIs might affect the social capital of local communities in their 
                                                 
36
 In four cases where the headman was absent, the community questionnaires where answered by 
the deputy village headman, chairperson or school head teacher. 




vicinity (section 3.5.1). Against the background of these hypotheses, we present the 
results of our experimental investigation, first discussing first-mover behavior in the 
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (section 3.5.2), and then analyzing different strategies 
of second movers (section 3.5.3). In a further step, we provide a tentative assessment 
of the mechanisms that are likely to drive our results (section 3.5.4). Finally, we 
discuss the outcome of the natural field experimental measure and how it compares 
to the lab-in-the-field experimental measure (section 3.5.5).  
3.5.1 Hypotheses 
As discussed above, the smallholder communities that surround LSAIs are 
characterized by informal institutions that are governed by traditional authorities. 
When LSAIs that operate using a different set of institutions are set up in the 
proximity of these communities, we posit that the trust and reciprocity of 
smallholders may be affected in the following ways:37 
Individualism 
When LSAIs are established in the proximity of a smallholder community, the 
increased exposure to modern agricultural techniques and the profit-seeking 
business model of the LSAI may raise smallholders’ awareness of an individualistic 
lifestyle. Similar to the example of Chinene village (Kajoba, 1994), commercialization 
may lead to more self-regarding and individualistic behavior of smallholders who 
wish to utilize their land in more productive ways such as through the cultivation of 
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 Social capital of smallholders may also be affected by displacements or resettlement (Lesorogol, 
2005) and through a leadership effect which may occur if the land acquisition process is opaque and 
causes villagers to distrust their local leaders. However these effects are unlikely to be relevant for our 
study. There were no displacements within the villages of our study and the leadership effect does not 
apply since the chiefs and not the local village headmen and –women were involved in the settlement 
of the LSAIs. Furthermore, immigration driven by employment opportunities on the investment 
farms may have an impact on villagers’ social capital, but we find no significant differences in the 
incidence of migration between villages close to the investment farms and those further away (Table 
3.1). Lastly, the statistics in Table 3.1 do not indicate any differences in the asset levels (our proxy for 
income levels) of villages near and further away from the LSAI, which dispels concerns of an income 
effect across the study villages. 




cash crops. This individualistic behavior is at odds with the customary system of 
tenure that favors cooperation and trust amongst individuals. Thus it is possible that 
social capital of smallholders living in these communities might deteriorate. 
Consequently, we formulate: 
Hypothesis 1a. Due to a rise in individualism, the levels of cooperation in the _near 
villages are lower than in the _further villages. 
Communal Coping 
Conversely, if smallholders perceive the materialization of a LSAI as a threat or a 
positive development they may bond together as a way of dealing with the new 
actors within their communities. This could result in more frequent community 
meetings or other forms of mutual cooperation that raise the social capital of the 
village. Lyons et al. (1998:583) introduce the notion of communal coping which 
occurs when “one or more individuals perceive a stressor as ‘our problem’…and 
activate a process of shared or collaborative coping”. If communal coping occurs in 
the villages next to the LSAIs it may lead to increased levels of intra-village 
cooperation amongst smallholders. 
Hypothesis 1b. Due to uncertainty from the presence of LSAIs, cooperation levels in 
the _near villages are higher than in the _further villages. 
Reputation 
As smallholders are employed on LSAIs, they may acquire traits such as reliability, 
reciprocity and fairness that are necessary for the functioning of more formalized 
market institutions. As demonstrated by Ensminger (2004), smallholders may 
internalize these norms and apply them in similar settings within their communities. 
This will lead to an increase in the levels of trust and reciprocity among smallholders 
that are in direct contact with these investments. 




Hypothesis 2. Due to repeated interaction with the LSAI, cooperation levels of LSAI-
employed villagers are higher than those of non-employed villagers. 
3.5.2 Results: First-mover cooperation 
The results in Figure 3.3 indicate that smallholders living in _near villages tend to be 
more cooperative than those in _further villages.  
Figure 3.3. Smallholder proximity and cooperation of first movers in the sequential 
PD 
 
The level of first-mover cooperation in the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma is 70.98 
percent in _near villages compared to 59.83 percent in _further villages. Employing a 
(two-sided) chi-squared test for a first-glance analysis, we find that this difference is 
statistically significant at p-value = 0.012. Likewise, we find a 71.09 percent 
propensity of LSAI workers to cooperate as first movers compared to 61.27 percent of 
non-LSAI workers. This difference is significant at p-value = 0.033 (chi-squared test). 

























































Figure 3.4. LSAI workers and cooperation of first movers in the sequential PD 
 
The first-glance result of first-mover cooperation above needs to be substantiated by 
a regression analysis. It is crucial that we take the structure of the data into account 
and control for socio-economic observables. We estimated two logit regressions, one 
employing a parsimonious specification and one controlling for a large set of 
observables, clustering the standard errors at the village level in both estimations. 
We present the results in Table 3.3. The estimations confirm the increase in first-
mover cooperation of smallholders in villages close to LSAIs and that of LSAI 
workers. Even if we cluster the standard errors and control for a variety of potential 





























































Table 3.3. Regression analysis of first-mover cooperation 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables I Logit regression II Logit regression 
   
_near village (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.113** 0.108** 
 (0.050) (0.052) 
Age (continuous) -0.055 0.017 
 (0.050) (0.083) 
Male (dummy, 1 = yes) -0.045 -0.015 
 (0.038) (0.063) 
Education in years (continuous) -0.002 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.014) 
Literacy (continuous) -0.017 -0.023 
 (0.024) (0.031) 
LSAI worker (dummy, 1 =yes)  0.116* 
  (0.060) 
Migrated after LSAI was set-up  0.046 
  (0.095) 
Own hectares (continuous)  0.003 
  (0.004) 
Household head (dummy, 1 = yes)  -0.055 
  (0.075) 
Household sells crops  0.032 
  (0.063) 
Village area (continuous)  0.005 
  (0.013) 
Land title (dummy, 1 = yes)  -0.013 
  (0.060) 
Ethnicity  -0.002 
  (0.003) 
Asset index based on pca  -0.130 
  (0.257) 
Region No Yes 
Crops No Yes 
Observations 454 366 
Villages 29 29 
The table presents marginal effects. The observations from the control villages are the baseline of the 
estimations. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level for 29 villages in all 









We therefore find evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1b and 2: 
Result 1. First-mover cooperation is significantly greater in near_ villages compared to 
_further villages. Communal coping may explain this result. 
Result 2. First-mover cooperation is significantly greater for LSAI workers than for 
non-workers, which may point to a reputation effect.  
Note that the support for Hypothesis 1b by Result 1 does not reject Hypothesis 1a. 
Rather, it may be that we measure a composite effect in which the communal coping 
mechanism dominates. 
3.5.3 Results: Second-mover conditional cooperation 
The decision making of the second movers in the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma 
involved two choices: (1) cooperation (pink choice) or defection (yellow choice) in 
the case of first-mover cooperation and (2) cooperation or defection in the case of 
first-mover defection. In order to analyze the decisions of second movers, we 
formulate four strategies: first, reciprocity (or conditional cooperation) when second 
movers answer cooperation with cooperation and defection with defection; second, 
payoff maximization which is characterized by defection in both cases; third, 
altruism which occurs when second movers cooperate in both cases; and fourth, a 
seemingly irrational strategy of answering cooperation with defection and defection 
with cooperation.  
We find similar rates for all strategies in _near and _further villages; none of the 
differences is statistically significant. Conditional cooperation varies between 36 and 
38 percent; payoff maximization varies between 29 and 31 percent, and altruism 
between 19 and 17 percent. The remaining 14 percent were second movers with a 
seemingly irrational strategy. 




Thus, we do not find a direct effect of the proximity of large-scale agricultural 
investments on the propensity to play a certain strategy more often (i.e. null results 
for Hypotheses 1a and 1b for second movers). Next, we again look at whether there is 
any effect for LSAI workers (Hypothesis 2). We are especially interested in the 
propensity of conditional cooperation. Indeed, we find that the share of conditional 
cooperation among LSAI workers is 42.62 percent and thereby significantly greater 
than the share among non-workers (32.29 percent). This difference is significant at 
p-value = 0.025 (chi-squared test). Figure 3.5 depicts this result. 
 
Figure 3.5. Conditional cooperation of LSAI workers and non-workers 
 
Again, we complement our first-glance chi-squared test with a regression analysis for 
second movers’ cooperation which mirrors the analysis for first movers. Table 3.4 































































Table 3.4. Regression analysis of second-mover conditional cooperation 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variable III Logit regression IV Logit regression 
   
_near village (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.028 0.013 
 (0.041) (0.051) 
Age (continuous) 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Male (dummy, 1 = yes) -0.031 -0.042 
 (0.058) (0.069) 
Education in years (continuous) -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Literacy (continuous) -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.030) (0.032) 
LSAI worker (dummy, 1 =yes) 0.082* 0.148** 
 (0.048) (0.059) 
Migrated after LSAI was set-up  -0.000 
  (0.061) 
Household head (dummy, 1 = yes)  0.012 
  (0.068) 
Own hectares (continuous)  -0.001 
  (0.004) 
Household sells crops  0.088 
  (0.056) 
Village Area (continuous)  -0.009 
  (0.014) 
Land title (dummy, 1 = yes)  0.029 
  (0.083) 
Ethnicity  0.001 
  (0.002) 
Asset index based on pca  -0.021 
  (0.169) 
Region No Yes 
Crops No Yes 
Observations 455 380 
Villages 29 29 
The table presents marginal effects. The observations from the control villages are the 
baseline of the estimations. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village 
level for 29 villages in all estimations. Statistical significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We find that this effect remains statistically significant and robust to changes in the 
regression specification (see regressions III and IV). We therefore formulate: 




Result 3. Conditional cooperation is more pronounced for smallholders who worked 
on a large-scale farm than for comparable smallholders. 
This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and with Ensminger (2004) and 
Heinrich et al. (2001), who find that market integration increases cooperativeness 
and fair pay-offs. Recall that our descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 shows more than 
double the amount of smallholders with work experience on the investment farm in 
_near villages compared to _further villages. 
Since the effect of being employed on the investment farm turned out to be 
particularly dominant in the case of both first mover and second mover cooperation, 
a natural follow up question that arises is whether the levels of cooperation vary with 
the duration of market exposure or employment on the LSAI. 
In the individual questionnaire, we asked participants who stated that they had 
worked on a LSAI about the length of their employment. A pairwise correlation (and 
similarly a logit regression) does not yield any significant effect for first-mover 
cooperation. Conversely, a pairwise correlation (and a logit regression) between 
second-mover conditional cooperation and the length of employment yields a 
positive and significant effect at the 5 percent level. The propensity to conditionally 
cooperate is about 50 percent higher for farm workers who have been employed for 
more than a year compared to those who were employed less than 3 months (an 
increase from 30 percent to 50 percent). Figure 3.6 visualizes the effect. Hence, we 
find evidence that cooperation of long-term employees is significantly greater than 
of short-term employees. When controlling for village location, gender, age, being 
born in the village and years of education, the effect remains significant at the 5 
percent level (the estimation results can be found in Table 3.A.3 in appendix 3.7). 
 
 




Figure 3.6. Second-mover reciprocity and length of employment on the LSAI 
 
Of course, we cannot fully rule out reverse causality. For instance, it could be that 
employees that are not reciprocative do not reach long-term employment and get 
laid off beforehand. Our finding is nevertheless in line with the reputation 
hypothesis that reciprocal behavior and market integration go hand in hand (Arrow, 
1972; Henrich et al., 2001; Ensminger, 2004; Ensminger and Henrich, 2014).  
3.5.4 Support for communal coping and reputation hypotheses 
As described in the sections above, the first trip of our field research that occurred 
between mid-August and the end of September 2015 was conducted in a blinded 
manner so that neither the field research assistants nor the study respondents were 
aware of the central research question. In addition, neither the research support 
letter by the provincial government nor the questionnaires used for the study 
included questions on the LSAIs in order to rule out response biases.  
The second round of field work was conducted in July 2016. The main aim of this 
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mechanisms described above. Having collected all the experimental data, we could 
freely engage village representatives in discussions about their interactions with 
LSAIs, land governance as well as the frequency of village meetings and the topics 
discussed without fear of biasing the results from the lab-in-the-field experiment. 
To verify whether communal coping drives the results that we observe for first 
movers in _near villages, we asked each village headman (or –woman) and other 
community members present if there was a LSAI within walking distance of their 
community. In line with our expectations and own observations, only the 
participants from _near villages responded affirmatively. Within these villages, there 
was a general perception of uncertainty and disgruntlement mostly caused by the 
belief that the LSAIs did not adequately compensate their employees for the amount 
of work they were expected to do. Over 90 percent of the community representatives 
and members interviewed in the _near villages, indicated that they were not happy 
with the remuneration offered by the LSAI and that there had been at least one 
meeting (formal or informal) were this topic had been discussed. While the villagers 
from the _further villages also met frequently to discuss different topics, there was 
no topic that directly affected all community members within these villages. This 
indicates that perceptions of uncertainty and adversity caused by the presence of the 
LSAI have led the smallholders in _near villages to bond together. Overall, this 
provides support for the communal coping channel. 
At first glance our main findings, i.e. LSAI workers having a greater propensity to 
cooperate, may appear paradoxical considering the general discontentment with the 
LSAIs reported above. To better understand what might be driving these results, we 
compare the socioeconomic characteristics of LSAI workers with other villagers that 
do not have any experience on LSAIs. From Table 3.5, it is clear that LSAI workers 
own fewer assets and have less land holdings than other villagers that have not been 
employed on the LSAI. This suggests that increased incomes or a sense of ‘giving 




back to the community’ cannot be driving the cooperative outcomes observed in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4. 
Table 3.5. LSAI worker socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
 
Non- workers LSAI workers  
Variable Mean SD Mean SD p-values 
Male 0.44 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.00 
Household head 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.12 
Age (in years) 38.48 17.55 37.58 14.96 0.94 
Migrant 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.12 
Years of education 6.57 3.49 6.26 3.23 0.12 
Literacy (5 = highest level) 2.65 1.30 2.59 1.33 0.48 
Asset index 0.43 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.01 
Hectares cultivated 5.13 6.56 4.72 6.76 0.01 
Individuals 569 356  
Note: Statistically significant p-values in bold. The p-values are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney 
tests for the continuous variables and chi-squared tests for the binary variables.  
 
In our communication with representatives from the _near villages on the LSAI recruitment 
process and work conditions, many of the respondents indicated that the employment 
opportunities offered by the LSAI were low skill positions that did not require any specific 
expertise. They also suggested that it was not difficult to work for the LSAIs since they did 
not have strict recruitment criteria. Once newly employed, workers were usually first 
offered short term contracts which could be renewed for the next harvesting (high labor 
demand) season depending on their performance. Some of the key characteristics expected 
of the workers were that they were punctual, reliable and hard working.  
From this, it is clear that although there is no strict screening process during the recruitment 
phase, once employed, workers are required to invest in reputation-enhancing traits if they 
are to secure a contract for the next harvesting season or even a permanent contract. As 
shown in other studies (Ensminger, 2004), it is possible that these reputation-enhancing 
traits are internalized by villagers as norms and applied in their natural settings. This is in 
accordance with our finding that cooperation increases with the length of employment on 
the investment farm (Figure 3.6). 




3.5.5 Natural field experiment 
In addition to the lab-in-the-field experimental measure, we conducted a natural 
field experimental measure that compared the governance of public goods across the 
study villages. This experiment had two objectives: (i) to provide independent 
evidence on the effect of LSAIs on villagers’ social capital; and (ii) to validate the lab-
in-the-field experiment. Narayan and Pritchett (1996:887) state that social capital at 
the village-level can also be measured through the “management of resources that 
are treated as common property within the village or among several villages, such as 
improved water supplies, local irrigation capabilities, and local roads”. For this 
reason, during our first field research trip in August and September 2015, we 
endowed each village in our sample with a free public good that took the form of a 
solar system.38 
The public good was a d.light D20 solar system. This product comes with a solar 
panel, a battery unit, two stationary and a portable LED lamp, two light switches and 
a USB port accompanied by several adaptors for mobile phone battery charging. It is 
manufactured to meet the needs of poor people in the developing world: it is very 
simple to handle and robust in extreme weather conditions. Once fully charged, the 
solar systems can provide lighting for 7-15 hours and can charge 4-5 simple mobile 
                                                 
38
 There are several reasons why this product was useful as a public good in a village setting like the 
one we investigated in our study. First, 98.17 percent of all participants in our study did not have 
access to the electricity grid. 65.63 percent reported to use battery-powered torches for lighting 
followed by 28.26 percent who reported using candles. This is also confirmed by the 2013 and 2000 
night lights data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Given the very low income of individuals in our study 
environment and our observations, we assume that these options were not used regularly. Often 
these individuals did not have any source of light beyond the fireplace outside their huts. Hence, the 
lamps of the public good were very useful. 
Likewise phone charging is very useful to the villagers. While 79.51 percent of them reported owning a 
mobile phone (these are almost always simple and affordable mobile phone to make phone calls or 
send a text message, not smartphones), most of them do not have electricity access at home. Hence, 
the usual way of charging mobile phones is to travel to a shop with electricity and pay for charging. It 
often takes several hours to reach these shops by foot. Hence, the public good can serve as a source of 
electricity for charging mobile phones for free and close by. 




phones per day.39 In mid-July 2016 we returned to the villages for an unannounced 
visit to examine the status of the solar systems. 
The solar systems were bestowed in each village only after all lab-in-the-field games 
had been played and the administration of the household surveys was coming to an 
end.40 We followed a script that amongst others stated that the solar system was 
provided by our research team (and our funding institution, the International 
Growth Centre at the London School of Economics) for free and without any 
obligations. We stressed that the solar system was given to the whole community 
and invited the respective headman or –woman to receive the solar system on behalf 
of the community members. We demonstrated how to operate the solar system and 
provided examples of the different ways in which the solar systems could be used as 
a public good. For instance, we suggested that the lamps could be used for village 
gatherings such as overnight services at the church, weddings, and funerals as well 
as studying in groups at night, and childbirths. In addition, we pointed out that the 
panel could be used by all members of the village to charge the batteries of their 
mobile phones for free (given the battery life and sporadic use of these simple 
mobile phones this was a realistic scenario). In front of all study participants, all 
village headmen or –women confirmed that they would use the solar system for the 
good of the community and acknowledged that they had understood all the 
information provided. 
We expected heterogeneity concerning the community solar system along two 
dimensions. First, we were interested in how many solar systems were still present 
and working in the villages (and not sold, lost, stolen or broken, for instance). 
Second, we were interested in whether the public good nature of the community 
                                                 
39 More information about the solar system is available on the product website: 
http://www.dlight.com/. 
40 We recorded pictures and videos of the handing over of the public goods in all villages. These 
media files are available from the authors upon request. 




solar system was maintained almost a year after or whether it had been privatized 
(assumingly by the headman or –woman). Note again that there was never any 
announcement that we would ever return to the village which makes the 
anticipation of our return as a motivator highly unlikely. 
Along the first dimension we were surprised to find very little heterogeneity. All but 
two solar systems were still present and working in the villages including all of their 
parts.41 Along the second dimension we indeed found several solar systems that were 
privatized by the headman or –woman, while others were shared either by means of 
using the lamps at village gatherings, by allowing community members to charge 
their mobile phones for free, or both.42 The sorting into two broad categories – 
privatized and shared – and into various degrees of sharing was done by interviewing 
multiple random individuals from the villages independently, interviewing the 
headmen and –women, and rating of the statements by a new set of two ‘blind’ 
research assistants who neither knew the research question nor the game outcomes 
from the villages. 
As shown in Figure 3.7, the results from this sorting into privatized and shared solar 
systems reveal a significant difference between _near and _further villages (p= 0.011, 
chi-squared test test). Strikingly, sharing occurred in all _near villages, whereas the 
solar systems were privatized in almost half the _further villages.43 This corroborates 
the findings of the lab-in-the-field experiment, even though the evidence should 
only be regarded as suggestive due to the low number of 25 observations. 
                                                 
41 One solar system was missing and another one was damaged due to improper use (drilling into the 
battery). Two headmen and their families were absent, so that these observations are missing. 
42 For this comparison we are able to consider 25 of 29 villages. One solar system was damaged, 
another one was gone, as described above, and in two villages we were not able to interview the 
headman or the family due to absence. 
43 Comparing the headmen characteristics in Table 3.A.2, we have no reason to believe that the 
headmen were significantly different across the near and _further villages. This confirms that the 
differences in the sharing of the solar systems are driven by village-level social capital and not village 
heads’ characteristics. 




Figure 3.7. Sharing of community solar systems and proximity to LSAIs 
 
Next, as a simple validation exercise, we pool all villages and test for a correlation 
between the measures of social capital in the lab-in-the-field and the natural field 
experiment. It turns out that the propensity to cooperate of first-movers at the 
village-level indeed correlates with the extent to which solar systems are shared in 
the village. While the average propensity to cooperate is 49.9 percent in the 7 
villages where the solar systems were fully privatized a year later, it is 68.3 percent in 
the 18 villages that share at least to some degree. This difference in propensities is 
statistically significant (two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.0082). The propensity 
to conditionally cooperate does not differ between the two categories of villages 
(37.5 percent for privatized and 35.5 percent for shared solar systems). Figure 3.8 















































Figure 3.8. Lab-in-the-field and natural field experiment measures 
 
 
In summary, we find that our natural field experimental measure of social capital, 
i.e. sharing a public good, correlates significantly with one of the lab-in-the-field 
measures, i.e. first-mover cooperation in the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is 
in line with literature that argues that villages with higher social capital are bound to 
have better communal property or public goods management (e.g. Narayan and 
Pritchett, 1996; Bouma et al., 2008). Our natural field experiment therefore provides 
some external validity for our findings from the lab-in-the-field experiment.44 
3.6 Conclusion 
The latest wave of LSAIs has prompted a growing literature that analyses the spill-
over effects of these investments on communities residing in their proximity. So far 
this research has focused on directly observable outcomes of such investments that 
                                                 
44 Similar approaches for behaviour in different domains like common pool resources, (charitable) 
giving and cheating are discussed by Levitt and List (2007), Stoop et al., (2012), Stoop (2014), Galizzi 

















































include changes in employment, input use and productivity. In this chapter, we 
provide first insights into the impacts of LSAIs on social capital, which is not directly 
observable yet highly important for economic development (Putnam, 1993; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). 
Using both a lab-in-the-field and a natural field experiment, we examine whether 
intra-village levels of cooperation among smallholders are affected by neighboring 
LSAIs. We formulate several hypotheses based on the literature (Arrow, 1972; 
Ensminger, 2004; Kajoba, 1994; Lyons et al., 1998) which argue that village 
communities may adjust their cooperative behavior when exposed to market-
oriented systems such as those that characterize LSAIs. We indeed find evidence in 
favor of the communal coping and the reputation hypotheses. Smallholders in 
villages close to LSAIs are uncertain and jointly discuss the arrival of the investors, 
causing them to trust each other more than those in villages further away. Likewise, 
villagers who have entered an employee-employer relationship with LSAIs are more 
likely to trust and to reciprocate trust – an effect which intensifies with the duration 
of the work relationship. Our field experiment regarding the governance of a public 
good – a community solar system– points in the same direction of greater 
cooperation in communities neighboring LSAIs. 
The two LSAIs selected for this study are largely representative of other LSAIs that 
are operational in Zambia and resemble those in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Our findings may hence carry over to other countries that have similarly experienced 
a rise in demand for agricultural land. Future research may take a closer look at 
different employment modes on large-scale farms that foster positive externalities. 
The establishment of LSAIs constitutes only one of many examples where traditional 
communities are exposed to market-oriented systems in the course of economic 
development and structural transformation. While the overall effects of market 




exposure may differ from case to case, outcomes are likely to be driven by common 
transmission mechanisms.  




3.7 Appendix: Additional figures and tables  
Figure 3.A.1. The support letter from the Provincial Government 
  
































27087 Maize, Soya Beans, 
Wheat 
Emvest South Africa Kalonga 
Estates 





South Africa Mkushi 4094 Maize, Soya Beans, 
Wheat 




South Africa Mpongwe 12822 Maize, Soya Beans, 
Wheat 
Denbia Denmark Lusaka 3000 Coffee Plant, Maize, 
Fruit, Onion, Potatoes, 
























Kafue 1575 Barley, Sorghum, 
Maize, Soya Beans, 
Wheat 





Chibombo 650 Sun Flower, Soya 
Beans 
Vixers Farming Zimbabwe Chibombo 1200 Soya Beans 
Tiso Blackstar South Africa Mpande 990 Maize, Soya Beans 









Table 3.A.2. Village head characteristics  
 
_near villages _further villages 
 




First mover cooperation 0.62 0.51 0.63 0.5 0.96 
Second mover cooperation 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.25 0.88 
No. household members 7 2.92 7.56 3.22 0.52 
Age 56.31 13.84 59.31 16.5 0.48 
Asset index based on pca 0.55 0.18 0.47 0.15 0.39 
Household sells crops 0.75 0.45 0.81 0.4 0.69 
Hectares cultivated 9.98 8.81 12.56 11.3 0.49 
Land title 0 0 0.13 0.35 0.19 
Male (dummy, 1=yes) 0.77 0.44 0.94 0.25 0.19 
Married 0.85 0.38 0.81 0.4 0.81 
Education in years 5.54 3.93 5.56 3.18 0.98 
Literacy (with 5 being the 
highest value) 
2.85 1.38 2.75 0.86 0.86 
Smallholder 0.92 0.28 1 0 0.27 
LSAI worker(dummy, 1=yes) 0.23 0.44 0.13 0.34 0.45 
Number of headmen 13 16   
 
  




Table 3.A.3. Regression analysis of second mover conditional cooperation and length 























Note: The table presents marginal effects. The observations from the control villages are the 




 (1) (2) 
Independent Variables Logit regression Logit regression 
   
Amount of time worker worked 
on farm 
0.055* 0.058** 
 (0.029) (0.026) 
_near village (dummy, 1 = yes)  -0.015 
  (0.081) 
Age (continuous)  -0.000 
  (0.003) 
Male (dummy, 1 = yes)  -0.168** 
  (0.080) 
Born in the village (dummy, 1 = 
yes) 
 -0.105 
  (0.075) 
Education in years (continuous)  0.000 
  (0.011) 
   
Observations 180 177 




3.8 Appendix: Instructions 
Introduction 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s activities may take three to 
four hours. Before we begin I want to make some general comments about what we 
are doing here today and explain the rules that we must follow. 
We will ask each of you to make decisions involving money and to answer a few 
questions. Whatever money you earn during the activities will be yours to keep and 
take home. Nobody but the researchers and you will know what you decided and 
earned, and money will be given in private. No other participant will learn about 
your decisions and earned money. We will be supplying the money. This money was 
given to us by the London School of Economics, a university in Great Britain, to use 
for research and it is not our own personal money. 
Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important. Many 
of you were invited here without knowing very much about what we are planning to 
do today. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to 
participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started 
the activity or not. 
We will be asking you to do three activities with other individuals in your village 
today. Your earnings from all three activities sums to your total earnings. You will be 
informed about the outcomes in the three activities and your total earnings in 
private at the end of all activities.  
If you have heard anything about these types of activities, you should try to forget 
about that because each activity can be completely different. It is important that you 
listen as carefully as possible. 




We will run through some examples of how the activities work. You cannot ask 
questions or talk while here in the group. This is very important. Please be sure that 
you obey this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the activities for 
everyone. If one person talks about the activities while others can hear it, we would 
not be able to carry out the activities today. Do not worry if you do not completely 
understand the rules as we go through them here in the group. Each of you will have 
a chance to ask questions in private to be sure that you understand how the 
activities work. 
Before we explain the activities we divide you into two groups, the Green Group and 
the Black Group, according to the colored cards that you have drawn from the bag a 
moment ago. The two groups will separate, so that green-card people and black-card 
people cannot see or hear each other. 
After we have explained the activities, you will all wait in a group. We will call you 
by the number on your ticket, so please listen carefully for your number. While you 
are waiting you can talk about anything else you want other than the activities here 
today. 




Activity 1 – Black Group 
In activity 1 you can choose between two options: Pink and Yellow. Another person 
from the Green Group, who is randomly matched with you, also chooses between 
Pink and Yellow. 
You decide first and then the other person from the Green Group will decide second. 
Your payment and the payment of the other person depend on your own decision 
and the decision of the other person: 
If you choose Pink and the other person also chooses Pink, then you will receive 40 
kwacha and the other person will also receive 40 kwacha. 
 
If you choose Yellow and the other person chooses Pink, then you will receive 50 
kwacha and the other person will receive 5 kwacha. 
 
If you choose Pink and the other person chooses Yellow, then you will receive 5 
kwacha and the other person will receive 50 kwacha. 
 
If you choose Yellow and the other person also chooses Yellow, then you will receive 
30 kwacha and the other person will also receive 30 kwacha. 
 
Remember, you decide first and then the other person from the Green Group will 
decide second. 
 




Please choose on the sheet of paper by marking your choice with the pen on the Pink 
or the Yellow arrow. 
 
  




Activity 1 – Green Group 
In activity 1 you can choose between two options: Pink and Yellow. Another person 
from the Black Group, who is randomly matched with you, also chooses between 
Pink and Yellow. 
You will decide second; that is, the other person from the Black Group decides 
before you. 
Your payment and the payment of the other person depend on your own decision 
and the decision of the other person: 
If you choose Pink and the other person also chooses Pink, then you will receive 40 
kwacha and the other person will also receive 40 kwacha. 
 
If you choose Yellow and the other person chooses Pink, then you will receive 50 
kwacha and the other person will receive 5 kwacha. 
 
If you choose Pink and the other person chooses Yellow, then you will receive 5 
kwacha and the other person will receive 50 kwacha. 
 
If you choose Yellow and the other person also chooses Yellow, then you will receive 
30 kwacha and the other person will also receive 30 kwacha. 
 
You will decide second; that is, the other person from the Black Group decides 
before you. 





Please choose on the sheet of paper by marking your two choices, one for each of the 
two possible scenarios, with the pen on the Pink or the Yellow arrow. 
 





4 Market exposure makes females 
behave more competitively and closes 
the gender gap 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Competitiveness is a key component of success in modern market economies. Firms 
compete for customers, employees compete for positions, politicians compete for 
voters, and students compete for university placements. The origins of individual 
competitiveness have been of great interest for economists in recent years. The 
literature shows that differences in competitiveness already exist among children 
and depend on parental backgrounds and attitudes (Almas et al., 2015; Deckers et al., 
2015; Khadjavi and Nicklisch, 2015). Beyond parental influences, behavioral economic 
research suggests that societal arrangements influence individuals’ preferences for 
competition, especially gender differences (Andersen et al., 2013; Buser et al., 2014; 
Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2003; 
Gneezy et al., 2009; Leibbrandt et al., 2013; Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2015). 
Most changes in societal arrangements, like the extent of gender equality and 
market integration, happen endogenously and over a long time horizon. This feature 
makes it hard to identify causal effects of societal arrangements on its members’ 
preferences. For instance, Henrich et al. (2001, 2004, 2010) and Henrich and 
                                                 
 This chapter has been co-authored with Menusch Khadjavi and Rainer Thiele.  
 Funding from the International Growth Centre at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science under the project number 1-VRS-VZMB-VXXXX-89311 is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Ensminger (2014) provide compelling evidence that market exposure correlates with 
pro-social behavior in small-scale societies. With regard to gender differences, 
Alesina et al. (2013) show that present day norms and beliefs on gender equality are 
greatly influenced by the adoption of traditional agricultural practices such as the 
historical use of ploughs. Likewise, Gneezy et al. (2009) and Andersen et al. (2013) 
provide evidence on differences in competitiveness in matrilineal and patriarchal 
societies. Leibbrandt et al. (2013) show how work arrangements based on natural 
circumstances influence competitiveness while Siddique and Vlassopoulos (2017) 
find that ethnicity is an important determinant of competitive preferences. 
All these findings yield valuable insights into the emergence and endogenous 
development of competitive preferences through changes in long-term societal 
arrangements (Bowles, 1998). The aim of this study is to complement previous 
findings of mostly long-term effects with an example of rather short-term effects, 
which is more likely to allow for a causal interpretation. One of the few studies that 
investigate how competitive preferences are shaped by a relatively short-run societal 
change is by Booth et al. (2016), who analyze how social norms for different birth 
cohorts in mainland China and Taiwan have been influenced by the adoption of 
capitalist market-oriented reforms and Marxist ideology over a period of four 
decades. 
In this chapter, we take advantage of an exogenous change over an even shorter time 
period that has affected small-scale farmers in a number of developing countries: 
rapid market exposure through the set-up of large-scale farms. Following the triple 
fuel, food and financial crisis of the years 2008 to 2009, investors from multinational 
firms have expressed a large interest in agricultural land in developing countries. 
Currently more than 1000 deals that cover an area of approximately 40 million 
hectares (an area comparable to the size of Zimbabwe or Paraguay) have been 
concluded (Nolte et al. 2016). Being market-oriented, highly mechanized, and capital 
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intense, these investments often acquire land next to small-scale farmers that 
typically have low productivity levels, limited access to markets, and are subsistence 
oriented. This situation mirrors the encounter of two classic antithetical paradigms 
of rural farming and development, where the small-scale farmers represent a 
communal peasant economy and the agricultural firm represents the modern market 
economy (Timmer, 1997). 
To investigate how the competitive behavior of small-scale farmers is altered by the 
establishment of large-scale farms, we employ the lab-in-the-field experiment first 
used by Gneezy et al. (2009). More specifically we analyze the decisions to compete 
made by 442 small-scale farmers in 13 randomly selected villages located within a 15 
kilometer radius of two large-scale-farms and compare them with the decisions of 
484 similar small-scale farmers from 16 randomly selected villages that are located 
50-75 kilometers further away from the two large-scale farms. Our central hypothesis 
is that exogenous market exposure that is introduced through the set-up and 
operation of large-scale farms leads to more competitive behavior of small-scale 
farmers.  
The results from the lab-in-the-field experiment provide strong evidence in favor of 
this hypothesis. We find that female small-scale farmers that have experienced 
exogenous rapid exposure to market oriented agriculture are more willing to 
compete than those that have no such exposure. Interestingly, male small-scale 
farmers’ competitive behavior is determined by endogenous market exposure 
through crop sales and not exogenous market exposure. This is likely to be due to 
the fact that male small-scale farmers are already exposed to factors that raise their 
competitiveness such as better access to assets and patrilineal norms which 
undermine the effect of exogenous market exposure. In communities near large-
scale farms, females’ competitive behavior is raised to the extent that the gender gap 
in competitive behavior is leveled off in communities near large-scale farms. These 
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results are further corroborated by a comparison of the competitive behavior of 
children (aged 5 to 15) from the two sets of villages. We find that children living in 
villages close to large-scale farms are significantly more competitive than their 
counterparts in villages further away.  
The remainder of our chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief 
description of the study context. This is followed by an explanation of the 
experimental design and procedure in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the main 
results and some robustness checks. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Study context 
The study was conducted in the Mumbwa and Mkushi regions of Zambia’s Central 
Province. These two regions were selected as they both have large-scale farms that 
were recently set up in the proximity of small-scale farming communities. The farm 
in Mumbwa was allocated an area of over 30,000 hectares and cultivates nearly one 
tenth of this land. It began its operations in 2012. The land investment in Mkushi 
was set up in 2010 and consists of 6 farms that together account for approximately 
4000 hectares. These farms can be considered large for a country like Zambia where 
more than 70 percent of farmers cultivate less than 2 hectares of land and another 23 
percent cultivate plots of land that range between 2 and 5 hectares (CSO, n.d). The 
two large-scale farms both operate in competitive market environments and seek to 
become major suppliers of wheat and maize for Zambia and her neighboring 
countries. As a means of achieving its goal of becoming a major player in Sub-
Saharan Africa’s food production, the large-scale farm in Mumbwa recently 
expanded its farming division to incorporate livestock and is now the second largest 
meat company in Zambia (Amatheon Agri, 2015). The two farms are representative 
of other large-scale farms in Zambia and sub-Saharan Africa in a number of regards: 
they are similar in size, cultivate similar crops, were set up at almost the same time 
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and target the same markets as other farms of the same magnitude (Harding, 2017; 
Khadjavi et al., 2017). 
This competitive environment driving the two large-scale farms is in contrast to the 
conditions facing neighboring small-scale farmers who are mostly reliant on low–
productive, rain-fed agriculture. Small-scale farmers’ competition and full market 
participation is hindered, for instance, by their limited access to productive assets 
(Deininger and Olinto, 2000). Chapoto and Jayne (2011) show that in the years 
2010/2011 less than 50 percent of the small-scale farming households in Central 
Province participated in and sold their output on maize markets. The bulk of this 
output (90 percent) was sold directly on small-scale farms to traders. The authors 
point out that there is a reasonable degree of competition to purchase maize within 
these villages. Villages that sell maize in Central province are visited by 7 different 
traders on average, which makes the environment especially competitive for traders. 
However, the high supply of traders per village means that the small-scale farmers 
do not have to compete aggressively to sell their output.  
This setting makes it interesting for us to examine how the exposure to competitive, 
highly productive and market-oriented large-scale farms affects small-scale farmers’ 
preferences for competition. We posit that exposure to market-oriented large-scale 
farms will increase small-scale farmers’ individualism and willingness to participate 
on the market as has been found in previous research (Kajoba, 1994). Since 
competitive behavior can be regarded as a key ingredient to participate in market 
economies we expect that small-scale farmers that have been exposed to large-scale 
farms will become more competitive. 
Moreover, we also expect that those farmers who have already had some degree of 
market exposure through the sale of their produce to traders will be more 
accustomed to competition and will hence display a higher willingness to compete. 
Thus, in the context of our study, we expect that market exposure, be it exogenous 
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(through large-scale farms) or endogenous (through crop sales), increases the 
competitive behavior of small-scale farmers. 
4.3 Experimental design and procedures 
29 villages were visited between mid-August and September 2015 and again in July, 
2016. The villages where randomly selected using maps and village lists provided by 
the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Lusaka. 13 villages within a radius of 
15 kilometers from the two large-scale farms (_near villages) and 16 villages (_further 
villages) within a 50 to 70 kilometer radius from the large-scale farms were selected.  
Once the _near and _further villages were identified, village heads were approached 
to request permission to conduct the lab-in the-field experiments in their village. 
Unaware of the true motive of the research questions, the village heads were asked 
to invite all adults in the village to participate in an incentivized study that sought to 
analyze socio-economic conditions in the villages. A total of 442 adult participants 
took part in these experiments in _near villages and 484 in _further villages. 
In order to elicit the impact of exogenous market exposure on participants’ 
competitive behavior, the incentivized competition game of Gneezy et al. (2009) was 
employed.45 This experiment was selected due to its simple nature that makes it 
suitable for a setting such as ours where more than half of the study participants 
could not read or write well in English or in the main regional languages (Nyanja or 
Bemba). In addition to being simple, the experiment is well suited for such a setting 
as the task (throwing ten tennis balls using an undertoss) is unfamiliar.  
Before tossing the balls, participants were asked to decide between two options: 
Option A and Option B. Option A meant that the participant earned 5 Zambian 
                                                 
45 The game was the third and last task, after a sequential prisoner’s dilemma to measure social 
capital and a deception game. Khadjavi et al. (2017) provide further information on the results from 
the sequential prisoner’s dilemma. 
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Kwacha (approx. $0.50 at the time of the study) for each successful toss into the 
bucket. Option B paid 15 Zambian Kwacha (approx. $1.50) for each successful toss 
(the threefold amount of Option A) to the participant, but only if the participant 
scored more tennis balls into the bucket than an anonymous randomly matched 
participant from the same village. Hence, the payment in Option A was a piece rate 
that was independent of other participants’ success while the payment in option B 
was a combination of a piece rate and a competition. If a participant scored fewer 
balls into the bucket than the other participant, then she/he received no money in 
the game under Option B. In case of equal scores, Option B yielded 5 Zambian 
Kwacha for each successful throw (just like Option A).46 Ten successful tosses could 
earn the participants 150 Zambian Kwacha. The payoffs from competing can be 
considered as high since the average rural per capita monthly income was estimated 
at 185.9 Zambian Kwacha during the period in which the study was conducted (CSO, 
2016). 
After a participant made her decision on the option and tossed the tennis balls, she 
was directed to a spatially separate waiting area. This measure ensured that neither 
the two groups nor participants within each group could communicate the task, 
their decisions or scores. Great caution was undertaken to ensure that all tosses were 
made in secluded areas with natural barriers to block other participants from 
learning about the scores of their companions. Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.6 
illustrates such a set-up. 
To investigate whether children’s competitive behavior is also altered by adults’ 
market exposure, we adjusted the nature of the pay-offs so that they were no longer 
monetized. The incentive structure for children was the same, except that they 
earned 1 (Option A) or 3 marbles (Option B, if own_score > other_score) for each 
scored tennis ball. Marbles themselves are valuable to children as they are 
                                                 
46 Appendix 4.7 contains the instructions of our study. 
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commonly used by children in Zambia to play traditional games such as Nsolo (a 
variant of the board game Mancala).47 After receiving their earnings, the children 
were informed that they may retain the marbles or exchange them for other toys and 
school stationary (at exchange rates mirroring market prices). 401 children between 
the ages of 5 and 15 participated in our competition game. Children were only 
allowed to participate in the experiment after they had been granted permission by 
their parents or guardians.  
Recognizing that it would be extremely difficult and costly to design such a study 
within a panel setting that tracks the evolution of competitive behavior before and 
after the establishment of a large-scale farm, we undertake several measures to 
ensure that the _further villages are a good counterfactual for the _near villages. 
First, we compare the possible determinants of small-scale farmers’ competitive 
behavior prior to the establishment of the large-scale farms. As shown in Table 4.1, a 
large set of pre-treatment village characteristics, such as population density, rainfall 
and access to infrastructure, do not differ significantly between _near villages and 
_further villages.  
Second, we compare small-scale farmer and village level characteristics after the 
establishment of the large-scale farm and only find significant differences in the 
mean age of small-scale farmers, in the number of small-scale farmers that have 
worked on large-scale farms as well as the number of small-scale farmers solely 
engaged in crop sales. However, these differences are not surprising as it can be 
expected that there is a larger number of farm workers in the vicinity of large-scale 
farms and a higher number of small-scale farmers engaged in crop sales further away 
from the large-scale farms since alternative employment opportunities are 
unavailable.  
                                                 
47 Marbles have also been used as a form of payment for children in other experimental studies that 
sought to elicit children competitiveness, for instance see Madsen (1971). 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics by village type 
  _near villages _further villages   




Individual and household characteristics 
Household head 0.46 0.09 0.49 0.13 0.32 
Number of household members 6.35 0.81 7.11 1.08 0.07 
Male 0.55 0.15 0.47 0.12 0.12 
Age  35.07 2.46 41.11 5.25 0.00 
Years in education 6.56 1.08 6.52 0.86 1.00 
Large-scale farm worker 0.52 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.00 
Recently migrated to the village 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.68 
Asset index 0.42 0.03 0.41 0.10 0.46 
Land title 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.66 
Crops sold 0.68 0.61 0.82 0.10 0.03 
Crop index 0.21 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.46 
 
Village characteristics 
Village size (hectares) 413.00 579.19 1112.56 2069.41 0.90 
Ethnic groups in village 8.46 3.31 7.84 3.11 0.55 
Village is patrilineal 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.19 
 
Pre-treatment village characteristics 
Population density (pixel) 5.50 0.52 5.54 0.52 0.85 
Population density (5 km buffer) 5.50 0.52 5.54 0.51 0.74 
Mean monthly rainfall (pixel) 81.29 3.32 80.05 5.59 0.47 
Mean monthly rainfall (5 km buffer) 81.26 3.05 80.18 5.73 0.51 
Elevation (pixel) 1213.85 28.82 1250.63 140.12 0.83 
Elevation (5 km buffer) 1221.39 28.56 1252.24 132.78 1.00 
Mean monthly maximum temperature 
(pixel) 30.47 0.49 30.08 1.32 0.98 
Mean monthly maximum temperature 
(5 km buffer) 30.42 0.50 30.08 1.25 0.86 
Distance to nearest road 0.49 0.61 1.54 2.14 0.20 
Distance to nearest water line 1.97 1.13 1.79 1.83 0.33 
Distance to nearest rail 71.90 77.57 63.82 65.45 0.20 
Note: The p-values are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney tests on the village-level. The asset index 
includes information on the households’ possessions of livestock holdings, radios, agricultural 
equipment, transportation, as well indicators of the quality of housing. 
 
Importantly, we do not find any significant differences across gender, ethnicity and 
whether the village has a patrilineal lineage. These variables have been identified in 
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the literature as key determinants of competitive preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Siddique and Vlassopoulos, 2017; Gneezy et al. 2009).  
Third, we collected soil samples from all the villages visited to test whether 
differences in soil quality could influence the location of large-scale farms and the 
competitiveness of small-scale farmers. Fourth, we conducted interviews with the 
large-scale farm managers and the Investment Promotions Officer at the Zambian 
Development Agency - which is the agency charged with promoting and facilitating 
investments - to ensure that villagers’ preferences did not play a role in the 
settlement of the investors. Fifth, to make sure that other forms of market 
integration were not driving the results we kept access to roads constant across both 
sets of villages. None of these additional cautionary measures revealed that small-
scale farmers in _near villages are systematically different from their counterparts in 
_further villages. 
4.4 Results 
We first report the results of the lab-in-the-field experiment with the adult 
participants. This is followed by the results of the same experiment with children 
aged 5 to 15 years old in a subset of villages. Finally, we present a robustness check 
where our main explanatory variable of interest, distance from the investment farms, 
is continuous rather than dichotomous as in the base specification. 
4.4.1 Adults 
In line with our central hypothesis, we indeed find that participants in _near villages 
are more likely to choose the competitive option (54.36 percent) when compared to 
participants in _further villages (47.75 percent).  
This difference of about 14 percent is statistically significant based on a (two-sided) 
chi-squared test (p < 0.05). Note also that the share of competitive choices in _near 
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villages is greater than chance (binomial test, p < 0.05). Figure 4.1 depicts this 
result.48 
Figure 4.1. Competitive choices of adults by village group 
 
Given the rich data collected in the survey, we investigate whether the results 
presented in Figure 4.1 hold after controlling for individual, household and village 
level socio-economic observables. We also include a variable that indicates whether 
a participant sells crops as our proxy for market integration and estimate a logit 
regression of the following form: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑣 + 𝛽2𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝜒𝑖ℎ𝑣 + 𝛽4𝜌𝑟 + 𝑖ℎ𝑣 
where 𝑦𝑖 represents the individual’s decision to choose the competitive option, 𝜏𝑣 is 
a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for _near villages, 𝜇𝑖 is a variable that indicates 
whether an individual engages in crop sales, and 𝜒𝑖ℎ𝑣 is a vector of individual, 
household and village-level socio-economic variables. 𝜌𝑟 is used to control for any 
                                                 
48 See Figure 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.6 for histograms of competition game scores in our two village 
groups. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions in the 
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region-specific effects while 𝑖ℎ𝑣 is the error term. As a robustness check we replace 
𝜏𝑣 with a continuous variable 𝛿𝑣 measuring the distance from the large-scale farm to 
the villages. Since the outcome variable 𝑦𝑖 is dichotomous, we estimate all 
specifications with logit regressions and report the marginal effects in the tables 
below. 
We find consistent evidence that competitive behavior is stronger in _near villages 
even after estimating different specifications that introduce step-wise controls for 
individual, household and village-level socioeconomic characteristics (columns I, II 
and III). Further, we find that small-scale farmers who sell crops on markets are 
significantly more competitive than small-scale farmers that do not engage in such 
crop sales. 
Interestingly, the two channels of market exposure, (1) the effect of living close to 
large-scale agricultural investments and (2) selling crops on markets, affect 
competitiveness jointly. We therefore find clear evidence that both endogenous 
market integration (the decision to sell crops on markets) and exogenous market 
exposure (the settlement of agricultural investments next door) increase 
competitiveness. 
In addition, we obtain evidence that village level characteristics that have been 
identified as determinants of competitive behavior in existing literature also affect 
the decision to compete of participants in our study. First, we observe that an 
increase in the number of ethnicities in a village significantly reduces participants’ 
willingness to compete. This is in line with Siddique and Vlassopoulos (2017), who 
also find a reluctance to participate in competition games when the pool of potential 
competitors is multiethnic in Bangladesh. 
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Table 4.2. Regression analysis of adults’ competitive behavior 
 I II III 









    
_near village = 1 0.093** 0.084* 0.145*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.039) 
Household sells crops = 1 0.123** 0.111** 0.110** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) 
Household head = 1  0.010 0.018 
  (0.050) (0.051) 
No. of household members (continuous)  -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Age (continuous)  -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Male = 1  0.025 0.024 
  (0.053) (0.056) 
Education in years (continuous)  0.001 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Large-scale farm worker = 1  0.021 0.015 
  (0.041) (0.041) 
Migrated after large-scale farm = 1  -0.045 -0.042 
  (0.050) (0.051) 
Asset index based on pca  -0.023 -0.002 
  (0.083) (0.084) 
Crop index based on pca  0.091 0.099 
  (0.077) (0.075) 
Land title = 1  0.060 0.063 
  (0.051) (0.051) 
Village area (continuous)   0.000 
   (0.000) 
No. of ethnic groups i (continuous)   -0.013* 
   (0.007) 
Village is patrilineal = 1   0.118* 
   (0.061) 
Region = 1 0.008 0.036 -0.025 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.043) 
    
Observations 842 795 795 
Note: The table presents marginal effects, except for the constant of the estimation. The observations 
from the _further control villages are the baseline of the estimations. The standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the village-level (29 villages) in all estimations. Statistical significance: *p 
< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Second, we find that being in a patrilineal village increases participants’ willingness 
to compete. This is in line with Gneezy et al. (2009), who use the same game as we 
do and show that nurture in matrilineal and patriarchal settings plays a significant 
role in shaping competitive preferences. Surprisingly, in contrast to previous studies 
(e.g. Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Booth and Nolan, 2012), we do not find that gender 
influences competitive behavior. 
This null result on gender is particularly surprising in the context of rural Zambia 
where differences in gender equality and ideologies are prolific (Evans, 2017). We 
further explore this puzzling outcome by comparing the competitive behavior of 
female and male participants in the two village groups.  
Figure 4.2. Competitive choices by village group and gender 
 
In _further villages we indeed find that female participants are more likely to shy 
away from competition as pointed out in the literature on gender and 
competitiveness (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Booth and Nolan, 2012): 43.45 percent of 
females and 53.18 percent of males opt into competition. A chi-squared test rejects 
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and 53.69 percent of males opt into competition. This difference is not significant (p 
> 0.6). Figure 4.2 depicts the results. 
To better understand what might be driving these results, we run a logit regression 
disaggregated by gender and control for the same socioeconomic variables as in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.3 reports the results for male participants in the first two columns and for 
female participants in the last two columns. This time we find that male participants’ 
competitive behavior is determined by endogenous market exposure (crop sales) 
while female participants’ competitive behavior is driven by exogenous market 
exposure (proximity to the large-scale farms). We no longer find that both forms of 
market exposure jointly affect competitive behavior.  
This result on the heterogeneous effects of market exposure is puzzling as it 
indicates that different mechanisms drive male and female competitive behavior. 
Comparing the males and females in our sample in Table 4.A.1 in the appendix, we 
observe that the percentage of study participants who report that they are engaged 
in crop sales is balanced. However, despite the fact that there are no significant 
differences in crop sales across both sexes, endogenous market exposure is only 
important for males. This is likely to be driven by prevailing norms and customs in 
rural Zambia that favor male participation in the labor and agricultural markets and 
assign domestic and agricultural roles to women (Evans, 2017). Thus, even though 
the males and females in our study are both engaged in crop sales, males may be 
more proactive in these markets while females may have to balance crop sales along 
with agricultural work and other domestic chores.49  
 
                                                 
49
 Crop sales are reported as a binary variable thus we cannot estimate the intensity of male and 
female sales. 
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Table 4.3. Regression analysis of adults’ competitive preferences by gender 









     
_Near village = 1 0.034 0.062 0.141** 0.203*** 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.063) (0.073) 
Household sells crops = 1 0.180*** 0.140** 0.070 0.087 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.066) (0.067) 
Household head = 1  0.085  -0.027 
  (0.075)  (0.062) 
No. of household members (continuous)  -0.003  -0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Age (continuous)  -0.002  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Education in years (continuous)  0.007  -0.005 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Large-scale farm worker = 1  0.032  -0.011 
  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Migrated after large-scale farm = 1  -0.049  -0.033 
  (0.060)  (0.100) 
Asset index based on pca  0.022  -0.097 
  (0.130)  (0.147) 
Crop index based on pca  0.052  0.178 
  (0.086)  (0.142) 
Land title = 1  0.145**  0.020 
  (0.074)  (0.069) 
Village area (continuous)  0.000*  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
No. of ethnic groups (continuous)  -0.010  -0.015 
  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Village is patrilineal = 1  0.111*  0.116 
  (0.059)  (0.108) 
Region = 1 -0.031 -0.023 0.032 -0.028 
 (0.051) (0.069) (0.065) (0.083) 
     
Observations 419 402 423 393 
Note: The table presents marginal effects, except for the constant of the estimation. The observations 
from the _further control villages are the baseline of the estimations. The standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the village-level (29 villages) in all estimations. Statistical significance: *p 
< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Examining the remaining socio-economic characteristics in Table 4.A.1, we observe 
that males are more educated, own more assets and cultivate a more diverse 
selection of crops. In addition, males are more likely to head households than 
females. This suggests that females are more economically disadvantaged than their 
male counterparts. Considering that males have significantly more productive 
resources and that there are multiple factors jointly affecting their competitive 
behavior (see Table 4.3), exogenous market exposure may have a minimal effect on 
them since they already behave competitively. Thus given the setting, it is 
reasonable that females are more responsive to exogenous market exposure as there 
are no other factors that simultaneously affect their competitive behavior. 
 To further understand the mechanisms in which exogenous market exposure affects 
females’ competitive behavior, we interact the dummy variable that indicates a 
village is near a large-scale farm with females’ socioeconomic characteristics. These 
results are reported in Table 4.A.2 in the appendix. We do not find that females’ 
competitive behavior is raised because large-scale farms increase female asset 
holdings or employment opportunities. This indicates that other mechanisms are 
driving the observed effect. 
A study that analyzes willingness to compete in rural and urban Uganda by Bjorvatn 
et al. (2016), finds a gender gap in competitiveness for rural areas but not for urban 
settings. The authors argue that these results are driven by the rural context where 
attitudes towards women are negative. In a similar vein, considering that large-scale 
farms bring development opportunities to rural areas, it is likely that exogenous 
market exposure raises females’ awareness of opportunities that were previously 
unavailable and weakens the prevailing norms that are disadvantageous to women. 
While our data cannot confirm that market exposure increases females competitive 
behavior through empowerment and exposure to opportunities, evidence for an 
analogous effect in Zambia is provided by Evans (2017) who uses ethnographic data 
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from a rural and urban setting in the Luapula and Copperbelt provinces and finds 
that exposure to women that are engaged in socially valued roles erodes masculine 
gender ideologies. 
Overall, we can conclude that exogenous market exposure in our rural, developing 
country setting balances the competitiveness of females and males. The effect is so 
large that it closes the commonly associated gender gap. This finding may provide 
an additional element in the quest for measures to overcome gender differences (e.g. 
Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013).  
4.4.2 Children 
Next we complement our analysis of adults’ competitive behavior with children’s 
behavior. Analyzing children’s behavior is interesting, as they may be more receptive 
to short-term changes in their environment. While adults have developed their 
preferences over decades, children are at the prime of their preference formation.  
We find a similar effect of exogenous market exposure: there are a significantly 
higher number of participants who decide to make competitive choices in _near 
villages compared to _further villages (63.09 percent vs. 42.26 percent respectively, 
two-sided chi-squared test: p < 0.000). Examining the results of females and males 
separately, we find that both genders are more competitive in _near villages 
compared to _further villages (see Figure 4.3). Analogous to the results that we 
obtained for adults in Figure 2, we find a large gender gap in competitiveness for 
_further villages (52.08 percent for males vs. 29.17 percent for females, chi-squared 
test: p < 0.01), but not for _near villages (62.72 percent for males vs. 63.41 percent for 
females, (chi-squared test: p > 0.9). 
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Figure 4.3. Competitive choices of children by gender and village group. 
 
Controlling for all other available variables regarding the children (age, number of 
scored tennis balls in the competition game and region of data collection) in a logit 
regression analysis confirms these results (see Table 4.A.3 in Appendix 4.6 for 
details).50 
It is likely that children’s competitive behavior is influenced by that of adults (Almas 
et al., 2015; Deckers et al., 2015; Khadjavi and Nicklisch, 2015). In _near villages, 
females may pass on their competitive preferences to their children which cause 
competitive behavior to rise for both their male and female children. Although these 
suggested mechanisms are in line with existing literature that point out how 
children’s competitive behavior is shaped by their parents socioeconomic 
characteristics and preferences, more data that explains how exactly these changes 
come about would be required to establish strong causal relations. 
 
                                                 
50
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4.4.3 Robustness of results 
In order to investigate whether the two main results obtained on exogenous market 
exposure reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are robust, we change the specification of 
our main variable of interest from a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if a 
village is near a large-scale farm to a continuous variable that indicates the distance 
away from the large-scale farm. All other individual, household and village-level 
socio-economic controls from the previous specifications are retained. The results 
are reported in Table 4.A.4. We now see that an increase in the distance away from 
the large-scale farms significantly reduces the likelihood that a participant will 
engage in competition. This corroborates our result that proximity to a large-scale 
farm increases competitive behavior. 
Next we investigate whether we observe heterogeneity in the drivers of male and 
female competitive behavior as reported in Table 4.3. These results are reported in 
Table 4.A.5. Again we find that exogenous market exposure, which is now measured 
as the distance from the large-scale farm, is only pertinent for female participants. 
We do not find evidence indicating that these preferences are driven by other factors 
for female participants. The main determinants of males’ competitive preferences 
remain unchanged.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Our investigation concentrates on the encounter of two economic and farming 
systems which are at the extremes along the dimension of market exposure. There is 
peasant, small-scale farming on the one hand and capital-intense market-oriented 
large-scale farming by the global agricultural industry on the other hand (Timmer, 
1997). Our result is that living in the proximity of large-scale agricultural investment 
sites makes small-scale farmers more competitive compared to similar small-scale 
farmers who live at a distance to the investment sites. We regard this finding as 
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highly important for agricultural policy and for the broader understanding of what 
kind of societal arrangements may influence individuals’ preferences (Bowles, 1998).  
Depending on the desirability of competitiveness in society, this externality by large-
scale farms may be regarded as a benefit or a cost. In the specific case of rural 
Zambia, we believe that moving small-scale farmers’ preferences towards greater 
competitiveness may increase their market participation and thereby enable them to 
achieve higher productivity. The externality we identify in our research may 
therefore be deemed beneficial.  
In communities further away from investment sites we find the commonly observed 
gender gap in competitiveness (Gneezy et al., 2003; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), i.e. 
that males are more competitive than females. Conversely, the gender gap is 
completely closed in communities near the sites. This finding suggests that in our 
case market exposure not only increases competitiveness of small-scale farmers in 
general, but that females’ competitiveness ‘catches up’ with males’. Further research 
is needed to establish the mechanisms in which females’ competitive behavior is 
raised through exogenous market exposure. A large body of literature argues that 
competitiveness is key to succeed in market environments and that females’ lack of 
competitiveness explains their lower incomes and participation in leadership 
positions (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Buser et al., 2014). Accordingly, balancing 
competitiveness of females and males through market exposure in the rural setting 
of developing countries may be regarded as a valuable positive externality. 
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4.6 Appendix: Additional figures and tables 
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Figure 4.A.2. Histograms of competition game scores  
 
Note: A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions in the two 
village groups (p > 0.2). 
 
 












      
Household head 0.28 0.45 0.64 0.48 0.00 
No. of household members 6.74 2.96 6.77 3.37 0.94 
Age  37.23 16.30 38.85 16.90 0.16 
Years of education 5.57 3.37 7.33 3.19 0.00 
Large-scale farm worker 0.32 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.00 
Recently migrated to the village 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.39 0.15 
Asset index 0.39 0.17 0.44 0.17 0.00 
Crop index 0.18 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.00 
Crops sold 0.75 0.43 0.78 0.42 0.32 
Land title 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.52 
Note: Statistically significant p-values in bold. The p-values are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney 
tests for the continuous variables and chi-squared tests for the binary variables. 
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Table 4.A.2. Mechanisms driving females’ competitive behavior 









     
_Near village 0.128** 0.118* 0.139** 0.115 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.064) (0.109) 
_Near village * employed  0.105   
  (0.148)   
Employed  -0.048   
  (0.104)   
_Near village * farm worker   -0.041  
   (0.101)  
Large-scale farm worker   0.036  
   (0.083)  
_Near village * asset index    0.067 
    (0.273) 
Asset index based on pca    -0.163 
    (0.158) 
Region = 1 0.052 0.055 0.045 0.053 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
     
Observations 467 467 463 461 
Note: The table presents marginal effects, except for the constant of the estimation. The observations 
from the _further control villages are the baseline of the estimations. The standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the village-level (29 villages) in all estimations. Statistical significance: *p 
< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
  




Table 4.A.3. Regression analysis of competitive decisions of children 







    
_near village 0.210** 0.112 0.348*** 
 (0.087) (0.099) (0.111) 
Age (continuous) 0.018 0.006 0.025* 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
Score -0.021* -0.017 -0.027 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.023) 
Region= 1 0.002 -0.029 0.043 
 (0.103) (0.128) (0.118) 
    
Observations 400 205 195 
Note: The table presents marginal effects, except for the constant of the estimation. The 
observations from the _further control villages are the baseline of the estimations. The standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the village-level (29 villages) in all estimations. Statistical 
significance: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 4.A.4. Adults’ competitive behavior with distance from large-scale farm 
 (1) (2) (3) 






Distance from large-scale farm (continuous) -0.002** -0.002** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household sells crops = 1 0.124** 0.123** 0.115** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) 
Household head = 1  -0.006 0.017 
  (0.049) (0.051) 
No. of household members (continuous)  -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Age (continuous)  0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Male = 1  0.055 0.025 
  (0.056) (0.056) 
Education in years (continuous)  0.019** 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.007) 
Large-scale farm worker = 1  0.012 0.014 
  (0.042) (0.041) 
Migrated after large-scale farm = 1  -0.051 -0.043 
  (0.051) (0.051) 
Asset index based on pca  -0.009 -0.017 
  (0.081) (0.083) 
Crop index based on pca  0.094 0.107 
  (0.081) (0.076) 
Land title = 1  0.071 0.064 
  (0.050) (0.050) 
Village area (continuous)   0.000** 
   (0.000) 
No. of ethnic groups in village (continuous)   -0.014** 
   (0.007) 
Village is patrilineal = 1   0.118* 
   (0.063) 
Region = 1 -0.004 0.023 -0.047 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) 
Literacy (continuous)  -0.060**  
  (0.026)  
Observations 842 785 795 
Regional FE YES   
Note: The table presents marginal effects, except for the constant of the estimation. The observations 
from the _further control villages are the baseline of the estimations. The standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the village-level (29 villages) in all estimations. Statistical significance: *p 
< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  




Table 4.A.5. Adults’ competitive behavior by gender  









     
Distance from large-scale farm (continuous) -0.001 -0.002 -0.003** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household sells crops = 1 0.181*** 0.144** 0.071 0.090 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.066) (0.067) 
Household head = 1  0.084  -0.030 
  (0.075)  (0.061) 
No. of household members (continuous)  -0.003  -0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Age (continuous)  -0.002  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Education in years (continuous)  0.007  -0.006 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Large-scale farm worker = 1  0.030  -0.012 
  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Migrated after large-scale farm was set-up = 1  -0.049  -0.034 
  (0.060)  (0.099) 
Asset index based on pca  0.015  -0.121 
  (0.129)  (0.145) 
Crop index based on pca  0.055  0.188 
  (0.084)  (0.147) 
Land title = 1  0.143*  0.024 
  (0.074)  (0.070) 
Village area (continuous)  0.000**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
No. of ethnic groups in village (continuous)  -0.011  -0.016 
  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Village is patrilineal = 1  0.115*  0.113 
  (0.062)  (0.106) 
Region = 1 -0.035 -0.036 0.016 -0.054 
 (0.050) (0.071) (0.064) (0.084) 
     
Observations 419 402 423 393 
Note: The table presents marginal effects, except for the constant of the estimation. The observations 
from the _further control villages are the baseline of the estimations. The standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the village-level (29 villages) in all estimations. Statistical significance: *p 
< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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4.7 Appendix: Instructions 
 
Introduction 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. Today’s activities may take three to 
four hours. Before we begin I want to make some general comments about what we 
are doing here today and explain the rules that we must follow. 
We will ask each of you to make decisions involving money and to answer a few 
questions. Whatever money you earn during the activities will be yours to keep and 
take home. Nobody but the researchers and you will know what you decided and 
earned, and money will be given in private. No other participant will learn 
about your decisions and earned money. We will be supplying the money. This 
money was given to us by the London School of Economics, a university in Great 
Britain, to use for research and it is not our own personal money. 
Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important. 
Many of you were invited here without knowing very much about what we are 
planning to do today. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not 
wish to participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have 
started the activity or not. 
We will be asking you to do three activities with other individuals in your village 
today. Your earnings from all three activities sums to your total earnings. You 
will be informed about the outcomes in the three activities and your total earnings 
in private at the end of all activities.  
If you have heard anything about these types of activities, you should try to forget 
about that because each activity can be completely different. It is important that you 
listen as carefully as possible. 
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We will run through some examples of how the activities work. You cannot ask 
questions or talk while here in the group. This is very important. Please be 
sure that you obey this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the 
activities for everyone. If one person talks about the activities while others can hear 
it, we would not be able to carry out the activities today. Do not worry if you do not 
completely understand the rules as we go through them here in the group. Each of 
you will have a chance to ask questions in private to be sure that you understand 
how the activities work. 
Before we explain the activities we divide you into two groups, the Green Group 
and the Black Group, according to the colored cards that you have drawn from the 
bag a moment ago. The two groups will separate, so that green-card people and 
black-card people cannot see or hear each other. 
After we have explained the activities, you will all wait in a group. We will call you 
by the number on your ticket, so please listen carefully for your number. While you 
are waiting you can talk about anything else you want other than the activities here 
today. 
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Activity 3 (instructions for research assistants in parentheses) 
Activity 3 is throwing this ball into this bucket from a line. (Show them the ball, 
bucket and line.) You will have 10 tries. 
We now ask you to choose one of two options according to which you will be paid in 
the experiment. 
OPTION 1:  If you choose this option, you will get 5 kwacha for each time you get 
the ball in the bucket in your 10 tries. So if you succeed 1 time, then you will get 5 
kwacha. If you succeed 2 times, then you will get 10 kwacha. If you succeed 3 times, 
you will get 15 kwacha, and so on. 
OPTION 2:  If you choose this option, you will receive a reward only if you succeed 
more times than a randomly matched person who is playing in the other group 
(green or black). If you succeed more than this person, you will be paid 15 kwacha for 
every time you succeed. So if you succeed 1 time, then you will get 15 kwacha. If you 
succeed 2 times, then you will get 30 kwacha. If you succeed 3 times, you will get 45 
kwacha and so on. But you will only receive a reward if you are better than the 
person in the other group. If you both succeed the same number of times, you will 
both get 5 kwacha for each success. 
A successful throw is one where the tennis ball remains inside the bucket. 
We now ask you to choose how you want to be paid: according to Option 1 or 
Option 2. Now you may play. 
(Record both their ID number and their choice, 
Allow the participant to toss the balls, while you record the result of each ball in the 
following manner: S is success, X is failure.) 
 





5 Agribusinesses, smallholder tenure 
security and plot-level investments: 
Evidence from rural Tanzania 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The rise in the demand for agricultural land and its consequences on surrounding 
communities has been widely debated in recent years. In the last 16 years, 1,004 
agricultural deals covering an area of 26.7 million hectares have been concluded globally. 
This area is much larger when one considers the area taken up by intended and failed 
agricultural investments (Nolte et al., 2016). While a lot of attention has been paid to the 
impacts of these growing agricultural investments on their surrounding communities, 
very little is known about how local communities are affected once an investment has 
ceased or reduced its operations. 
 It is now acknowledged that not all large-scale agricultural ventures are successful. There 
are a number of reasons why agricultural investments fail. Most prominently, a number of 
international firms speculated on the recent global fuel crisis by acquiring vast amounts 
of land in developing countries for the production of biofuels. However, these firms did 
not consider the subsequent global recession and fall in the price of fossil fuels that led 
many of them to abandon their agricultural ventures (Mujenja and Wonani, 2012; Sulle 
                                                 
 This version of Chapter 5 was submitted to the African Development Review for consideration of 
publication. The final revised version has been published as: Sipangule, K. (2017). ‘Agribusinesses, 
Smallholder Tenure Security and Plot-level Investments: Evidence from Rural Tanzania’ African 
Development Review, (29):1 79-197. doi:10.1111/1467-8268.12271. It has also been published as a United Nations 
University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Working Paper 2017/106. 
 This study was supported by funding provided by the UNU-WIDER through its PhD internship program. 
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and Nelson, 2013; Sulle, 2015). In addition, the rapid scale of these investments, coupled 
with widespread activism on ‘land grabs’ forced many governments to reconsider their 
investment friendly policies. As a result prolonged negotiations with national 
governments, financial constraints as well as changes in the policy environment further 
contributed to the withdrawal of agricultural investments (Nolte et al., 2016). 
Large-scale agricultural investments have been heavily criticized for their adverse impacts 
on the tenure security of smallholders living in adjacent communities (HLPE, 2011). The 
impacts of these investments on tenure security are particularly pertinent for 
smallholders in rural regions of sub-Saharan Africa, where formal title is largely absent 
and customary tenure is prevalent (Cotula, 2011; HLPE, 2011).  
The importance of tenure security has been widely recognized by a vast literature (see for 
instance: Besley, 1995; Braselle et al., 2002; Besley and Ghatak 2010; Fenske, 2011). In 
addition to protecting land users from expropriation, tenure security is a key determinant 
of smallholders’ plot investments and technical efficiency (Njikam and Alhadji, 2017). 
Secure tenure has been found to enhance smallholder investments in the following ways: 
first, a lower probability of land expropriation provides an incentive for smallholders to 
undertake long term investments that yield higher returns. Second, if tenure security has 
been strengthened, through for example, the adoption of title, plots gain collateral value 
that can be used to obtain credit. Finally, if legally recognized property rights are 
available and an active land market exists where land can easily be sold or rented out, 
smallholders will have a higher plot valuation and incentive to invest in improving the 
quality of their plots. Braselle et al. (2002) refer to these three respective channels as the 
assurance, collateralization and realizability effects. Of the three channels, it is the first 
that has received the most attention from development scholars. They have analyzed how 
several factors such as political connectivity (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Markussen and 
Tarp, 2014), inheritance customs (Dillon and Voena, 2016), migration-induced population 
pressures (Grimm and Klasen, 2015) and land reform programs (Banerjee et al., 2002, 
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Holden and Yohannes, 2002; Deininger and Ali, 2008; Leight, 2016; Zikhali, 2010) 
influence tenure security and investments.  
Despite this vast literature, the relation between tenure security and smallholders’ 
investments remains inconclusive, particularly when one considers the case of sub-
Saharan Africa. Positive associations have been found between tenure security, fallow, 
agricultural productivity and soil conservation (Besley, 1995; Deininger and Ali, 2008; 
Lovo, 2016) while Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) find little support for the role of tenure 
security in enhancing productivity. This chapter contributes to the literature by 
investigating how a reduction in the share of land held by agribusinesses and plantations 
in smallholder villages affect tenure security and plot-level investments. More specifically, 
we investigate the spill-over effects from a decrease in the share of land held by 
agribusinesses or plantations on smallholders de jure and de facto plot-level tenure 
security and investments in rural Tanzania. 
Tanzania makes a good case for a study on the impacts of decreasing areas held by 
agribusinesses on adjacent smallholder communities. It was among the top 20 countries 
targeted for agricultural land investments in the late 2000s, however recent data shows 
that this is no longer the case (Nolte et al., 2016). The country also experienced a large 
influx of biofuel investments in the mid-2000s that later ceased their operations (Arndt et 
al., 2011; Sulle and Nelson, 2013; Sulle, 2015). Drawing on two waves of plot-level data from 
the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TZNPS) and adopting a plot and year fixed effects 
approach, we find that a decrease in the share of land held by agribusinesses significantly 
increases tenure security. Moreover, we find that the share of land cultivated by 
agribusinesses positively and significantly increases the time spent on plots but has no 
significant effect on fallow and other cash intensive investments. Analyzing other possible 
transmission mechanisms, we find that agribusinesses have a positive and significant 
impact on the number of household members employed in the agricultural sector.  
Our findings provide insights for two important strands of literature; first they add a new 
dimension to the growing literature on the impacts of large-scale agricultural investments 
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on neighboring smallholder communities. This is the first attempt to rigorously analyze 
the impacts of agribusinesses on smallholder tenure security and the first to investigate 
how smallholders are affected when agribusinesses cease or decrease their operations. 
Second, we contribute to the already existing but inconclusive literature on the impacts of 
tenure security on land related investments. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of 
the Tanzanian land tenure system and discusses the relation between agribusinesses and 
tenure security. Section 5.3 discusses the conceptual framework and hypotheses while 
section 5.4 introduces the data and summary statistics. The econometric approach is 
presented in Section 5.5. The results are presented in section 5.6 and section 5.7 
concludes. 
5.2 Tanzanian land tenure and agribusinesses 
5.2.1 Land tenure system 
The Tanzanian land tenure system has its roots in the “villagisation” program that was 
introduced in the 1960’s to encourage rural peasants and pastoralists living in chiefdoms 
and individual settlements to move into centrally planned Ujamaa villages (Collier et al., 
1986; Odgaard, 2006; Knight, 2010). The villagisation program was expected to facilitate 
the use of modern agricultural techniques and ease the provision of goods and services. It 
was grounded in equity enhancing principles that allocated uniform plot sizes to 
households (Thiele, 1986; Odgaard, 2006). Similar land reforms were undertaken across 
other sub-Saharan African countries such as Ethiopia (Kebede, 2002). Despite this 
socialist backdrop, the program had a distorting effect which was fueled by the mass 
expropriation of land, forced resettlement as well as uncertainty over the loss of family 
land (Knight, 2010). In response to these distortions, the government of Tanzania 
initiated and tasked the Shivji commission with investigating and making 
recommendations on how these land issues could be addressed. The recommendations 
influenced the formulation of the 1995 National Land Policy as well as the enactments of 
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the Land Act (responsible for the governance of urban land) and the Village Land Act in 
1999. Following these Acts, land tenure in Tanzania is classified into three main 
categories that comprise village land at 70 percent, reserved lands at 28 percent (set aside 
for forests, game reserves, public utilities and land designated under the town and 
country planning ordinance) and general land (unassigned public land held by the 
Commissioner of Lands) which covers 2 percent of all land (Odgaard, 2006; Knight, 2010; 
Byamugisha, 2014).  
According to the Village Land Act, the main institutions responsible for the governance of 
village land are: (i) the village assembly that includes all village residents above the age of 
18 and elects the village council every five years, (ii) the village council which is an elected 
committee that administers land on behalf of the village assembly (Odgaard, 2006; 
Knight, 2010). The village council is responsible for village land categorization into 
communal land (publicly used and occupied); land that is occupied on an individual or 
family basis under customary law and vacant land that may be availed for communal or 
individual occupation in the future (Odgaard, 2006; Wily 2003). Unlike other sub-
Saharan African countries with customary law embedded in their historical traditions, the 
forced relocations into Ujamaa villages, abolishment of chiefdoms and strong socialist 
policies pursued in the 1970’s did away with all forms of custom (Knight, 2010; Wily, 
2003). This complex history dissuaded the Village Lands Act from ascribing a fixed 
definition of customary rights and instead allows each village to determine their own 
rules and practices as long as they are not discriminatory and do not contradict 
Tanzanian land law. Thus customary law is often based on the customs or norms that 
were prevalent in the village prior to the introduction of Ujamaa (Knight, 2010). 
All land in Tanzania is vested in the president, and thus only ‘customary rights of 
occupancy’ can be granted to village land-owners by the village council. Customary rights 
of occupancy may be granted either verbally or in writing. They carry as much weight and 
validity as the granted rights of occupancy that apply to general lands (Knight, 2010). 
Customary rights of occupancy accord land owners usufruct and transfer rights that 
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include the rights to sell, gift, endow, rent and collateralize their plots. A major 
contribution of the Village Lands Acts has been to recognize the legality of transferable 
and inheritable use rights on village land. However, the Act does not clarify whether 
customary rights of occupancy are a prerequisite for land users to exercise their transfer 
rights (Odgaard, 2006). 
One of the key stipulations of the Village Land Act is that a village first has to be formally 
registered and has to have obtained a certificate of village land before any of the 
provisions of the Village Land Act can be brought to force. Certificates of village land can 
only be awarded after villages have harmonized their boundaries with neighboring 
villages; demarcated their land into communal, individual and reserve land; and 
undertaken a cadastral survey. The application is submitted to the district officer, who 
drafts the certificate for approval by the village council. Once the village council approves 
the certificate, it is then sent to the Commissioner of Lands for final approval. This step-
wise process is purposefully designed to protect villagers’ rights and to allow communities 
to govern themselves (Knight, 2010; Byamugisha, 2014). 
The implementation of the Village Land Act had a slow start due to the lack of finances 
and administrative capacity. In 2004, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, set 
up the ‘Property and Business Formalisation Programme’ (MKURABITA) with the 
assistance of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto to hasten the process (Pedersen, 2011; 
Ali et al., 2016; Byamugisha, 2014). Several pilot land formalization projects have been 
carried out under MKURABITA and by 2011, the number of villages that had their land 
registered increased to 60 percent. Despite the increase in the number of village 
certifications, the uptake of individual and household titles has been very low with only 
0.4 million household and individual titles being registered in 2011 (Byamugisha, 2014). 
One of the major factors behind this low uptake of title has been the high costs of 
formalization which are not affordable for poor households (Ali et al., 2016).  
5.2.2 Agribusinesses and tenure security 
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The Tanzanian government actively promotes agribusinesses as one of the main pillars of 
its Kilimo Kwanza strategy (Agriculture First) that aims to make agriculture the mainstay 
of the economy. For instance, the government initiated the Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) in 2010 (SAGCOT, 2011; Sulle and Nelson, 2013). 
SAGCOT’s objective is to increase the profitability of the agricultural sector by promoting 
clusters that incorporate all phases of the agricultural value chain, starting from 
agricultural research stations, large-scale farms and ranches with out-grower schemes to 
processing, storage and transport facilities (SAGCOT, 2011). 
Despite these efforts by the government, the number and size of agribusinesses have 
reduced in the last years. The current wave of agribusinesses has largely been driven by 
the global crisis that resulted in an increase in the demand for land to be used for the 
cultivation of biofuels (Arndt et al., 2011). Sulle and Nelson (2009), estimate that by 2009, 
over 4 million hectares of land had been requested for the cultivation of jatropha, sugar 
cane and oil palm. Investments covering 2.5 percent of this land (100,000 hectares) were 
granted full rights of occupancy. Many of these investments ceased their operations just a 
few years after being granted these rights of occupancy (Sulle and Nelson, 2013; Sulle, 
2015). This decrease in bio-fuel related investments has also occurred in other Sub-
Saharan African countries. In neighboring Zambia, for instance, the global recession led 
many of the agribusinesses that acquired land for biofuel production, particularly 
jatropha to cease their operations (Mujenja and Wonani, 2012).  
The withdrawal of agribusinesses from village land has fueled a discussion on their 
impacts on smallholder land tenure security (Sulle and Nelson, 2013). Agribusinesses and 
other private entities are only allowed to lease land that falls under general land (Cotula 
et al., 2009). If an agribusiness identifies suitable village land or is shown prospective 
village land by the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), the village assembly will decide 
whether to allocate land to the agribusiness or not. Some of the key criteria considered 
are whether the agribusiness will contribute to the economy and wellbeing of locals as 
well as whether the area of land being requested is so extensive that it “will impede the 
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present and future occupation and use of village land by persons ordinarily resident in the 
village” (Village Lands Act, 1999: 108). When a decision has been made, the village council 
is entitled to grant a maximum of 5 hectares of land without external approval, 5 to 30 
hectares with the approval of the village assembly, more than 30 hectares with the 
approval of both the village assembly and the commissioner of lands (Knight, 2010). The 
agribusiness will only be able to access the land after undergoing a series of negotiations 
with the village council, the district council land committee and village assembly which 
result in the conversion to general land.  
While the Village Land Act has several checks and balances that protect villagers’ tenure 
security from outsiders, there are legal loopholes that can be used to circumvent the Act. 
First, the President of Tanzania retains the right to transfer land from village land to 
general or reserved land (compulsory acquisition) as long as it is in the interest of the 
public. Since agribusinesses may be deemed to be of national interest, villages face the 
risk of having their land expropriated for such investments. Village assemblies have the 
right to approve or reject the partitioning of village land but only if the area identified by 
the Tanzanian government is less than 250 hectares (Knight, 2010).  
Moreover, there is a discrepancy in the definitions of general land between the two land 
acts, which may result in the conversion of village land to general land without villagers’ 
consent. According to the Village Land Act, general land is defined as "all public land 
which is not reserve land or village land". However, in the definition provided by the Land 
Act, general land also includes unoccupied or unused village land (Knight, 2010). Since 
village land may often be left unused or under long durations of fallow to allow for soil 
replenishment or rejuvenation of pasture, considering unused village land as general land 
may reduce the amount of land available to smallholders. Once converted, general land is 
out of bounds to smallholders and cannot be accessed even after the agribusiness has 
ceased its operations and left the village (Sulle and Nelson, 2013). 
5.3 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
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5.3.1 Plot-level tenure security and decreasing agribusiness sizes 
The first part of the empirical analysis is concerned with how a decrease in the share of 
land cultivated by agribusinesses in a village may affect smallholder plot-level tenure 
security. As noted in the previous section, the Tanzanian land tenure system protects 
smallholders land rights and any uncertainty over land tenure security mostly arises after 
the agribusiness has failed and smallholders are not able to reclaim their land. The 
heightened uncertainty that comes with the failure of agribusinesses may increase 
smallholders need to secure their plots by acquiring individual title. Based on this, we 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: A decrease in the share of land held by an agribusiness at the village level 
increases smallholder’s incentives to gain de jure tenure security. 
Our definition of de jure tenure security is not restricted to customary rights of occupancy 
but also includes other forms of recognized title such as letters from the village assembly, 
letters of inheritance and agreements certified by the local court which are less costly. 
Hypothesis 1b: A decrease in the share of land cultivated by an agribusiness at the village 
level increases smallholders’ plot-level de facto tenure security. 
Smallholders’ perceptions of plot security are taken as the de facto measure of tenure 
security. It is expected that once the agribusinesses decrease the share held or leave a 
village smallholders perceive that their plots are more secure. 
5.3.2 Decreasing agribusiness sizes and plot-level investments 
The impacts of a decrease in the area held by agribusinesses on plot-level investments are 
more ambiguous. Theoretical works show that a decrease in tenure security reduces 
agricultural investments (Besley, 1995; Besley and Ghatak, 2010). Based on this, it is likely 
that if a decrease in the area cultivated by agribusinesses increases smallholders de jure 
tenure security, smallholders will have collateral that can be used to obtain credit and 
increase cash-intensive investments. This is the collateralization effect (Braselle et al., 
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2002; Maiangwa et al. 2004). Moreover, if a decrease in the area cultivated by 
agribusinesses increases smallholders’ perceived tenure security; it may raise their 
incentives to invest in long term cash-intensive investments through the assurance effect. 
Figure 5.1. Conceptual framework 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
Another strand of literature on large-scale agricultural investments provides evidence for 
positive spill-overs from agricultural investments to nearby smallholder communities (for 
example, Deininger and Xia, 2016; Sipangule and Lay, 2015). If agribusinesses increase 
smallholders’ employment opportunities and raise income levels, smallholders are more 
likely to engage in cash-intensive investments. When agribusinesses cease their 
operations, these cash generating opportunities dissipate (Sulle and Nelson, 2013). 
However, if the presence of an agribusiness results in smallholder learning effects, a 
decrease in the area held by agribusinesses will not reduce smallholders’ non cash-
intensive plot-level investments.  
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Thus, as shown in Figure 5.1, it is likely that agribusinesses can affect plot-level 
investments both negatively and positively and that the net effect will depend on the cash 
intensiveness of the smallholder plot-level investments.  
Based on this we posit the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: Due to a learning effect, a decrease in the share of land cultivated by an 
agribusiness does not reduce smallholders’ non cash-intensive investments. 
Hypothesis 2b: Due to a rise in smallholders’ tenure security, a decrease in the share of 
land cultivated by an agribusiness increases smallholders’ cash-intensive investments. 
Hypothesis 2c: Due to a reduction in smallholders’ employment and income generating 
activities, a decrease in the share of land cultivated by an agribusiness reduces 
smallholders’ cash-intensive investments. 
5.4 Data and summary statistics 
The data used in this chapter are sourced from the first and third rounds of the Tanzania 
National Panel Survey (TZNPS). The TZNPS is collected by the Tanzania National Bureau 
of Statistics as part of the Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys on 
Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). The first round of the TZNPS was collected between October 
2008 to September 2009 and the third from October 2012 to November 2013. The first 
round visited 3265 households across 409 Enumeration Areas across rural and urban 
areas in Tanzania and Zanzibar. The third wave interviewed 5015 households. The surveys 
have a low attrition rate of 4.84 percent. The TZNPS are ideal for our analysis as they 
contain detailed information at the household, plot and village levels. We restrict the 
sample to plots that have been cultivated in rural areas during Masika -the long rainy 
season. The 2008/2009 dataset originally contains 5128 plots which reduce to 2,554 plots 
after we impose these restrictions. We use the data from the same plots in 2012/2013 and 
end up with a panel of 5,101 plots.  
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The information on the land held by agribusinesses in each wave is taken from the 
community questionnaire. The community questionnaires were administered at the 
enumeration area level to village chairpersons, executive officers and several sub-village 
chair people. In rural areas, enumeration areas roughly follow village boundaries and can 
thus be considered as providing village level information. 746 plots are in villages that 
report having experienced an increase in the area cultivated by agribusinesses over the 
study period, 1409 report a decrease whilst 2946 report no change in the area cultivated 
by agribusinesses at the village level. 
 Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the acres cultivated by agribusinesses in villages in 
2008/2009 and 2012/2013. It is clear that both the frequency and sizes of the land 
cultivated by agribusinesses has reduced over the last four years.  
Figure 5.2. Acres held by agribusinesses in 2008/2009 and in 2012/2013 
 
Source: Author’s own based on TZNPS data. 
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This is in line with other literature that points out that many of the agribusinesses that 
were allocated agricultural land cultivation did not come into fruition or ceased their 
operations (Sulle and Nelson, 2013; Sulle, 2015) 



















Note: The green pins 
indicate the villages with 
agribusinesses while the red 
ones are villages without 
agribusinesses. 
 
Source: Authors own using 
TZNPS data. 





The locations of the villages that report that they have agribusinesses are shown in 
Figures 5.3.a and 5.3.b. In 2008/2009, 29 percent of the villages (represented by the green 
pins) reported that they had an agribusiness or plantation cultivating land in their village. 
By 2012/2013 the number of villages reporting that part of their land was being cultivated 
by an agribusiness reduced to 18 percent. From Figure 5.3a, it is clear that agribusinesses 
tend to be clustered in some parts of Tanzania while other regions do not have any 
villages that report that they have an agribusiness cultivating land.  
A key question that emerges is how the locations of agribusinesses are determined. Since 
agribusinesses are profit orientated, it is likely that their locations are not determined at 
random. Literature on the determinants of large-scale agricultural investments has found 
that weak land governance and institutions are amongst the most important 
determinants of the location of large-scale agricultural investments (Nolte, 2014; Arezki et 
al. 2015). If village level tenure security influences the likelihood that an agribusiness is set 
up in that village, our analysis may be prone to endogeneity bias. 
In the preceding sections, we outlined the various rounds of negotiation that need to be 
completed before an agribusiness is granted village land. This tedious process acts as a 
deterrent to agribusinesses and protects smallholders’ interests. The exception is when 
the state uses its powers to obtain untitled village land under the Compulsory Acquisition 
Act. However, since all land is vested in the President, village tenure security levels 
should not play a major role in determining which villages have their land expropriated 
by the compulsory acquisition act. It is more likely that the state considers market 
accessibility, the availability of agricultural land and agro-climatic conditions when 
enacting the compulsory acquisition act. The TZNPS does not contain information on the 
mode of land acquisition followed by agribusinesses. Thus we draw on data from the 
2007/2008 Agricultural Sample Census on Large scale Farms. The 2007/2008 Agricultural 
Sample Census covers a total of 1,006 large-scale farms (968 for the Mainland and 38 for 
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Zanzibar). It provides a good estimate of the land acquisition process of agribusinesses in 
our sample as the data collection phase coincides with the first wave of the TZNPS. The 
information presented in Table 5.1 confirms that most land acquired by private 
agribusinesses is obtained via leasehold on general land. This proves that agribusinesses 
prefer already titled land and are less likely to be located in villages with low tenure 
security. We revert to this discussion after we have introduced the empirical specification 
in the next section. 
Table 5.1. Modes of land acquisition by large-scale farms (hectares) 
 
Lease Customary Purchase Rent Borrow Compulsory Total 
State 422,987 15 117 5 217 26,953 450,294 
Private 600,868 3,866 13,360 2,135 779 2,109 49,202 
Other 18,454 11,541 4,708 735 1,717 3,324 40,479 
Total 1042309 15422 18185 2875 2713 32386 1653865 
Source: Authors own using data from the 2007/2008 Agricultural Sample Census on Large Scale Farms. 
 
To analyze plot-level tenure security, we rely on two measures from the TZNPS. The first 
provides information on all plots that have title (de jure tenure) whilst the second is based 
on a question that asks whether plot cultivators are comfortable with leaving their plot 
fallow for several months without worrying that it will be lost, which indicates whether a 
plot is perceived as secure (de facto tenure). Figure 5.4 graphs the distribution of these. 
From this graph we observe that in 2008/2009, villages with agribusinesses had slightly 
more title than villages without agribusinesses. In both villages perceived security is 
already quite high at approximately 90 percent in 2008/2009; still villages with 
agribusinesses experience a slight increase in 2012/2013. 
Table 5.2 compares the socio-economic and plot-level characteristics of smallholders in 
villages with and without agribusinesses over the two study periods. From the table we 
can see that the number of plots in villages with agribusinesses reduce considerably over 
the study period. In 2008/2009 households in villages with agribusinesses tend to have 
significantly more assets and a lower number of heads with primary education. In 
addition, plots in villages with agribusinesses tend to be smaller and to have lower 
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ownership rates as compared to villages without agribusinesses. These plots are also less 
likely to have suffered from erosion and have a higher value per acre in 2008/2009. 
However in 2012/2013, many of these differences no longer exist. The only significant 
differences that persist are that household heads in villages with agribusinesses tend to be 
younger and tend to apply more kilograms of fertilizer per acre on their plots. 
Figure 5.4. Distribution of plot-level tenure security across villages and time 
 
Source: Authors own using data from TZNPS. 
 
 
5.5 Econometric approach 
This section presents the econometric specifications that test the hypotheses stated in the 
preceding section. We estimate the determinants of plot-level tenure security as follows:  
𝑇𝑝ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡 +  𝜔𝑝ℎ + 𝜃𝑡 + 1𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡    (1) 
where 𝑇𝑝ℎ𝑡 is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the plot 𝑝 of household 
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several months without fear of expropriation (de facto tenure security). 𝐴𝑣𝑡 represents the 
share of land cultivated by the agribusiness in each village.  
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Table 5.2. Socio-economic and plot-level characteristics of smallholders in villages with and without agribusinesses 
  2008/2009 2012/2013 
 
Agribusiness No Agribusiness Agribusiness No Agribusiness 
 Household Characteristics Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age of hh. head 47.76 14.16 46.63 14.89 47.94 15.14 50.52 14.74 
Fem head 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 
No. hh members 5.62 2.52 5.82 3.04 5.79 1.84 6.14 3.22 
Head with prim. Educ. 0.49 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.74 0.45 0.63 0.48 
Hh expenditure per member 
*
 380,829 228,825 402,705 278,706 561,314 231,985 592,017 396,887 
Asset_index 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.12 
         
Plot Characteristics   
 
        
 
  
Acres 1.67 3.57 2.58 5.78 2.12 2.63 2.40 4.43 
Years plot cult. 18.46 13.95 17.57 13.51 19.45 13.83 20.35 14.21 
Plot owned by hh. 0.75 0.43 0.90 0.30 0.92 0.27 0.86 0.35 
Fem head owns plot 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.39 
Fem head decides 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40 
Plot Wetness index 13.17 3.18 13.57 4.66 13.43 1.68 13.87 4.09 
Soil eroded 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Plot value per acre 1,096,132 5,358,897 982,225 5318945 629,728 722201 1,315,742 489,1109 
         
Plot-level investments   
 
        
 
  
Intercropping 0.28 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.49 
Fallow duration 0.18 0.73 0.23 1.50 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.29 
Days spent on plot 123.12 108.23 107.58 109.30 80.92 75.89 76.42 76.51 
Fertilizer kg per acre 58.05 366.31 88.65 594.02 215.15 656.54 81.27 490.42 
Observations 703 1475 53 2122 
 * Expenditures in Tanzanian Shillings, Statistically significant p-values in bold. The p-values are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney tests the 
continuous variables and chi-squared tests for the binary variables. 
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In results reported in the appendix, 𝐴𝑣𝑡 takes on the form of a dichotomous variable 
that is equal to one if a village has an agribusiness. 𝑋𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡 is a vector of time varying 
plot, household and village level controls that include, amongst others, soil quality, 
years that the plot has been owned, the number of household members and the age 
of the household head. 𝜔𝑝ℎ are plot fixed effects; 𝜃𝑡 are year fixed effects and 𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡 is 
an error term.  
To examine whether the share of land held by an agribusiness affects smallholder 
investment decisions at the plot-level, we estimate regressions of the following form: 
𝐼𝑝ℎ𝑡 = 𝛿1𝐴𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿2𝜏𝑝ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐴𝑣𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑝ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡 +  𝜔𝑝ℎ + 𝜃𝑡 + 2𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡 (2) 
In this case, 𝐼𝑝ℎ𝑡 represents the land investment choice; 𝜏𝑝ℎ𝑡 is a tenure index for the 
plot created by taking the first component from a principal component analysis. 
𝐴𝑣𝑡 ∗ 𝜏𝑝ℎ𝑡 is an interaction between the share of land held by an agribusiness and the 
index of tenure security. 2𝑝ℎ𝑣𝑡 is the error term. The dichotomous dependent 
variables in equations 1 and 2 are estimated using linear probability models while the 
continuous variables in equation 2 are estimated using Honoré (1992)’s trimmed 
least absolute deviations (LAD) panel tobit estimator that controls for censoring of 
the dependent variable that arises from not all cultivators reporting that they have 
undertaken plot-level investments. This is executed using the pantob command in 
the Stata statistical software package. Linear probability models are favored as fixed 
effects are not compatible with panel probit models. 
All regressions are estimated using plot and year fixed effects to allow for 
comparability and to control for time invariant unobservables that may bias the 
results. As the unobserved differences across plots may not be random or 
uncorrelated with the predictor and independent variables, fixed effects are better 
suited to control for this. A Hausman test also rejects the null hypothesis that the 
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errors are correlated with the regressors confirming that plot-level fixed effects are a 
better fit.  
As discussed in the previous section, the results obtained after estimating equation 1 
would be biased if the location of an agribusiness was determined by the village level 
tenure security. To check for this bias, we employ a probit model to analyze the 
determinants of agribusiness locations in 2008/2009. Based on studies that have 
analyzed the determinants of agribusiness locations at more aggregated levels (see 
Arezki et al., 2015), we adopt the following specification: 
𝐴𝑣 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑣 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑣 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑣 + 𝑎4𝑋𝑣 + 3𝑣 (3) 
Where 𝐶𝑣 is a vector of village agro-climatic variables; 𝐷𝑣 is a vector of distance 
variables and 𝑋𝑣 is a vector of other village specific characteristics.  
5.6 Results 
This section presents the study results. We start by presenting marginal effects of 
the probit model on the determinants of agribusiness locations. From Table 5.3, we 
can see that the main determinants of agribusiness locations in 2008/2009 are the 
distance to the market and district headquarters as well as rainfall patterns. None of 
the measures of village level tenure security (percentage of plots with de jure and de 
facto, the possession of a village certificate) are significant. This confirms the 
evidence presented in section 5.4 and makes us confident that endogeneity is not a 
major problem for our analysis.  
We now proceed to analyze how a decrease in the area cultivated by an agribusiness 
affects plot-level security. The results are presented in Table 5.4. Columns 1 and 4 
present parsimonious specifications, while Columns 2 and 4 report the full models 
with household, plot and village time variant observables. 
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Distance to market (ln) 0.128*** 
 (0.045) 
Distance to district headquarters (ln) -0.100** 
 (0.045) 
Annual village rainfall (ln) 0.308** 
 (0.135) 
Annual Village temperature 0.354 
 (0.327) 
Village has certificate (1=Yes) -0.105 
 (0.092) 
Plots with title (%) -0.003 
 (0.003) 
Plots perceived as secure (%) -0.002 
 (0.003) 
Village Infrastructure 0.306 
 (0.210) 
Village head is educated 0.045 
 (0.053) 




Regional FE YES 
Marginal effects from Probit model reported in table, Standard errors in 
parentheses. Statistical Significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
From Table 5.4 we can see that if the share of land held by agribusinesses increases 
by one unit, the probability that plots have both de jure and de facto tenure security 
reduces. This reduction is significant for all specifications except the restricted 
model on perceived tenure security in Column 3. Inversely interpreted, a one unit 
decrease in the share of land held by an agribusiness results in a 33 to 39 percent 
increase in the probability that a plot has de jure tenure security and a 13 percent 
increase in the probability that a plot has de facto tenure security.  
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Table 5.4. Regression analyses of plot-level tenure security and the share of land 
cultivated by agribusinesses 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




     
Agribusiness share -0.330*** -0.388*** -0.042 -0.133* 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.076) (0.070) 
Age of household head  0.004*  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Number of household members  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Head has primary education = 1  0.025  0.037 
  (0.030)  (0.025) 
Female household head  -0.027  -0.088* 
  (0.038)  (0.052) 
Log of expenditure  0.042**  -0.014 
  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Log off farm income  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log Plot size  -0.014  -0.010 
  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Age of plot  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Soil quality  0.005  0.005 
  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Log of plot value  0.016*  0.004 
  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Plot owned by household  -0.219*  0.061 
  (0.112)  (0.067) 
Village certificate = 1  0.001  -0.006 
  (0.016)  (0.014) 
Log of total village area  0.004  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant 0.143*** -0.713** 0.910*** 1.035*** 
 (0.007) (0.333) (0.005) (0.247) 
     
Observations 4,345 4,067 4,995 4,074 
R-squared 0.039 0.057 0.001 0.015 
Number of plot_ident 2,395 2,352 2,554 2,354 
Crop Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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This increase is significant both in economic and statistical terms and is indicative of 
the smallholders’ response to the high uncertainty that arises from the departure of 
an agribusiness. Based on this we find evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
Table 5.5. Regression analyses of plot-level tenure security and changes in the share 
of land cultivated by agribusinesses 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Land title Perceived Tenure 
   
Increase in agribusiness share 0.001 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Decrease in agribusiness share 0.037*** 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 0.124*** 0.906*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
   
Observations 4,345 4,995 
Number of plot_ident 2,395 2,554 
Crop Controls YES YES 
Year  YES YES 
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses, Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
To better understand this result, we take advantage of our dataset that allows us to 
distinguish between plots that are located in villages that have experienced an 
increase and decrease in the area cultivated by agribusinesses over the study period. 
In Table 5.5, we can see that the results reported in Column 1 and 2 of Table 5.4 are 
mostly driven by a decrease in the share of land cultivated by agribusinesses. We 
observe that plots that are in villages that have experienced a reduction in the share 
of land cultivated by agribusinesses have significantly more title. Comparing these 
results with Figure 5.4, we can see that perceived security is already quite high across 
plots (above 90 percent) so that a slight increase does not make a significant 
difference. Having established that a decrease in the share of land held by 
agribusinesses positively affects the probability that a plot has tenure security, we 
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now proceed to analyze how plot-level investments are affected. Table 5.6 reports 
these results.  
Table 5.6. Regression analyses of non cash-intensive investments  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Days on plot Fallow 
   
Agribusiness share 96.504*** 7.086 
 (33.276) (13.329) 
Tenure_index 14.544 -0.607 
 (15.284) (6.373) 
Tenure and Agri_share -46.734 3.233 
 (39.995) (9.065) 
Age of household head -0.029 -0.000 
 (0.659) (0.273) 
Number of household members 7.890*** -1.647 
 (2.476) (1.772) 
Head has primary education -0.938 0.818 
 (11.040) (12.087) 
Female household head 9.893 -5.094 
 (13.893) (0.000) 
Log of expenditure -1.413 -2.065 
 (7.209) (3.423) 
Log off farm income 2.868*** 0.689 
 (0.893) (0.550) 
Log Plot size 27.397*** 2.796 
 (10.593) (8.555) 
Age of plot -0.214 -0.036 
 (0.346) (0.044) 
Soil quality 10.556** -0.321 
 (4.473) (1.133) 
Log of plot value 4.815 0.916 
 (3.859) (1.385) 
Plot owned by household 1.545 2.379 
 (31.098) (0.000) 
Village certificate 3.415 -8.862*** 
 (6.224) (3.336) 
   
Observations 4,067 4,067 
Crop Controls YES YES 
Year YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We find a significant and positive relation between the share of land held by an 
agribusiness and the total days that household members spend on the plot but do 
not find any significant effect for fallow. Recalling Figure 5.3, over 90 percent of the 
plot cultivators reported that they are not afraid of leaving their plots fallow, thus it 
is not surprising that the effect on fallow duration is not significant.  
Table 5.7. Regression analyses of transmission channels and the share of land 
cultivated by agribusinesses 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Contract_farm Employment Expenditure 
    
Agribusiness share 0.010 0.907*** -0.157 
 (0.014) (0.223) (0.125) 
Age of household head -0.003 -0.004 0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.010) 
Age of head squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of household members 0.001 0.038*** 0.095*** 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.009) 
Head has primary education = 1 0.006 -0.056 0.073* 
 (0.005) (0.077) (0.044) 
Female household head 0.013 0.146 -0.121* 
 (0.014) (0.140) (0.064) 
Constant 0.069 0.011 12.903*** 
 (0.045) (0.415) (0.263) 
    
Observations 2,815 2,815 2,810 
R-squared 0.007 0.064 0.405 
Number of households 1,410 1,410 1,410 
Year YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Subsequently, we analyze whether the share of land held by agribusinesses affects 
cash-intensive investments. We analyze the impact on the use of improved seeds; 
irrigation, fertilizer and the total days spent by hired laborers. The TZNPS does not 
include information on plot demarcation or fencing that are also typically analyzed 
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in the literature. We do not find any evidence that suggests that the share of land 
held by an agribusiness or tenure security significantly affect cash-intensive 
investments. The results are reported in Table 5.A2 in the appendix.  
In the conceptual framework (Figure 5.1), we showed that agribusinesses may also 
affect smallholders’ plot-level investments through spill-overs that persist even after 
the agribusinesses have ceased their operations. Table 5.4 shows that agribusinesses 
raise the number of days spent on the plot through channels other than tenure. To 
investigate these transmission channels, we employ a household and year fixed 
effects specification to analyze how the share cultivated by an agribusiness affects 
households’ engagement in contract farming, the number of household members 
employed in the agricultural sector and household expenditure. The results are 
reported in Table 5.7. 
From Table 5.7, we can see that an increase in the share of land held by an 
agribusiness in a village increases the number of household members employed in 
the agricultural sector. Similarly a decrease in the share of land held by an 
agribusiness reduces the number of workers employed in the agricultural sector. 
Columns 1 and 3 show that contract farming and household expenditure are not 
significantly affected by a change in the share of land held by agribusinesses. This 
confirms that the significant effect observed on the time spent on the plot in Table 
5.4 is driven through a spill-over effect that arises when smallholders are employed 
by agribusinesses and not tenure security. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 2a. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates how a decrease in the share of land held by an agribusiness 
in a village affects smallholder plot-level tenure security and investments in rural 
Tanzania. Taking the literature on tenure security and plot-level investments as a 
starting point, we find that a decrease in the amount of land held by an agribusiness 
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at the village level, increases smallholders’ de jure and de facto tenure security. The 
uncertainty that arises after agribusinesses cease their operations and smallholders 
lose their access to village land, leads smallholders to obtain title for their plots. 
Since customary rights of occupancy are costly smallholders also obtain other forms 
of recognized title such as letters from the village assembly, letters of inheritance 
and agreements certified by the local court.  
Analyzing how agribusinesses affect smallholder plot-investments, we find that the 
share of land held by agribusinesses raises the time spent by household members on 
their plots. This result is not driven by changes in tenure security but is likely to be 
driven by a learning effect that comes from employment on the agribusiness. Since 
employment in the agricultural sector often takes a seasonal nature, smallholders 
can increase the time invested on the plot while holding short term jobs provided by 
the agribusinesses. Taken together, our study reveals the importance of taking a 
comprehensive impact assessment of agribusinesses on local populations. 
Agribusinesses can have productivity enhancing effects on smallholders by 
increasing the time invested on plots but can also have adverse impacts such as 
raising uncertainty once they cease their operations. In order to mitigate these 
adverse impacts, the existing land framework should be revised to ensure that 
smallholders are able to reclaim their land if agribusinesses do not come into 
fruition or cease their operations. In addition, more information should be provided 
to smallholders the village assemblies and councils on the implications (both 
positive and negative) that arise from the coming of agribusinesses. 
A limitation faced by this study is that we were not able to distinguish between the 
crops grown and the nature of the agribusiness. It is quite likely that the impacts on 
smallholder tenure security differ if one considers the different agricultural models 
and land acquisition procedures followed by the agribusinesses. Further research is 
needed to analyze these effects in more detail.  
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5.8 Appendix  
Table 5.A.1. Regression analyses of plot-level tenure security and the presence of an 
agribusinesses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




     
Village has agribusinesses -0.072*** -0.087*** 0.025* -0.014 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age of household head  0.004*  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Number of household members  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Head has primary education = 1  0.028  0.038 
  (0.030)  (0.024) 
Female household head  -0.026  -0.089* 
  (0.037)  (0.052) 
Log of expenditure  0.044**  -0.014 
  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Log off farm income  0.000  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log Plot size  -0.011  -0.009 
  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Age of plot  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Soil quality  0.005  0.005 
  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Log of plot value  0.014*  0.003 
  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Plot owned by household  -0.215*  0.062 
  (0.112)  (0.067) 
Village certificate = 1  -0.002  -0.005 
  (0.016)  (0.014) 
Log of total village area  0.006**  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Constant 0.146*** -0.711** 0.905*** 1.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.331) (0.006) (0.246) 
     
Observations 4,345 4,067 4,995 4,074 
R-squared 0.040 0.058 0.002 0.013 
Number of plot_ident 2,395 2,352 2,554 2,354 
Crop Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses, Statistical Significance*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.A.2. Regression analyses of non cash-intensive investments and the share of 
land cultivated by agribusinesses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Improved seeds Irrigation Fertilizer Hired labor 
     
Agribusiness share 0.115 0.014 0.109 40.547 
 (0.153) (0.079) (0.151) (42.363) 
Tenure_index -0.000 0.013 0.031 -11.222 
 (0.049) (0.015) (0.032) (14.889) 
Tenure and Agri_share -0.030 -0.141 -0.202 15.710 
 (0.112) (0.092) (0.137) (35.980) 
Age of household head 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.663 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.579) 
Number of household members 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -1.131 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (1.614) 
Head has primary education 0.091*** 0.014 0.007 -1.343 
 (0.033) (0.013) (0.024) (17.907) 
Female household head -0.005 0.026 -0.004 10.506 
 (0.050) (0.016) (0.025) (17.568) 
Log of expenditure 0.025 0.001 0.046*** 7.264 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.014) (5.717) 
Log off farm income -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.103 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.625) 
Log Plot size 0.006 -0.004 0.031* 25.462** 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.018) (10.276) 
Age of plot -0.002** -0.000 -0.002*** 0.046 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.251) 
Soil quality 0.003 -0.002 -0.018* -2.994 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (4.246) 
Log of plot value 0.008 0.000 -0.002 -2.074 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (2.565) 
Plot owned by household -0.000 -0.004 -0.045 -28.058 
 (0.069) (0.005) (0.067) (27.240) 
Constant -0.435 0.012 -0.466**  
 (0.319) (0.121) (0.209)  
     
Observations 3,482 3,482 3,482 3,482 
R-squared 0.055 0.016 0.031  
Number of plot_ident 2,006 2,006 2,006  
Crop Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
Columns 1 to 3 report robust standard errors. Columns 4 reports bootstrapped standard errors 
obtained from Honore's panel tobit model with plot-year fixed effects. Statistical Significance*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.






6 Drivers of households’ land-use 
decisions: A critical review of micro-
level studies in tropical regions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Global change is the aggregate result of billions of individual decisions and 
understanding the determinants of these decisions is crucial for its analysis. This is 
particularly true in the case of land-use change which is a fundamental component 
of global change. Land-use change affects biodiversity, food security as well as the 
levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Governments, policies as well as global 
and domestic markets set the conditions, under which micro-agents, i.e. households, 
firms, and farms, eventually take and implement decisions on land use. This process 
is accelerated by interlinked and interacting economic systems as well as by the 
digital proximity of social systems in a globalizing world (Liu et al., 2014; Liu et al., 
2013; Eakin et al., 2014).  
Studying the causes and consequences of land-use change requires the integration of 
natural sciences with social and geographical information (Rindfuss et al., 2004). 
Geographers and natural scientists utilize spatially explicit models at highly 
disaggregate scales while social scientists mostly rely on models that include human 
behavioral components to understand the determinants of land-use change (Irwin et 
                                                 
 This chapter is co-authored with Elisabeth Hettig and Jann Lay. It is a slightly modified version of 
the paper: Hettig, E., Lay, J. and K., Sipangule (2016). Drivers of Households’ Land-Use Decisions: A 
Critical Review of Micro-Level Studies in Tropical Regions published in Land, 5(4): 32. 




al., 2001). Based on these approaches, land system science (LSS) has evolved from a 
science that solely addressed the patterns and causes of deforestation to a science 
that is now capable of analyzing more subtle land-cover changes through the use of 
intricate models that conceptualize the causal and feedback relationships within 
coupled human and environmental dynamics (Turner et al., 2007; Lambin et al., 
2003). The data fed into these models has become more sophisticated in recent years 
and now includes high-resolution satellite imagery, geographic information systems 
as well as detailed socio-economic and geophysical data that model the human-
environment interactions driving land-use change (Vance and Geoghean, 2004). 
Given the theory of coupled human and environmental systems, land system science 
extends its scope to the linkages and feedback mechanism between integrated 
coupled systems over geographically and socially large distances (Liu et al., 2013; 
Eakin et al., 2014). These so-called telecoupled interactions include socioeconomic 
and environmental effects, which might be non-linear and multidirectional and lead 
to intended or unintended, direct and indirect changes of different orders in the 
affected system (Eakin et al., 2014). 
Since the emergence of land-change science, a number of literature reviews and 
meta-analyses that analyze the causes of land-use change have been published, in 
particular Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) and Geist and Lambin (2001). These 
reviews are based on the first wave of land-use change studies that analyzed the 
causes of deforestation in tropical regions in the early 1990’s. These literature 
reviews called for more micro-level case studies that enable a better understanding 
of the causes and the mechanisms of land-use change (Geist and Lambin,2001; 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999). Since then, a large empirical literature of micro 
studies has emerged and meta-analyses of these studies are included in Keys and 
McConell (2005) and in Rudel (2007). 




This chapter aims to analyze and review the drivers of land-use change that 
influence households’ land-use change decisions. More specifically, we 
systematically review 91 micro-level studies and conduct a meta-analysis to 
understand the importance of specific determinants of households’ land-use 
decisions. Similar to Keys and McConell (2005), we focus on tropical regions as they 
have experienced the most dramatic land-use change in the last decades. Hence, the 
studies we include consist of both empirical and theoretical multidisciplinary works 
that are conducted in tropical regions, at the village or household level, and 
published between the years 2000 and 2015.  
Two important contributions emerge from our review: first, we depart from the 
conventional practice in earlier reviews to focus on the conversion of forest lands by 
including a discussion on the conversion of agricultural and ranching lands, 
protected forests and wetlands. Second, by placing an emphasis on micro-level 
studies, we can provide a more detailed assessment of household-level drivers than 
earlier reviews (with Keys and McConell (2005) being the exception) that stressed 
the role of more aggregate drivers such as population growth and market 
developments. This allows us to demonstrate not only the importance of household 
factors for land-use change, but also the heterogeneity in the relationship between 
land-use change and growth-associated micro-level drivers, which is caused by the 
complex interactions among these drivers, in particular income and technology, and 
the role of context-conditions, in particular institutions, policies, and market 
conditions. These results imply that land-use policies will have to take into account 
this heterogeneity and avoid one-size-fits-all approaches. In fact, this may explain 
why global fairly uniform approaches targeted at influencing land use change, for 
example Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD, and 
REDD+) have not been overly successful (Angelsen, 2012). The remainder of this 
chapter is structured as follows: We first introduce a conceptual framework adapted 
from Angelsen and Kaimowitz’ (1999) model. This is followed by a systematic meta-




analysis of the micro-level studies reviewed. We then provide a detailed and 
comprehensive literature review and close with a summary, conclusions, and some 
reflections on future research.  
6.2 Conceptual framework of land-use change  
To conceptualize the multiform and complex dynamics of human-environmental 
systems and land-use change, we build on a concept of the causes of deforestation 
proposed by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999). This simple framework that provides a 
stepwise distinction of the causes of deforestation has been widely cited in both the 
deforestation and land use literature (see for instance, Geist and Lambin, 2001). It 
includes a three-stage-process of underlying causes (macroeconomic variables), 
immediate causes (decision parameters) and sources of deforestation (agents’ 
actions). While we find that this model is a good starting point for a more detailed 
analysis of the drivers of land-use change, we identify two major limitations of the 
framework. First, it neglects the role of household endowments and characteristics 
in driving land-use change. Second, it does not explicitly consider interlinkages and 
feedback mechanisms within coupled human and environmental systems and 
between different systems. Within a system, there could be feedback mechanisms 
between the different stages, for example between agents’ choices and underlying 
causes of deforestation. For instance, agents may influence policies, which again 
affect land-use decisions. Further, interlinkages between the decision parameters 
need consideration. For example, technology and infrastructure are likely to be 
linked. Further, there could be multidirectional interactions of one system towards 
other socially and geographically remote human-environmental systems, so-called 
telecoupling interactions (Liu et al., 2013; Eakin et al., 2014). 
We draw on the framework by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) but modify it to suit 
our purposes in the following ways. First, rather than analyzing all actors of land-use 
change we only focus on the land-use decision parameters of farm-households and 




small-scale farms. Second, deforestation is obviously only one form of land-use 
change and we include other categories, such as reforestation or the conversion of 
wetlands to agriculture. Third, we expand the range of micro-level drivers 
(institutions, infrastructure, markets and technology) to include household 
characteristics and endowments (for instance, physical capital and family workforce) 
and key policies (for example, forest conservation policies, institutional reforms of 
land rights, or agricultural policies). Fourth, we present more precise elaborations of 
the feedback mechanisms between and within the hierarchical components of land-
use change within a specific human-environmental system. Fifth, we link the 
dynamics of one system to others capturing the potential interacting and feedback 
processes between two or more systems (see Figure 6.1). Our concept thus integrates 
the determinants and outcomes of land-use change in a human-environment system 
both vertically, i.e. between underlying causes, micro-level drivers and outcomes, as 
well as horizontally, i.e. between specific micro-level drivers. Embedded in a 
telecoupled world, it is further linked to at least one other distant land system by 
telecoupling interactions and feedbacks. 
Figure 6.1 shows our framework. It illustrates the decision-making process of micro-
level agents and how the underlying causes of land-use change (macro-economic 
variables) are linked to the micro-level drivers and to the final land-use change 
outcomes, which we define as non-used forest, forestry, protected forest, logging, 
fallow, agroforestry, agriculture, ranching, or wetland cultivation. Underlying causes 
include policies, population growth, and global markets. It further sets the dynamics 
of land-use change in one system in the context of telecoupling processes with other 
human-environmental systems. To keep it simple, we do not illustrate the potential 
cross-scale links between specific elements of the system A to elements of the 
system B (and possibly further systems, which are described by the third white 
arrow). 





Figure 6.1. Concept of the micro-level drivers of land-use change. 
 
Authors’ concept based on Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), Eakin et al. (2014) and Liu et al. (2013). 
 
Focusing on the land-use change dynamics of micro-level agents, we refer to the 
central causalities between macro-economic variables and micro-level drivers of 
land-use change. The impact of underlying policies on land-use decision making is 
dependent on two relevant aspects: first, on the institutional framework of land-use 
rights and the (non-)existence of land tenure security and second, on key policies for 
land use. Individual land-use decisions highly depend on the respective land 
governance and on the ways in which land-use rights can be transmitted and 




guaranteed. Likewise, land-specific key policies such as settlement programs, public 
schemes for highway expansion, or land extension services, influence and alter all 
other land-use decision parameters of agents. To illustrate how population growth 
affects agents’ land-use decisions, our concept focalizes primarily on local 
population pressure via immigration. Immigration is either triggered by key policies 
and by price signals of developing markets. Finally, we include the impact of global 
markets and focus on global cash crop markets, which create incentives for agents to 
switch their land use towards cash crop cultivation and thus might raise households’ 
incomes. Income growth in turn may alter crop consumption patterns and hence 
crop demand on the regional and global scale.  
Introducing institutions, we show that local land-use rights, such as formal property 
rights or informal (customary) rights drive land-use change. Taking these contrary 
systems as an example, agents may react differently regarding their decision on land 
extension or cash crop cultivation. The degree of tenure security, implemented 
through legal titling or local agreements, determines the reliability of these land 
rights. As a second decision parameter, the accessibility to public services, market 
centers and transport infrastructure, influence agents’ land-use decisions by 
enabling rural households to improve their access to agricultural inputs and sell 
their output.  
Third, the agents’ characteristics and endowments that include the culture/ethnicity 
of a household and its physical capital, labor or social capital are key parameters for 
agent’s land-use decision making. For instance, a higher level of wealth enables a 
household to invest in more capital intensive land uses such as pasture. These 
individual effects are reinforced if access to capital (or other factor) markets are 
limited.  
Hence, introducing the fourth choice parameter, the quality of input and output 
markets plays a fundamental role for agents’ land-use change. Households’ land use 




differs if markets for labor and agricultural inputs are limited or even non-existent. 
For example, cash crop adoption and agricultural expansion - and thus the 
systematic forest conversion - is more restricted for households in areas with 
fragmented markets. Finally, land-use decisions are determined by the respective 
agricultural technology available for and adopted by households. 
Furthermore, our framework on land-use change identifies four relationships 
between the micro-level drivers within one human-environmental system that are 
depicted by the dotted lines in Figure 6.1. First, there is a reciprocal link between the 
accessibility to infrastructure and developing markets. On the one hand, public 
improvements in transportation networks reduce costs and facilitate economic 
activity, which in turn promotes the emergence of input and output markets in 
remote areas. On the other hand, evolving markets trigger infrastructure 
development. Both dynamics are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Second, 
household characteristics and endowments affect the adoption of technologies and 
agents’ crop management strategies. For example, the adoption of a more labor-
intensive technology depends on either household’s capital available for hiring labor 
or on family workforce. Third, access to infrastructure and public services influences 
agents’ options of off-farm employment and vice versa. Lastly, market conditions 
determine the production decisions of households. If input or output markets are 
limited or non-existent, households have to fall back on family workforce and capital 
endowments. Thus, the decision on land-use change depends on the households’ 
own shadow price for family labor, leisure and assets and is not determined by 
external factor market prices. 
Feedback loops also operate from the final land-use outcomes to the micro-level 
drivers through the mechanisms depicted by the small boxes above the micro-level 
drivers of land-use change. Certain land-use changes could strengthen or weaken 
land rights. This is especially the case if land is weakly governed and there are 




additional informal rules of land rights. Since the conversion of non-used forests in 
tropical regions goes along with the introduction of property rights, longer fallow 
periods could attract other agents to encroach and convert forestland for their own 
purposes. In addition, different land uses and the corresponding landscape changes 
may influence infrastructure requiring a different set-up such as those necessary for 
plantation cultivation. At the household-level, land-use choices go along with 
specific income effects, for example, cash constraints could be relieved allowing the 
household to accumulate physical capital for new investments. This in turn 
determines production decisions, especially so under imperfect factor markets. 
Finally, land-use outcomes induce neighborhood spill-over effects, for example via 
copying or knowledge transfer in informal networks. 
Across systems, telecoupling interactions include socioeconomic-environmental 
effects, which might be governed and intended, for example global policy programs 
including the global program for sustainable forest management called Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD and REDD+). An example for 
unintended, ungoverned impacts across systems is the recent phenomenon of large-
scale land acquisitions in developing countries – sometimes referred to as “land 
grabbing”. These acquisitions, often by foreign investors are driven by the increased 
global demand for agricultural products and have repercussions, sometimes land 
right conflicts, in very remote places (Anseeuw et al., 2012). That conflicts in such 
places reach the attention of a worldwide audience and influence global discourses 
through the campaigns of NGOs shows that – in a globalized world – agents might 
not only cross distance but also scale and hierarchical contexts (Eakin et al., 2014), 
thereby linking not only the elements of within but also between different systems.  
6.3 Overview of reviewed studies and meta-analysis 
Following the concepts of Cooper (1982) our review adopts the elements of an 
integrative research review. As is common with integrative research reviews our 




study collects and compares the results of primary studies on micro-level land-use 
change to represent the current state-of-the-art and to point at research gaps within 
the relevant literature. As part of this, we apply a meta-analysis to synthesize the 
results of the reviewed studies systematically. Specifically, we code the qualitative 
information across studies according to a questionnaire (see Appendix 6.6, Table 
6.A.1). We further extend the existing theory on the micro-level drivers of land-use 
change and carefully examine the potential threats to validity of the reviewed 
studies.  
The studies reviewed in this chapter were collected during the period from March 
2011 to September 2015. They were sourced from academic databases and search 
engines such as Google Scholar, Scirus, Repec, Mendeley, AgEcon Search as well as 
from cross references of cited papers. Keywords and search items included “land-use 
change” and “household” or “village”, restricted to studies published between 2000 
and 2015. Our initial search resulted in a total number of approximately 180 studies. 
These studies were carefully read by two of three authors and only included in the 
sample of studies if they met the following key criteria. First, the data analyzed in 
the studies must include information collected at the household or village level. In 
addition, the studies must analyze land-use change at the village- or household level 
and the drivers of change have to include household characteristics. Second, the 
papers had to be published in peer-reviewed journals between 2000 and 2015. We 
took 2000 as the base year because the last comprehensive meta-analyses and 
empirical reviews were published in the early 2000s. Third, we restricted our sample 
to studies that were conducted in tropical regions as these regions experienced the 
highest rate of land-use change during our study period. Once papers that fulfilled 
all three criteria were selected, they were further screened for the methodological 
rigor. If the authors concluded that – despite having undergone a peer review 
process - a paper still failed to properly identify the drivers of land-use change at the 
household level it was excluded from the literature review. In the event that the 




same author published a set of accompanying papers using the same dataset and 
identifying the same drivers of land-use change, only one paper was included in the 
review. These restrictions resulted in a subset of 91 studies that were included in the 
review.  
After the 91 papers were selected, the authors underwent a rigorous reading and 
coding processes based on a questionnaire (see Appendix 6.6, Table 6.A.1). The 
questionnaire was designed to collect information such as the academic 
backgrounds and present affiliations of the authors of the reviewed studies, the year 
of publication, and applied methods. The main results of the papers, i.e. the type of 
land-use change and land-cover change, the land-use change drivers suggested in 
the paper as well as the region and country of study were also systematically 
recorded. Each paper was read and coded by two of the three authors to allow for a 
stringent cross-verification of all entries. 
Our classification of the drivers of land-use change is based on the conceptual 
framework introduced in the preceding section. In addition to the five main drivers 
identified by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) we include two new drivers of land-use 
change, i.e., household characteristics/endowments and key policies (see Appendix 
6.6, Table 6.A.2). Overall, 330 proxy variables for specific drivers are reported as 
having a significant impact on land-use change in the 91 studies. 
6.3.1 Land-use and –cover change 
The literature on micro-level land-use change often defines land-use change rather 
implicitly or vaguely and does not use a uniform definition of land-use change. 
Additionally, some studies do not make a clear distinction between land use and 
land cover. However, to synthesize the results of the 91 studies, a precise distinction 
between land use and land cover is required, as suggested by Lambin and Geist 
(2006) and Fisher and Unwin (2005). 




A widely used definition describes land cover as the observable (bio-) physical 
qualities of the Earth’s land surface (Di Gregorio and Jansen, 2000). In contrast, 
classifying land use always demands a socio-economic perspective on land (Fisher 
and Unwin, 2005). Consistent with this approach, Lambin and Geist (2006: 4) refer 
to land use as the “purposes for which humans exploit land cover. It involves both 
the manner in which biophysical attributes of the land are manipulated and the 
intent underlying that manipulation”. Hence, land use is always determined by the 
“arrangements, activities and inputs people undertake on a certain land-cover type 
to produce, change or maintain it” (Di Gregorio and Jansen, 2000). Following these 
definitions, a change in land use does not necessarily lead to a change in land cover, 
for example in the case of intensification. Moreover, the terms land cover and land 
use follow a many-to-many relation (Fisher and Unwin, 2005). For example, land 
covered by forest could be land used for forestry or conservation. In addition, 
agriculture can occur on land cover classified as grassland, woodland or wetland. 
Inconsistencies in the use of these terms render the systematic comparison of study 
results difficult, especially if evidence is based on remote sensing data, which need 
the interpretation of aerial information (Fisher and Unwin, 2005). 
In our systematic analysis of land-use change we are able to capture more subtle 
land-use change scenarios, which have not yet been classified in earlier literature 
reviews. Moreover, we illustrate that it is indeed useful and instructive to distinguish 
between land-cover (change) and land-use (change) clearly. We identify the initial 
land uses (LU) and land covers (LC) and the final LU and LC for each study in our 
sample using a one-to-many relationship between LC and LU categories (see Table 
6.1). Considering the variety of research objectives and applied methodologies, we 
only include land uses and land covers, which are central for each study. For those 
cases that do not provide direct information about the initial and final land covers/ 
land uses, we derive the categories from study site description and central 
statements or conclusions provided by the respective study. Since most studies 




analyze several land-use change scenarios, we allow for more than one land-use 
change scenario per study. We finally identify 184 land-use change scenarios that fall 
into 33 different categories of land-use change. 
Due to the variety in land-cover information across studies and disciplines (and 
sometimes the lack of precise information), our cover categorization follows a 
broader definition than other, more detailed categorizations, for example, the Land 
Cover Classification System (LCCS) by Di Gregorio and Jansen (2000). Thus, we 
classify land cover into forest, cultivated land, grassland, shrubland, desert and 
wetland (Table 6.1). Under forest we include land cover such as natural forest, 
primary forest, old-growth forest, mature forest, secondary forest, residual forest or 
woodland. We define cultivated land as areas used for agricultural purposes 
(including orchards and plantations). The land-cover categories grassland, 
shrublands and deserts denote land cover described as pasture land, arable land, 
savanna, bushland, or non-forest vegetation. Since one of the studies reviewed 
analyses land-use change at desert fringes, we also include desert as land cover, 
referring to dune landscape. The last land cover, wetland, indicates land covered, for 
example, by swamps. 
Under these LC categories we further classify 12 different land uses (Table 6.1). We 
assign the following forest uses: Non-used forest that captures natural forests; 
forestry, which refers to resource extraction, for example, firewood collection and 
hunting; protected forest that includes forest reservation; logging, which denotes 
logged forests for commercial reasons; and fallow, which is land left for regeneration, 
mostly within a cultivation cycle of shifting cultivation. Cultivated land could be 
used for agriculture or agroforestry whereby agriculture as a broader term 
encompasses mono and mixed-cultivation (including plantations) and is mostly used 
for cash crop cultivation. Agroforestry describes woody perennials and agricultural 
crops planted in agroforestry systems as well as shifting cultivation (Nair, 1993; 




Raintree and Warner, 1986). Grasslands, shrublands and deserts (i.e. dune 
landscape) are mainly used for ranching; this includes livestock farming, cattle 
ranching or agro-pastoralism. To capture the use of natural grasslands, shrublands 
and deserts, we include the terms non-used grassland/non-used shrublands/non-
used deserts. Similarly under wetland, we subsume non-used wetland, that captures 
natural wetlands, and wetland cultivation, that includes landscapes, for example, 
with rice fields.  
Overall, 77 percent of all scenarios analyzed in the reviewed studies concern land 
covered initially by forests (see Table 6.1). Within this subsample, the conversion of 
non-used forest and forestry receives most attention. Looking at final land uses, land 
is predominantly changed towards agricultural usage (52 percent) followed by 
ranching (22 percent) and some minor categories, like fallow (9 percent) and forestry 
(5 percent). Hence, as expected, the most analyzed scenario is the conversion of 
non-used forests or forestry for agricultural purposes, together these make up 62 
cases (34 percent of all land-use changes in the reviewed studies). The second largest 
share (35 cases or 19 percent) is accounted for by studies that analyze the conversion 
of non-used forests or forestry towards ranching. Hence, deforestation - represented 
by the land-cover change of forests into cultivated land or grassland/shrubland - is 
still the main focus of studies analyzing land-use change on the micro-level.  
Table 6.1 also reveals other important land-use change scenarios, for example the 
change of land use for agriculture/ranching towards fallow holding, which is covered 
by 14 cases in the scenario sample. In contrast, we identify only 8 cases of converted 
fallow holdings for agricultural purposes and 1 for ranching. There are also an 
important number of cases (14) that analyze the transformation of protected forest. 
Very few studies (5) in our sample delve into the reverse process, i.e. land-use 
change scenarios towards protected forest (or other protected zones).  
 




Table 6.1. Land-use (and cover) change of reviewed micro-level case studies.  
 




While these transformations may indeed be less frequent, this relatively low number 
of studies at the micro-level – at least when our inclusion criteria are applied – is 
surprising. Furthermore, the small number of cases focusing on the conversion of 
wetlands for agricultural purposes reveals the lack of research on, amongst others, 
the transformation of mangrove forests, which have been declining at a faster rate 
than adjacent inland tropical forests (Duke et al., 2007). Additionally, only three 
cases consider land-use transitions from non-used forests/forestry to logging. The 
low number of studies examining logged forests maybe explained by the fact that 
logging is predominantly carried out on large-scale concessions (Sodhi et al., 2007). 
Further, we could not find any studies that analyze the contribution of agents - who 
conform to our definition of micro actors - to systematic logging. This could be 
because logging activities carried out by households, might be illegal and thus less 
likely to be reported in household surveys (Sodhi et al., 2010) 
6.3.2 Geographical coverage 
The studies in our sample were carried out in 29 (sub) tropical countries (see Figure 
6.2). South America accounts for the largest share of studies in our sample (41 
percent) and together with Central America, it contributes to 63 percent of all the 
studies reviewed (see Table 6.2). This result is in line with the earlier review by Geist 
and Lambin (2001) who find that the majority of case studies come from Latin 
America. 
This large share can be attributed to the high deforestation rates in Central and 
South America, which hold the major share of earth’s primary forest cover and 
stocks in forest biomass (FAO, 2015; Laurance et al., 2001). The high number of 
studies in this region could also be a result of regional preferences by research 
groups and the related availability of land-use data. Land-use change studies on 
African countries account for 20 percent of all reviewed case studies; however, the 




bulk of these studies (N=13) are conducted after the year 2010 – pointing at the rising 
importance of land-use change in African countries (Chidumayo and Kwibisa, 2003). 
Figure 6.2. Geographical coverage of micro-level case studies  
 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation 
 
Only 15 percent of all case studies analyze land-use change in Asian countries. The 
limited number of Asian case studies is surprising, since research hints at high 
deforestation rates in South-East Asia due to logging activities and plantation 
agriculture (Elz et al., 2011; Miettinen et al., 2011; Sodhi et al., 2004).  





Africa Asia Total 
No. of studies 20 37 20 14 91 
Percent 22 41 22 15 100 
 




As noted above with regard to the lack of studies on logging, firms that operate such 
logging or large-scale agricultural activities appear to remain beyond the scope of 
micro-level studies of land-use change determinants.  
6.3.3 Interdisciplinarity 
Ideally, land-change science integrates natural, social and geographical sciences to 
understand patterns of land-use change (Rindfuss et al., 2004). We examine which 
disciplines are most actively involved in land-use change research and to which 
extent these disciplines collaborate. This is done by scrutinizing the authors’ 
educational qualifications and their current research interests. Table 6.3 provides a 
summary of the disciplines that are involved in land-use change research according 
to the studies reviewed. Within all case studies, most research is done by economists 
and geographers, followed by ecologists. Moreover, about half of the studies are 
multidisciplinary (N=47) and this share remains relatively constant over the period 
from 2001-2015. 





Agricultural Economics, Forest Economics, 
Environmental Economics, and Resource 
Economics 41 
Geography Spatial Analysis and Spatial Planners 29 
Ecology 
Environmental Sciences, Ecology, Biology, 
Botanic, Forestry, Biogeochemistry, 
Agricultural Science, Oceanography, 
Biostatistics, Entomology, and Soil Science 15 
Anthropology Anthropology 10 
Social Science 
Sociology, Political Science, Development 
studies, Public policy 2 
Demographic Science Demography, Population Science 3 
Multidisciplinary studies - 
with at least one differing 
discipline   52 




6.3.4 Methods and data 
We aggregate all methods used into five categories that comprise regression analysis 
(including choice models), multivariate analysis, descriptive statistical analysis, 
theoretical models, and (data-based) simulation techniques. Some studies use 
multiple methods, which results in 106 methods applied in 91 studies. Table 6.4 
shows that regression analyses account for 70 percent of the methods used. In 
addition, a few studies (9 percent) rely on multivariate analysis (for example 
ANOVA, Hazard models) or on simple descriptive techniques, such as correlation 
analysis. 10 percent of all applied methods are simulation techniques and out of 
these, half of the studies use agent-based modelling systems. We do not find that the 
disciplinary background of the authors determines the choice of methods used. 
Table 6.4. Methodological approaches taken in micro-level land-use change studies. 
Method % N 
Regression analysis 59 62 
Multivariate analysis 9 10 
Theoretical model 6 6 
Descriptive analysis 16 17 
Simulation techniques 10 11 
 100 106 
 
Most studies analyze land-use change using household and village data, relying often 
on relatively small samples of 100-200 observations (see Figure 6.3). 
Moreover, 48 percent of all studies integrate socio-economic data and information 
from satellite images (N=45). Only a few studies (explicitly) include qualitative data, 
such as results from focus group discussion or expert interviews (N=4). Though most 
studies explore between-household variation, i.e. household-level data, 8 percent 




(N=7) of all studies are based on village-level data. Some studies use also more than 
one database, which leads to a total number of databases of 93.  
Figure 6.3. Sample size of household data in reviewed case studies 
 
Note: For the graph one study with a sample size of 3554 households has been excluded. 
 
In terms of temporal dimension, most studies are based on cross-sectional data, and 
only 16 studies use panel data with typically two rounds of observation (see Table 
6.5). Beyond that, some studies rely on retrospective data (N=6) although this 
approach is prone to measurement errors, for example through recall biases, which 
especially increase for longer periods (Bernard et al., 1984).  
Table 6.5. Temporal dimensions in micro-level land-use change studies  
Spatial level Cross-section analysis Panel Analysis(t=2) Panel Analysis(t>2) 












N 61 16 12 
 
6.3.5 Internal and external validity 
Before providing some meta-analytical insights on the results of the studies, we 
briefly discuss some of the methodological challenges one is likely to encounter in 




the analysis of the micro-level drivers of land-use change and then explain how the 
studies reviewed have dealt with them. One of the key empirical challenges is 
revealing a truly causal relationship between a specific driver and the dependent 
variable. While some studies do their best to address the challenges of causal 
inference, other studies face problems of internal validity because of endogeneity 
(simultaneity and reverse causality) and omitted variable bias. If these possible 
sources of bias are not accounted for, a correlation between land-use change and 
changes in a specific driver (or rather a proxy of it) is mistaken as a causal effect of 
the latter on the former. 
In a number of studies, these empirical (econometric) problems are not adequately 
addressed. When estimating the causal effects of household-level variables (agents’ 
endowments, off-farm employment) on land use, the results may often be biased 
because of reverse causality and simultaneity, i.e. not only is the driver influencing 
land-use change, but also vice versa. For instance, if household wealth (or income) 
and a particular land use, such as cash cropping or ranching, are found to be 
correlated, this does not necessarily imply that wealthy households are more likely 
to be engaged in these land uses. Such a correlation is also likely to reflect that 
engaging in these commercial activities may have turned households wealthy in the 
first place. A similar argument can be made for off-farm employment - a variable 
that is often used as an explanatory variable in land-use change regressions. Here, 
reverse causality stems from the fact that the proceeds from cash crop farming 
enable otherwise liquidity-constrained households to invest in off-farm activities. 
More generally, both theory and evidence suggest that rural households that are 
constrained on important factor markets – most notably labor and credit markets – 
decide simultaneously on agricultural and non-agricultural production as well as 
consumption. This simultaneity is formalized in agricultural household models.  




At the household level, another potential source of bias – often ignored in empirical 
land-use change studies – is the so-called “unobserved heterogeneity”. In particular, 
regression analyses of technology adoption or market participation, i.e. cash crop 
adoption and land-use change, suffer from omitted-variable bias. Households may 
have unobserved characteristics, such as their intrinsic motivation or 
entrepreneurship skills, engagement in rent-seeking behavior, or risk-attitudes that 
directly explain their patterns of land-use change. Such unobserved characteristics 
tend to be correlated with some of the typical household or farmer characteristics 
included in regression analyses, for example education, income, and wealth. If 
unobserved characteristics are omitted from the estimation equation, the effects of 
these variables are likely to be biased. 
Omitted variable bias is not only a problem at the household-level. A particular 
challenge of empirical studies at the micro-level regards disentangling the effects of 
policies that tend to affect all studied households and individual (household-level) 
effects. Large-scale land-use change is often the result of deliberate planning 
policies, in particular agricultural and settlement policies. These policies establish 
infrastructure and create markets. Households react to these policies and incentives 
by moving to the agricultural frontier, and engaging in cash crop farming 
(sometimes through contract farming). This implies that empirical studies in such 
contexts need to account for the fact that there is a policy that simultaneously causes 
roads to be built, migrants to move into a certain area and to engage in a specific 
land use. It is obvious, that the correlation between roads and deforestation that will 
be observed in such a context cannot be interpreted as a causal effect.  
Finally, another very severe problem of reverse causality often arises, when the effect 
of institutions on land-use change is analyzed. Property rights at the agricultural 
frontier are often obtained directly by deforestation. This implies that a correlation 
between insecure property rights (acquired by deforestation) and land-use change 




cannot be taken as a sign of a causal relationship from weak institutions to 
deforestation. All these challenges pose serious threats to the internal validity of 
micro-level land-use change studies, i.e. to correctly attributing causality to specific 
drivers of land-use change. These challenges are addressed in only 17 of the 57 
regression analyses by using Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques or fixed effects 
estimations. This includes the studies by Shively and Pagiola (2004), Maertens et al. 
(2006) and Chibwana (2011). The application of these techniques is taken as a proxy 
that the study has made an explicit effort to reflect upon issues of endogeneity. We 
acknowledge that this is not to say that these issues have been addressed 
convincingly by the respective study. In principle, these empirical problems do not 
apply to simulation and theoretical models (with the exception of regression-based 
simulations). Here, assumptions, functional forms, rules, and parameters have to be 
put under scrutiny. Very few studies, however, rely on very stylized optimization 
models (N=2). 
Studies dealing with land-use change on the micro-level may also face difficulties of 
external validity. Since micro-level studies have per definition a small geographical 
coverage, they have to be clear in their contextualization also referring to the 
representativeness of their results. However, some studies fail to differentiate 
between the mechanisms specific to the study area and possibly generalizable 
results. For example, the insights on the impact of a particular set of communal 
rights on land may only be relevant in the respective context. This holds in 
particular for drivers related to institutional and policy change. 
6.3.6 Overview of covered drivers 
In this section, we present some first generalizations on the drivers of households’ 
land-use decisions analyzed by the reviewed case studies over space and time. This 
indicative analysis is based on the frequency of a reported driver that is found to 
have a significant effect on land-use change. Since many studies are not using 




regression models, our interpretation of significance does not only refer to statistical 
significance, but also classifies as significant those drivers that are stressed most by 
authors within the result or conclusion section. We classify the 330 variables that 
were reported as significant land-use change determinants in the case studies into 
seven main categories of drivers (institutions, infrastructure, endowments and 
characteristics, markets, technology, key policies, and demography referring to 
population and migration) (see Appendix 6.6 Table 6.A.2).  
Our findings reveal that household endowments and characteristics account for 42 
percent of all identified drivers (see Figure 6.4). This is followed by markets and 
infrastructure, representing 14 percent and 13 percent of the drivers reported in the 
studies; demography, technology, key polices, and institutions play a minor role in 
driving land-use change in the studies reviewed. Since household endowments and 
characteristics emerge as the most prominent driver, we further disaggregate this 
driver into physical-, human- and social capital and labor (see Appendix 6.6, Table 
6.A.3). Among the household endowments, physical capital is often found to be 
significantly associated with land-use change. In addition, labor and human capital 
also receive considerable attention (see Table 6.6).  
These meta-analytical findings need to be interpreted with caution. They cannot be 
directly taken as evidence that household characteristics and endowments are the 
most important driver of land-use change. 
For their interpretation, it is important to understand that the findings reflect the 
level of variation between households. In micro-level studies, households tend to be 
exposed to the same socio-economic and ecological environment; be it with regard 
to prices, other market conditions or institutions. Detecting land-use change in 
response to changes in the households’ environment typically requires variation and 
data over time; and as seen above, less than half of the studies have such data. That 
scale matters for the results, becomes apparent when we disaggregate the studies 




into different scales distinguishing between data collected on the household, village 
or regional level. 
Figure 6.4. Micro-level drivers of land-use change (N=330) 
 
 
Then it turns out that demography is the most important driver of land-use change 
on the village level. This finding points at the importance of migration for land-use 
change since demographic variation between villages is mainly driven by migration, 
not by natural demographic forces. 










% 50 33 14 3 
 
Once the caveats to the above aggregation exercise of drivers are understood, the 
meta-analytical findings first tell us that there is indeed substantial household 
heterogeneity, not only in terms of household-level characteristics, but also of 
observed land-use choices. Second, the household heterogeneity, in particular in 
terms of income and endowments, is significantly associated with land-use change. 




It is important to note that this is not necessarily the case, as one may expect 
household-level land-use change to be driven mainly by external forces with all 
households reacting more or less the same. In contrast, the detailed review of 
selected studies below will illustrate how household-level factors condition 
households’ reaction to these external forces. Third, in addition to this general 
insight regarding the heterogeneity in household characteristics and reactions, the 
results of Table 6.5 and 6.6 can be taken as a first indication that economic growth is 
an important aggregate force that drives land-use change. This is because the micro-
level determinants of economic growth, in particular physical capital, often turn out 
to be associated with households’ land-use decisions. 
However, the relationship between land-use change and these growth- associated 
micro-level drivers is not simple. As the subsequent literature review will show, 
there are complex interactions between these micro-level determinants, for example 
in the use of capital and labor, the application of technologies, and context-
conditions, in particular institutions, policies and the conditions on factor markets. 
6.4 Drivers, studies and cases of households’ land-use decisions 
We organized the review below according to the grouping of seven drivers suggested 
above. In addition to the factors that have been considered in earlier reviews, we 
carefully review household endowments/characteristics as well as key policies 
addressing land-use change. The many examples and case studies illustrate the 
complex interrelationships between land-use change and its supposed drivers. 
Different transmission channels with varying importance in different contexts are at 
work, often simultaneously. Empirical ambiguities do not only arise from different 
context conditions, but also because of the existence of non-linearity’s in the 
relationship between a specific driver and land-use change.  
 




6.4.1 Property rights and institutions 
In a setting where households draw their sustenance from agricultural activities, the 
rules and institutions that govern the ownership and utilization of land play a key 
role in determining households’ behavior and decisions. A significant number of the 
households analyzed in the studies reviewed are faced with weakly defined and 
insecure property rights (Etongo et al., 2015; Adams et al., 2013; Newby et al., 2012; 
Muriuki et al., 2011; Dolisca et al., 2007; Mena et al., 2006a; Pan et al., 2004; Murphy, 
2001; Otsuka et al., 2001).  
In the absence of well-defined property rights and tenure security households often 
gain de facto land rights through deforestation and land clearing (Etongo et al., 2015; 
Damnyag et al., 2012; Dolisca et al., 2007; Otsuka et al., 2001; Cattaneo, 2001). 
Cattaneo’s (2001) simulation model-based analysis of deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon assumes that deforestation enables the acquisition of property rights to 
“unclaimed” land. He further argues that this adds a speculative value of informal 
tenure rights to the potential returns from agriculture. These relationships imply an 
ambiguous effect of tenure security on deforestation or other forms of land-use 
change. In general, households or farmers in environments with relatively insecure 
rights may tend to use land conversion or possession of “unclaimed” land as a way of 
establishing informal land-use rights. In line with this argument, Dolisca et al. 
(2007) find that illegal occupants are more likely to convert forest into cultivable 
land than farmers with titled land in Haiti. Such behavior is reinforced by 
regulations that foresee titling through adverse possession; that is, farmers acquire 
titles after physically living on a piece of land for a 20-year period. Yet, Dolisca et al. 
(2007) also point at evidence for the same country that shows that titling programs 
have equally caused more deforestation, as more land is then cleared because of an 
increased value of the property rights established by clearing – this is very much in 
line with Cattaneo’s (2001) argument above. Generally, households will deforest or 




clear land up to the point where the marginal benefits of clearing (including both 
the value of potential agricultural production and of tenure rights) exceed or match 
the marginal costs of doing so (including the direct costs of clearing, for example 
labor costs, and of violating laws). 
Beyond these “direct” effects of establishing property rights through land conversion, 
the presence of insecure tenure has important effects on agricultural management 
practices, profits to be earned from agricultural activities, and, hence, investment 
decisions. It is well established that insecure property rights have an inverse relation 
with household’s planning horizons (Besley and Ghatak, 2010; Goldstein and Udry, 
2008).With shorter planning horizons, farmers are more likely to apply less 
sustainable agricultural management practices; in particular, they may invest less in 
soil conservation measures and leave too little land fallow. In line with this 
argument, Damnyag et al. (2012), show that farm households in Ghana are more 
likely to invest in shade grown cocoa and other perennial crops when they have a 
secure land title. One should note that these decisions might still be optimal for the 
individual household under the constraints faced. Less sustainable agricultural 
practices may eventually lead to land degradation and to possibly higher rates of 
conversion of non-cultivated to cultivate land again. 
In household surveys, the common practice in collecting information on land tenure 
and property rights is to include questions that either specify the characteristics of 
land tenure arrangement (customary or freehold, titled, rented or leasehold, share 
cropped) or that ask about the land acquisition process (inheritance, leasehold, 
purchase or illegal use) Damnyag et al., 2012; Dolisca et al., 2007). In cases where 
land titles are absent (or no information is available), property rights may be proxied 
through the duration of residence (Dolisca et al., 2007). These measures and proxies 
are typically used as explanatory variables in equations that explain land-use change. 
This procedure is not without problems, as it neglects the possibility that causality 




may be reverse: for instance, it assumes that land-use decisions are determined by 
property rights and not vice versa. However, the act of forest clearing may be 
observed because this decision gives rise to some kind of property right. 
The feedback between land rights and land-use change is illustrated in a study by 
Otsuka et al. (2001) who use data from Sumatra, Indonesia. They show that 
customary land rights respond to changing context conditions, in particular higher 
population pressure, by giving higher tenure security to households that invest 
more, specifically through planting trees, into land acquired by clearing communal 
forests.  
6.4.2 Market accessibility and infrastructure 
Households’ land-use choices highly depend on access to infrastructure and 
markets. Infrastructure networks and market integration determine households’ 
production decisions. This is because they influence economic structures beyond 
agriculture, i.e. income-generation opportunities in non-agricultural sectors with 
possible repercussions on land-use change. Hence, on a gradient of market 
integration, the production costs of agricultural commodities, the marketing 
networks, and the opportunity costs of engaging in agriculture differ and so will 
households’ land uses. The interrelation between developing markets and 
infrastructure extension is twofold: First, infrastructure can be triggered by 
developing markets, cash crop adoption and economic growth – possibly reinforced 
by spontaneous in-migration. Secondly, infrastructure extension can be a 
component of rural development and settlement policies and exogenously drive 
market integration. In reality, this process will often be iterative and both channels 
will reinforce each other.  
Similar to earlier reviews (Geist and Lambin, 2001; Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999), 
recent empirical findings confirm a strong impact of changing market integration on 




households’ land-use decisions (Kaminski and Thomas, 2011; Vadez et al., 2008; 
Caviglia-Harris, 2004). Better access to markets is found to be positively correlated 
with the extension of agricultural areas, especially for cash crop cultivation (Adams 
et al., 2013; Ellis et al., 2010; Klepeis and Vance, 2003; Vance and Geoghegan, 2002). 
Accordingly, a number of studies find a negative relation between distance to 
market centers and deforestation (Caviglia-Harris and Harris, 2011; de Souza Soler 
and Verburg, 2010; Wyman and Stein, 2010; Pan et al., 2007; Geoghegan et al., 2004; 
Sunderlin and Pokam, 2002). 
Most studies capture the effect of accessibility to markets on land-use change by 
controlling for infrastructure variables, such as distance to markets (Müller and 
Zeller, 2002) or distance to all-year roads (Maertens et al., 2006). As outlined above, 
interpreting the correlations between these variables and land-use change decisions 
as causal may be problematic. This is because neither the establishment of 
infrastructure nor the development of markets (the latter even much less) can 
always be considered to be exogenous to the household’s decision. Instead, both 
land-use change decisions as well as the establishment of rural infrastructure may be 
driven by the same – unobserved or omitted – factors, for example a rural 
development policy aimed at cash crop expansion. Furthermore, capturing market 
accessibility via distance variables is prone to ignore underlying variables, for 
example failing output and input markets. 
Some studies provide very instructive insights on the relationship between 
infrastructure/markets and land-use change. Cattaneo (2001), for example, uses a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model to analyze the impact of 
infrastructure extension on deforestation in the Amazon. He explicitly considers the 
response of commodity markets and finds that a 20 percent reduction in 
transportation costs for all agricultural products leads to an increase in deforested 
land between 21-39 percent. 




Other studies, however, suggest a more complex relationship between market access 
and land-use change. Using cross-sectional village-level data combined with GIS-
data from Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, Maertens et al. (2006) analyze how improved 
technologies in the lowlands affect agricultural expansion and deforestation in the 
uplands. In doing this, the authors also control for market access of households. 
Their findings suggest an inverse U-shaped relation between market access and 
agricultural expansion and argue that improved market access and declining 
transaction costs lead households to expand their land for agricultural production. 
However, at a later stage, households start to invest in off-farm activities, which in 
turn reduce the pressure on the forest. Müller and Zeller (2002) combine satellite 
imagery and survey data from Vietnam to analyze the land-use dynamics in the 
central highlands of Vietnam econometrically. They find that a period of land-
intensive agricultural expansion (at the expense of forest) was followed by a second 
period of labor and capital intensive agricultural growth. This pattern of agricultural 
growth without further land expansion was mainly driven by increased market 
integration that eased constraints on agricultural input and output markets.  
6.4.3 Household characteristics, income and wealth 
Household characteristics and endowments are crucial determinants of households’ 
behavior and are often included as control variables in regressions even when they 
are not the main motivation behind the study. Education levels, income, 
wealth/assets, gender and age of the household head are commonly controlled for in 
regression analyses of land-use change. Furthermore, households’ endowments with 
land, physical capital, and (family) labor are important determinants of land-use 
change decisions, but these will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
The conceptual framework above clearly shows the rationale for including education 
and income as explanatory variables into land-use change regressions. Yet, most 
studies could be more explicit about the reduced-form character of this type of 




exercise. In addition, endogeneity issues remain largely unaddressed in most studies. 
Education, gender and age, for example, affect the productivity and opportunity 
costs of most economic activities (in off-farm activities often more than in farming). 
At the same time, they affect values and attitudes of all kinds, for example the 
valuation of work as a farmer or consumption aspirations. Hence, the effects 
observed in a regression of land-use change on education (or age) will always reflect 
a combined (reduced-form) effect of these different transmission channels. Instead 
of acknowledging this, most studies tend to present an eclectic interpretation of the 
relationship between a specific household characteristic and land-use change. For 
example, Codjoe and Bilsborrow (2011) and Dolisca et al. (2007), point at a possible 
effect of education through increased consumption aspirations. Busch and 
Geoghegan (2010) stress the importance of education for the profitability of off-farm 
and non-agricultural opportunities at higher levels of education. While the 
hypothesized effects are likely to be at work in the respective cases, there may be 
other relevant transmission channels of education to land-use change. In addition, 
most studies fail to note that formal education is typically correlated with 
unobserved abilities (of different kinds, for example logical reasoning), which again 
tends to bias the measured effects. 
In particular in the absence of functioning labor markets, the availability of 
household labor, i.e. the composition of households in terms of age and gender, will 
affect agricultural production decisions and thus land use change (Perz et al.,2006). 
Perz et al. (2006), for example, finds that the number of both old and young 
household members is correlated with the cultivation of annuals and perennials, no 
such correlation can be detected for pasture. The relationship between income and 
land-use change is the most important and interesting, but empirically most 
challenging one. It is common for empirical micro-level land-use change studies to 
find a positive correlation between income and bringing land under cultivation 
(Godoy et al., 2009; Schmook and Vance, 2009).We have already pointed at the 




obvious problem of reverse causality in this relationship above, i.e. income 
determines the household’s current land use and, at the same time, this land use also 
influences income levels. Yet, very few studies make an attempt to address this 
problem. One exception is Caviglia-Harris and Harris (2008) who use lagged 
variables of income – instead of current income – in their analysis of cattle ranching 
expansion in the Brazilian Amazon. They find a positive correlation between income 
and pasture but not for cropland 
Off-farm income is often explicitly considered in analyses of land-use change as an 
important component of income of many rural households. It can reduce 
households’ dependency on agriculture and, as an important alternative income 
generation strategy, determines the opportunity costs of engaging in agriculture 
(Broadbent et al., 2012; Kaminski and Thomas, 2011). At the same time, off-farm 
activities may provide the liquidity required to invest in certain agricultural activities 
that need some initial investment, for example livestock or certain cash crops. Most 
studies do not make an attempt to disentangle these effects, but they confirm a net 
reduction in deforestation due to increased off-farm income. As the income portfolio 
and hence income, are simultaneously determined (by the same factors), the 
empirical caveats in terms of a causal relationship between off-farm income and 
land-use change mentioned above, also apply to on-farm income.  
Setting these concerns aside, the Mexican case study from the southern Yucatán, by 
Geoghegan et al. (2001), finds that households’ income generated through off-farm 
employment is found to be negatively correlated with forest clearance. In one of the 
few panel data studies, Rodríguez-Meza et al. (2004) empirically analyze the 
determinants of households’ land use in El Salvador. Controlling for household fixed 
effects, they also find that households’ engagement in income diversification 
through non-farm activities reduces land clearance. Pender et al. (2004) examine the 
determinants of land management in Uganda using village-level data. The results 




suggest six different development pathways where one is related to increasing non-
farm activities. The study points at another interesting effect of higher opportunity 
costs for labor. The pathway of increased off-farm opportunities seems to enhance 
soil degradation since less household labor is available for more sustainable 
practices. Similarly, the pressure on (local) labor markets by better-paying off-farm 
opportunities may encourage switching to less labor-intensive crops. For example, 
Newby et al. (2012), mainly attribute the increase of smallholder teak plantations in 
Northern Laos to such an effect. 
Access to and the availability of capital may also considerably raise households’ 
income levels. Access to capital may not only be required to finance investment 
costs, for example to set-up a rubber or oil palm plantation, but also to finance 
fertilizer and other inputs. These are two important related, but yet separate 
transmission channels that would probably result in ambiguous dynamic effects of 
access to capital – facilitating agricultural expansions initially and saving land later. 
To date, however, the literature has little to say on these possible dynamic 
ambiguities, which are also difficult to assess empirically. This is, for example, 
because capital incorporated in established farming activity is often not easy to 
measure. This may explain why the reviewed studies typically hypothesize a positive 
correlation of the availability of physical capital with agricultural land use. This 
conceptual weakness is reinforced by the fact that the problems of endogeneity and 
attribution of causality, which are similar to those with regard to income, are often 
not addressed. While some studies directly use capital endowments to explain land-
use change, others recur to access to capital. It should be noted that the estimates of 
the effects of the latter variable are also prone to suffer from endogeneity biases, as 
access to capital is typically determined by the same unobserved factors that 
determine land-use change, for example entrepreneurial or farming ability. Despite 
these shortcomings, the fact that capital (or access to it) is often found to be 
correlated with land-use change has some empirical content and points at the 




important role of capital. A number of studies suggest that capital is an important 
driver of deforestation for ranching and agriculture purposes (Busch and Geoghegan, 
2010; Wyman and Stein, 2010; Schmook and Vance, 2009; Perz et al., 2006; Vance 
and Iovanna, 2006; Vance and Geoghegan; 2004; Klepeis and Vance, 2003; Vance and 
Geoghegan; 2002). The “effect” of capital on land-use change can be very large. For 
example, using data on 132 households from Uruará county in eastern Brazil, Caldas 
et al. (2007) find that households with some capital (measured as durable goods 
available to the household upon arrival on the property) deforest between 20-30 
hectares more of forest than poorer households without any capital (the mean farm 
size in the study is 23 hectares). In addition, access to capital is also found to be 
associated with the adoption of longer term and higher yielding activities such as the 
cultivation of perennial cash crops and adoption of pasture in a number of studies 
(Van Wey et al., 2012; Vanwambeke et al., 2007; Perz et al, 2006). Kaminski and 
Thomas (2011) investigate the impact of institutional reforms within the cotton 
sector on households’ land uses in Burkina Faso, Africa. The authors combine a 
structural framework with cross-sectional regression analyses to show that the 
increase in cotton cultivation can be linked to both the enhanced access to credits 
and improved credit conditions after institutional reforms. 
While education, income, capital accessibility and wealth are certainly among the 
fundamental drivers of land-use change towards agricultural use, they are often 
reinforced (or mitigated) by social networks and other forms of social capital that 
are likely to play an important role particularly in the diffusion of certain crops or 
agricultural technologies. They facilitate learning by observation and provide 
farmers with local knowledge of soil quality, suitable agricultural technologies and 
crop marketing when extension services and other forms of formal institutions are 
absent. Busch and Vance (2011), for example, develop a theoretical model that 
focuses on the role of information spill-overs in spurring the diffusion of pasture in 
the southern Yucatan for groups of households originating from the same villages. 




They find that increases in village networks raise cattle adoption at a decreasing rate. 
Similarly, Vanwambeke et al. (2007) find that belonging to a social network is 
positively correlated with a household’s increased use of inputs (intensification) in 
irrigated areas in Northern Thailand. They also use village membership as a proxy 
for membership in a social network. Their analysis is limited to short-term effects 
and they do not find evidence for the decreasing positive impact of social capital 
reported in Busch and Vance (2011).  
6.4.4 Input and output markets 
In developing countries, rural smallholders typically face considerable constraints on 
input and output markets. While constraints on output markets generally hamper 
agricultural expansion, imperfections on capital, labor and other input markets may 
have ambiguous effects. On the one hand, they may also simply constrain expansion; 
on the other hand, input factor and input market imperfections may lead to 
substitution of these factors for land and thus promote land-intensive agricultural 
strategies. 
This mechanism is shown by Busch and Geoghegan (2010) who analyze land-use 
choices of rural households in the southern Yucatán region in Mexico. Using a cross-
sectional survey, the authors show that labor scarcity drives households’ expansion 
in cattle ranching, which is more intensive in land and capital than in labor. 
However, intensification of one sector can alter returns to factors and thus reduce 
pressure on land. In his case study on Philippine farm households at rainforest 
margins, Shively (2001) illustrates the effect of agricultural intensification in a 
context of a dichotomous lowland-upland economy. He estimates a theoretical 
model of lowland agricultural production with a model of labor allocation on a 
representative upland farm and finds that upland forest clearing and hillside farming 
are reduced by agricultural intensification in the lowlands (in this case, the 
introduction of irrigation). Higher labor productivity in the lowlands increases 




demand for labor from the uplands and creates a small but significant reduction in 
the rate of forest clearing. 
A typical finding of micro-level studies with regard to labor is the correlation 
between deforestation and agricultural extension and the use of hired labor (for 
example, Caviglia-Harris and Harris, 2008; Mena et al., 2006b; Walker et al., 2002; 
Walker et al., 2000), particularly for commercial agriculture Walker et al., 
(2002).Unfortunately, these studies do not take into account that hired labor is 
endogenous to land-use change: Labor use, be it family or hired labor or a 
combination, is always determined by the production technology and labor market 
conditions, i.e. wages and the availability of labor for hire – rather than vice versa. 
In the same study, Kaminski and Thomas (2011) also theoretically analyze the role of 
price fluctuations and the role of marketing risk for household’s crop choices; hence 
looking at product markets. To account for the importance of price fluctuations, 
Kaminski and Thomas (2011) include the relative variability of crop prices as a proxy. 
They find that optimal land use is also determined by the relative risk-profitability of 
households’ crop portfolios, which are a function of households’ technologies and 
input and output prices. This study illustrates the important role of output markets 
as a central driver of households’ production decision and land-use change, as does 
another study by Caviglia-Harris and Harris (2011) on the impact of settlement 
design in the Brazilian Amazon. Based on panel data of Brazilian households, who 
are predominantly small-scale farmers, the authors find a short- and a long-term 
impact of fluctuating milk prices on deforestation: First, increasing milk prices 
translate directly in higher income and encourage agents to intensify agricultural 
production. Then, labor is drawn away from forest clearing. In the longer term, 
increasing milk prices however raise incentives to extend the production, which 
leads to further forest clearance to support larger cattle herds. 




The effect of new markets has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. 
One exception is Hought et al. (2012) who examine land-use change in Banteay 
Meanchay Province, Cambodia. The study that combines remote sensing data with 
field interviews suggests that a sharp increase in (regional) demand for biofuel 
feedstock has been associated with a rapid expansion of cassava production at the 
expense of forests. While energy demand drives land-use change in this case, an 
important secondary effect of cattle ranching is pointed at by Luisana et al. (2012). 
Using a spatially explicit ecological-economic model, they consider the twofold land-
use change of cattle ranching, on the one hand, and the associated cultivation of 
feed resources and fodder, on the other.  
Finally, recent analyses of land markets stress the role of speculation. For example, 
Takasaki (2011) uses a theoretical model to show that, if labor and land markets exist, 
increasing land prices may promote forest clearing for speculative land holding. The 
case study of Carrero and Fearnside (2011) provides the corresponding empirical 
evidence for the role of speculation in land holding in their analysis of land-use 
strategies of households in one of Brazil’s deforestation hotspots along the Trans-
amazon Highway. Their case study results suggest that at least 30 percent of 
surveyed farmers acquire land for speculative reasons.  
6.4.5 Adoption of agricultural technology 
The availability of and the capacity (and willingness) to adopt agricultural 
technologies is a key driver of land-use change. Once a technology is chosen, it will 
determine smallholders’ factor use and the respective output level. Hence, the 
technology applied by households determines land uses and may induce land-use 
change depending on the specific characteristics of the technology. These 
technological characteristics that include the level of substitutability between input 
factors, interact with household endowments, such as the availability of family labor, 
and prevailing factor market conditions, for example the availability and price for 




hired labor. Once new agricultural technologies are adopted, they may lead to 
technological spill-over effects within villages and communities.  
Recent studies on the impact of technology on agriculture examine technology as a 
land- saving or land-consuming driver of land-use change. Empirically, these studies 
focus on the use chemical inputs (Caviglia-Harris and Sills, 2005; Rodríguez-Meza et 
al., 2004), irrigation systems (Shively and Pagiola, 2004), or mechanical tools 
(Codjoe and Bilsborow, 2011). The results are ambiguous: Some studies observe a 
negative link between the adoption of a new technology and deforestation or 
agricultural expansion (Vanwambeke et al., 2007; Pender et al., 2004; Mertens et al., 
2000). However, other studies find evidence for land extensification that is driven by 
technological improvements (Rodríguez-Meza et al., 2004; Sankhayan and Hofstad, 
2001). In this context, the effects of farm input subsidy programs to encourage the 
use of fertilizer may also be instructive. Chibwana et al. (2011) analyze the effect of 
the nationwide Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) in Malawi. The authors draw on 
a household survey of 380 households and apply a two-step regression strategy to 
control for endogenous selection into the program. They find an increased use of 
inputs for households participating in the FISP and an increase in the area of land 
planted with maize and tobacco. Furthermore, results suggest that subsidies reduce 
crop diversity and promote specialization in maize production. 
Although these studies show a correlation between land conversion and technology 
adoption, some of them fail to take the respective market conditions into account, 
particularly on input markets, as an underlying driving force. Especially in rural 
regions, area extension due to technical improvements may be induced through 
relaxed access to formerly constrained input markets. We have already referred to 
Kaminski and Thomas’ (2011) study on institutional reforms as the main driver of 
cotton expansion in Burkina Faso above. These reforms improved access to input 
markets and to technical advice. Underlying driving factors would need to be 




factored in not only conceptually, but also in the empirical analysis. The correlation 
between the use of a technology, for example chemical inputs or mechanical tools, 
and land conversion may often be traced back to underlying driving forces, such as 
access to capital or degraded soils.  
Moreover, the ambiguity of the findings on the impacts of technological change can 
be due to differences in elasticities of demand for agricultural products. As has been 
argued by Villoria et al. (2013) and Hertel (2012), a productivity improvement can be 
land-consuming when this demand elasticity is high, as it would be, when 
innovation happens at regional scale and the product substitutable. However, on the 
global level, demand for agricultural products is likely to be rather inelastic – close 
to the demand elasticity for food – and the response to technological change then 
land-saving (2012). Only a few studies discuss the net effects of new technologies on 
land use once the technology’s impacts on factor use (substitution), factor prices and 
possibly resulting spill-over effects between regions and sectors are taken into 
account. In South-East Asia, rural areas are often characterized by an upland-
lowland dichotomy. Shively’s (2001) study of such a context in the Philippines 
suggests that the adoption of a more labor-intensive technology (irrigation) in the 
lowlands promotes employment and reduces pressure on forests in both regions: 
With higher productivity, the factor returns in the lowland increase and lowland 
wages rise. As a consequence, upland households, who are now employed in the 
lowlands, pursue an intensification strategy on their own land, which in turn leads 
to a decrease in forest clearing and hillside farming. Within the same country 
context, Shively and Pagiola (2001) confirm these results using panel data with a 
focus on the impact of intensification on deforestation. With irrigation development 
in the lowlands, wages and employment rise and the authors show a positive 
correlation between the shadow value of lowland labor and the days of hired labor in 
the uplands. This indicates that upland households employed in the lowlands 
replace family labor with hired labor on their own farms. The wage-induced increase 




in labor productivity in the uplands reduces forest clearing and leads to 
intensification. 
Müller and Zeller (2002) use cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate the 
possible land-saving effects of intensification in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. 
They show that intensification indeed triggers land-saving effects; however, this 
result is only observed if technological change is accompanied by enhanced market 
integration and simultaneously enforced forest protection policies. These results are 
in contrast to those obtained by Maertens et al. (2006) who use cross-sectional 
village-level data combined with GIS-data to analyze the land-use implications of the 
introduction of hand-tractors in the rice sector in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. They 
show that the improved technology for rice cultivation induces a shift of labor into 
the forested uplands and thus increases agricultural extension and deforestation. 
The contradicting effects found in these two studies illustrate the importance of 
context specific conditions, here in particular the labor market conditions, in 
shaping the effects of technological change. 
With regard to the processes of technology adoption, a couple of recent studies have 
investigated the role of household interaction with the diffusion of technologies. 
Mena et al. (2011) use an agent-based model fed with empirical data, in this study, 
the authors assume that households transfer information and knowledge through 
imitation of neighbors’ cultivation strategies. Vanwambeke et al. (2007) analyze the 
emergence of cash crop markets and the industrialization of rural households in 
northern Thailand. Based on cross-sectional household data and remote sensing 
data, the authors apply a choice model to examine the impact of social-networks on 
new land-use strategies. The authors show that social networks defined by the 
number of other adopters in the village lead to intensified land use through 
information via sharing or observing.  
 




6.4.6 Population and migration 
There is a consensus in the literature that population pressure is an important driver 
of land-use change (Mekasha et al., 2014; Garedew et al., 2012; Ellis et al., 2010; Mena 
et al., 2006b) and that it also triggers technological change in agriculture 
technologies (Vance and Geogheghan,2002). Since population pressure can only be 
partially reflected at the household level, micro-level studies on land-use change 
often incorporate census data into their analysis (see for instance, Garedew et al., 
2012; Ellis et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2008; Maertens et al., 2006; Takasaki, 2007; 
Maertens et al., 2006; Mena et al., 2006a; Geoghegan et al., 2004 and Cattaneo, 2001). 
More precisely, population growth – often accelerated by migration – can either 
result in extensive (if uncultivated lands are available) or intensive land use (if 
uncultivated lands are not available). 
As many of the areas within the studies reviewed were previously forestland before 
they were converted to settlements or agricultural lands, the opening of these lands 
has been accompanied by migration into the previous forestlands. In fact, migration 
has received considerable attention in the land-use change literature and migration 
status has in many micro-level studies been hypothesized to affect households’ land-
use decisions. First, migrants are expected to follow extensive and unsustainable 
agricultural practices that lead to the encroachment of the forest frontier because 
they have shorter planning horizons, which cause them to be more destructive than 
host populations (Sunderlin and Pokam, 2002). Second, migrants are assumed to use 
unsustainable agricultural practices due to their limited knowledge of the local agro-
ecological conditions of their new region. Codjoe and Bilsborrow (2011) find weak 
empirical support for these hypotheses for migrant farmers in central Ghana, as they 
tend to have less fallow years than non-migrants. 
In a study on colonist farm incomes in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Murphy (2001) finds 
that new migrants earn less because they have less experience about the regional 




conditions. While this supports the claims made above that new migrants are not 
familiar with the agro-ecological conditions of their new residence it does not 
provide any evidence on their land-use patterns. Other studies that show that 
duration of residence matters for land-use change include Dolisca et al. (2007) who 
find that the longer households have lived in the Forêt des Pins Reserve in Haiti the 
less likely they are to clear forests. 
Using data from Southern Yucatán in Mexico, Schmook and Radel (2008) find that 
households with US based migrants have more pasture than non-migrant 
households. This is because the establishment of pasture is initially labor intensive 
but requires very low levels of labor inputs once established which makes it ideal for 
households with members that have migrated to the US. In addition, they find that 
migrant households cultivate more summer maize and chili and are less likely to 
cultivate traditional milpa when compared to non-migrants.  
6.4.7 Key policies 
To analyze the impacts of policies, inter-temporal data that captures the conditions 
before and after the policy or data from a counterfactual group that consists of 
households with the same characteristics that have not been exposed to the policy 
change is necessary (Schmook and Vance, 2005). However since policies are often 
experienced uniformly within a region, such data is not usually available for most of 
the studies reviewed in this chapter and the analyses are sometimes made with 
retrospective data that questions households on their experiences before the policy 
change. 
Market-oriented reforms adopted by many developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s played an important role in altering land use in many of the countries covered 
by the reviewed studies. One of the most extensively studied policies with respect to 
its land-use change implications is the Programa de Apoyo Directo al Campo 




(PROCAMPO), a cash transfer program introduced in 1994 in Mexico to mitigate the 
possible adverse effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on 
rural populations (Schmook and Vance, 2009; Kleipeis and Vance, 2003). Kleipeis 
and Vance (2003) were the first to clearly establish a link between the receipt of 
PROCAMPO cash transfers and the subsequent land-use decisions made by farm 
households. Using a panel data set with individual farm-level data that spans an 
eleven year period from the southern Yucatán peninsula in Mexico, the authors show 
that PROCAMPO payments are responsible for nearly 38 percent of deforestation 
that occurred in the study region between 1994 and 1997. They relate this finding to 
the eligibility conditions of PROCAMPO that are at odds with fallow regeneration 
and cause households to clear more forests in order to maintain the cultivation of 
crops in rich soils. A later study, by Schmook and Vance (2009) uses a seemingly 
unrelated regression to compare the effects of PROCAMPO and another agricultural 
support program - Alianza Para el Campo - on the households in the same region. 
PROCAMPO puts no restrictions on how the transfer should be spent, but attaches 
conditions on how land should be used. Instead, transfers from Alianza are tied to 
specific agricultural activities that have to be implemented by households (Schmook 
and Vance, 2009). In line with Kleipeis and Vance (2003), they find that 
PROCRAMPO is significantly correlated with a reduction in forest area and with 
increases in area under pasture and cultivation. In a similar vein, Alianza is found to 
significantly influence land use, in particular in favor of pasture.  
Using recall plot data from 1970-2009 in combination with aerial photographs, 
Ribeiro Palacios et al. (2013) examine the broader impact of economic reforms on 
land-use change in Mexico. Looking at the region of Southern Huasteca, the authors 
stress that market-oriented policies such as the promotion of agribusinesses are a 
key driver of a reinforced land conversion for cash crops, especially for citrus 
orchards. This typically occurs at the expense of food crop agriculture and secondary 
forests. The finding that market-oriented reforms increased deforestation and 




expanded areas devoted to agriculture is not unique to south-eastern Mexico. 
Another example is the abovementioned case of the reform of the Burkinabé cotton 
sector analyzed by Kaminski and Thomas (2011) that included the privatization of 
the parastatal firm SOFITEX (National Cotton Fibre Company). Going back to 
Mexico, Barsimantov and Antezana (2012) discuss how the adoption of the 1992 
Forestry Law and the 1992 Reform of the Mexican Constitution that were part of a 
set of free market and reregulation policies increased deforestation and later led to 
an increase in the production of avocados. The authors show that forest cover was 
reduced considerably because of these policy changes, particularly in the non-
forestry communities that had relatively less forest cover to begin with.  
Other policies that have played a key role in driving the land-use decisions made by 
households in the reviewed studies include policies targeted at infrastructure 
development (Pender et al., 2004; Müller and Zeller, 2002) and settlement policies 
(Caviglia-Harris and Harris, 2011). Caviglia-Harris and Harris (2011) show that even 
when policy makers take extra precautions in designing alternative new settlement 
policies to ensure that they meet both environmental and social objectives, in the 
long term the design does not influence land cover choices and that land clearing is 
extensive in all agricultural lots. After a ten-year period, they find that very little 
forest remains in the radial lots that are introduced by the new alternative 
settlement policy.  
Prominent examples of land-related policies include the Payment for Environmental 
Services (PES) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD 
and REDD+). These policies directly address households’ decisions to deforest by 
altering the payoffs to different land uses. Therefore, their effects on land-use 
change depend on the farmers’ livelihood and crop options and the related 
opportunity costs of altering land uses (Chavez and Perz, 2012). This is confirmed by 
Newton et al.’s (2012) evaluation of the impact of Bolsa Floresta, a PES scheme with 




an undifferentiated reward structure in the Brazilian Amazon. They emphasize the 
heterogeneity among farmers’ livelihood strategies that results in a strongly 
heterogeneous impact of the program on the decision of deforesting. In addition, the 
schemes’ impact also depend on possible differences in farmers valuations of 
ecosystem services (Vihervaara et al., 2012). Mello and Hildebrand (2012) who 
analyze the potential effects of carbon trade on land-use decisions and farm income 
of small-scale farmers in the eastern Brazilian Amazon illustrate the importance of 
sufficient compensation. The authors stress that carbon prices have to be high 
enough to cover transition costs to adopt land-saving technologies.  
6.5 Conclusion 
For this chapter, we have reviewed 91 recent empirical and theoretical studies that 
analyze land-use change at the farm-household level. The review builds on a 
conceptual framework of a human-environmental system focusing on micro-level 
agents and resulting land-use change drivers. This concept extends previous work by 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999). The framework considers feedback mechanisms 
between the different stages of the land-use change process, for example between 
the actions of agents and macroeconomic variables, and between specific causes 
within a stage, for example between different decision parameters such as the 
interlink between technology options and accessibility of infrastructure. Considering 
telecoupling interactions, the concept allows for multidirectional interactions of the 
whole system towards other socially and geographically remote human- 
environmental systems. Furthermore, our framework explicitly considers the role of 
household endowments and characteristics as drivers of land-use change. 
We first conduct a meta-analysis of the 91 studies. We find that the most frequently 
analyzed scenario is the conversion of non-used forests or forestry into land used for 
agricultural purposes – about a third of all scenarios. The second largest share is 
accounted for by studies that look into the conversion of non-used forests or 




forested areas into ranching. Most studies analyze land-use change using household 
and village data and, in doing so, often rely on relatively small samples of 100-200 
observations. There is a clear regional concentration of studies on Central and South 
America and some studies on African countries, while only 11 percent analyze land-
use change in Asian countries. The limited number of Asian case studies is 
surprising, since evidence hints at high deforestation rates in South-East Asia due to 
logging activities and plantation agriculture. In our view, this may be explained by 
the literature’s focus on household farms. Yet, the omission of firms that operate 
logging and large-scale farming activities implies that a key (micro-level) actor’s 
behavior remains unexplored. We find that a number of studies face problems of 
internal validity because of endogeneity (simultaneity and reverse causality) and 
omitted variable bias that are not adequately addressed. 
When we aggregate the variables identified as drivers in the micro-level studies into 
stylized categories, we find that household-level heterogeneity and the resulting 
differences in land-use decisions can be considered a key driver of land-use change. 
This is less trivial than it may appear, as it is also conceivable that forces external to 
households, in particular, policies and market signals, are strong enough to dwarf 
the effects of household-level differences. Among the household-level 
characteristics, the literature points at micro-level determinants of economic 
growth, in particular in physical capital, as a catalyst of human induced land-use 
change. 
However, as our detailed literature review shows, the relationship between land-use 
change and these growth-associated micro-level drivers is complex, in particular 
because of the interactions between these drivers, for example the use of capital and 
labor and the applied technologies, and also context-conditions, in particular 
institutions, policies and the conditions on factor markets. These complexities and 




interactions cause the abovementioned important challenges in the empirical study 
of land-use change. 
Land governance systems make a good case for the complexities and interactions 
discussed above. It is well established that the absence of well- defined property 
rights and tenure security often leads households to gain de facto land rights 
through deforestation and land clearing. In addition, insecure tenure shortens 
farmers’ planning horizons, which, in turn, makes them more likely to apply less 
sustainable agricultural management practices. When the impacts of tenure security 
on land use and management practices are empirically analyzed reverse causality 
issues, i.e. the fact that tenure security is influenced by land-use and management, 
receive too little attention in the literature. 
Reverse causality is also an often-unresolved issue in a fundamental relationship in 
micro- level land-use change studies, the relationship between income and land use: 
Income determines the household’s current land use and, at the same time, this land 
use also influences income levels. Similarly, empirical problems often remain 
unaddressed in the analysis of the effects of infrastructure development and 
increasing market integration that some studies also deem to be an important driver 
of land-use change. More and better infrastructure can be the result of increasing 
demand caused by cash crop adoption and economic growth, but it can also 
exogenously drive market integration. The literature too often assumes a one-
directional causal relationship and ignores that infrastructure development may well 
be driven by the same rural development policy, for example one aimed at cash crop 
expansion. 
Complex causal relationships hence complicate the empirical analyses and so do 
non-linear relationships as well as interactions between different drivers that are 
also frequently observed. One example for an important non-linearity is the inverse 
U-shaped relationship between market access and agricultural expansion that has 




been shown in a number of studies: Improved market access first leads to 
agricultural expansion, but, in a second stage, households start to invest in off-farm 
activities and reduce the pressure on forests. Important interactions are at work 
between factor (land, labor and capital) markets and household characteristics. 
Factor markets in developing countries tend to be imperfect, which implies that 
households’ initial factor endowments, for example initial wealth or household 
labor, may play an important role in explaining land-use and management choices. 
Factor market imperfection and limited household endowments may then simply 
constrain expansion. However, as the same market imperfections may lead to 
substitution effects, they may also promote land-intensive agricultural strategies. In 
the case of capital, these ambiguities are reinforced by the fact that capital does not 
only finance initial investment costs but also current costs for fertilizer and other 
inputs. This implies that access to capital may facilitate agricultural expansions 
initially and saving land later. These mechanisms are similar for technology 
adoption. New technologies, for example the introduction of a new crop, are often 
found to lead to agricultural expansion. Yet, they may also lead to land savings, 
conditional on the substitutability between input factors and possible interaction 
with household endowments and factor market conditions. In terms of household-
level determinants of technology adoption, the literature has often stressed that 
migrant status tend to be associated with the application of intensive and 
unsustainable agricultural practices. 
In sum, the rich empirical literature that has been reviewed in this study, illustrates 
the complexity of micro-level land-use change processes, in particular the 
interrelationships between household-level characteristics, factor market conditions, 
and land-use change. These are conditioned by institutions and policies. The review 
suggests that market-oriented reforms adopted by many developing countries in the 
1980s and 1990s have had an important role in altering land use. The empirical 
designs of many reviewed studies do not account for the complexity of the land-use 




change processes properly. While the studies have explored some key facets of 
household-level drivers of land-use change, future research would greatly benefit 
from methodological rigor and some more care should be taken when results are 
interpreted as causal relationships. Yet, does it matter if an empirical analysis does 
not pay attention to the fact that income is also determined by land-use change and 
not only vice versa? Yes, it does since the conclusion to be drawn from either finding 
differs dramatically. If income growth causes deforestation, there are good reasons 
to worry since most rural households at forest frontiers are still way below income 
levels that they would consider desirable – and are probably likely to achieve income 
growth at some point in the future. If incomes, however, have in the past grown for 
reasons related to land-use change, for example because of growing a cash crop on 
converted forest, they might in the future grow for different reasons, for example 
because growing economies tend to become more diversified and people engage 
more in non-agricultural activities. 
We want to close by reflecting briefly on some further implications of this review for 
the way forward. To generate evidence from local to global levels, the telecoupling 
framework is a simple but general and common approach to describe the 
interactions different between human-environmental-systems in a globalized world. 
It helps to capture synergies and trade-offs across different scales and systems and 
facilitate global policies to meet relevant socio-economic and environmental 
challenges. The telecoupling framework demands research on integrated systems, 
and more empirical studies building on this concept are desirable. Approaches may 
include both statistical and model-based analyses that combine data from a variety 
of sources, of course still including survey-based information. This should also 
enable researchers to extend the sample sizes and increase the external validity of 
the findings. External validity could also be improved by paying due attention to 
case selection and some more reflection on whether results should be regarded as 
context-specific or generalizable. 




These approaches may include both statistical and model-based analyses that 
combine data from a variety of sources, of course still including survey-based 
information. This should also enable researchers to extend the sample sizes and 
increase the external validity of the findings. External validity could also be 
improved by paying due attention to case selection and some more reflection on 
whether results should be regarded as context-specific or generalizable. 
Recently, the wider literature on land-use change has shifted from exploring the 
determinants of direct human-induced land-use change towards assessing how 
households (and other agents) can cope with the consequences of global 
environmental change; thus land-use change indirectly caused by human activity. 
There are of course important lessons to be drawn from our review for this emerging 
literature, as the reviewed land-use change determinants are closely related to a 
household’s or farmer’s capacity to cope with climate change. Moreover, recent 
studies often extend their analysis to examine also the implications of land-use 
change on livelihoods. The latter trend shows that it is increasingly acknowledged 
that land-use change and household welfare are simultaneously determined. 
Most of the studies focusing on land-specific policies combine satellite images with 
descriptive statistics of field data, which allow first snapshots on economic-
ecological consequences of land-use change on broader scales. However, whether 
these policies are effective over time in actually influencing land-use change 
decisions is still under-researched. A dynamic analysis using panel data on the plot 
or household level would be necessary to assess these policies more rigorously. Also 
impacts of more recent policies, like PES or REDD+, have to be further explored.  
Finally, while our review focused on household-level studies, we were surprised to 
find virtually no study that would have analyzed – at the micro-level – the decisions 
by firms that operate logging and large-scale farming activities. This implies that a 
key (micro-level) actor’s behavior remains unexplored and this omission partly 




explains the lack of studies in Asian contexts, where these players are probably more 
important. 
  




6.6 Appendix  
A questionnaire was constructed to systematically record information from the 91 
studies selected to be included in the review (Table 6.A1). The entries were recorded 
and cross verified by two of the three authors and a research assistant working with 
the authors.  
Table 6.A.1. Review questionnaire 
Question Comments 
Who authored the paper? List authors according to the 
order in the publication 
What are the academic backgrounds of the authors? Here look at the authors 
academic qualifications and 
profiles 
In which (peer-reviewed) journal was the paper 
published? 
  
When was the paper published?   
In which region (tropical or subtropical) was the data 
collected? 
  
What country was the data collected in?   
What type of analysis is conducted in the study?   
What type of methodology is used by the authors in 
the study? 
  
What type of spatial analysis is used in the study?   
What type of data is collected in the study?   
When was the household data used in the study 
collected? 
  
What variable did the authors use to identify land use 
change? 
  
Which explanatory variables are found to have a 
significant impact on the land change variable 
identified in the question above? 
Here only record the variables 
that significantly affect LUC 
What are the main socio-economic drivers of land-
use change identified by the authors? 
Here only include the main 
drivers that are cited by the 
authors and not all significant 
explanatory variables listed in 
question 13. 
How can the drivers identified in questions 14 be 
classified to match our coding scheme? 
Here classify the drivers in 
question 14 into the 7 main 
categories 
  




Table 6.A.2. Categorization of the drivers of land-use change 
Driver reported in studies Category assigned in meta-analysis 
Population density Demography 
Population pressure/growth Demography 
Migration Demography 
Agriculture output prices/Cash cropping Markets 
Agriculture input prices Markets 
Off-farm income/ Off-farm labor/ Off-farm wages Markets 
Hired labor Markets 
Credit (access) Markets 
Farm size Endowments 
Household size Endowments 
Household composition children Endowments 
Household composition gender Endowments 
Household composition labor Endowments 
Household education Endowments 
Social networks Endowments 
Technological progress Technology 
Land property rights Institutions 
Land tenure security Institutions 
(Key) Policies Key Policies 
Market access Infrastructure 
Infrastructure Infrastructure 
 
Table 6.A.3. Categorization of household endowments. 
Reported endowments and 
characteristics in reviewed studies 
Category assigned in meta-analysis 
Farm size Physical capital 
Wealth and capital endowment Physical capital 
Income Physical capital 
Household size Labor 
Household children Labor 
Household labor Labor 
Household education Human capital 
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